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Foreword
We are capable of producing and comprehending utterances that are novel not only in their
phonologic and syntactic forms but also, perhaps most characteristically, in their meanings.
This capacity is largely unique to humans, appears at a particular stage of development, and
may deteriorate following traumata or pathologies that often have neurological origins. It is
therefore a platitude that a mature, normal-functioning brain is necessary for us to possess
meanings and do with them whatever we do in ordinary discourse. What is far less obvious
is how the brain does it, and that is precisely the issue here. This book approaches linguistic
meaning in the human brain in a principled manner, combining modeling tools from formal
logic with experimental techniques from neurophysiology, and using the semantics of tense,
aspect and event structure as a test case.
What principles underlie our ability to code/decode meanings to/from speech signals?
Different answers have been given within different areas of cognitive science. Experimental
work in psychology and neuroscience has found support for such notions as immediacy and
incrementality, which appear descriptively adequate but resist rigorous formalization. Logic
and linguistics, on the other hand, have focused on desiderata for theories of meaning such
as compositionality and monotonicity, which afford precise formal analyses but provide little
empirical coverage as far as language comprehension, as opposed to entailment relations, is
concerned. This seeming trade-off between formal and empirical adequacy makes a shared
framework for the characterization and testing of these principles appear beyond reach. Yet,
it seems reasonable to seek some form of unification of research programs dealing with the
same questions, albeit from different perspectives. For that purpose, one needs a pluralistic
philosophy of science – presented in chapter 1 – which is more concerned with establishing
connections between theories, and making adjustments in each, than with trying to reduce
one theory to another, or even to eliminate one in favor of the other. Logic and neuroscience
are developing accounts of meaning that are legitimate in their own right, and furthermore
their relations fall outside all available schemes for reduction. So, talking of inter-theoretic
bridging instead of reduction makes the task of designing a unified framework for the study
of meaning less daunting. Chapters 2-6 present some modeling and experimental work that
exemplifies a viable integrative methodology.
The first part of the book, ’from semantics to neuroscience’, discusses some ins and outs
of bringing formal semantics – and the principles of compositionality and monotonicity in
particular – to bear on processing data. The motivation for the whole enterprise is presented
in chapter 1, which also anticipates most if not all the empirical issues discussed in the rest
of the book: time and causation in language, the ‘binding problem for semantics’ etc. That
chapter however is chiefly a philosophical and methodological one, in that it pins down and
discusses choices that have led to the current state of separation of disciplines investigating
meaning: the competence/performance distinction, the use of intuitions in linguistics and
psycholinguistics etc. We argue that formal semantics can constrain predictions in language
processing research, and that processing data can be used to correct semantic theories. This
two-way route from semantics to neuroscience is usually seen as a dead end, and charges of
’psychologism’, ’categorial errors’ and the like are sometimes issued. However, David Marr
has shown how optics and solid geometry can be included in a theory of visual processing,
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and much in the same way logic can be part of a theory of meaning processing. Thus, if one
takes formal semantics as a collection of ’computational theories’ in Marr’s sense, one can
ask what their algorithmic and physical implementations look like, and therefore how they
play out in processing reality. As we argued above, this has little to do with psychologism,
eliminativism, and reductionism. Rather, it is an attempt at drawing connections between
whatever approximates – to some reasonable degree of formalization – a theory of meaning
at each level of analysis in Marr’s scheme. Such a connection-drawing exercise is carried out
for monotonicity and compositionality in chapters 2 and 3 respectively. Chapter 2 is more
limited in its scope, as it discusses the processing consequences of monotonicity focusing on
one particular linguistic phenomenon: the imperfective paradox. However, more examples
of non-monotonic discourse processing are provided in chapter 1. Chapter 3 examines the
processing consequences of compositionality using a somewhat broader array of linguistic
and psycholinguistics examples, while keeping tense, aspect and event structure under the
spotlight. In chapters 1-3, immediacy and incrementality are assumed as further constraints
on the scope of simple composition and monotonic inference. Moreover, they are integrated
into discourse semantics in a more radical way than has been previously done, for instance
with the notion of incrementality in DRT.
The second part, ‘the electrophysiology of meaning’, reports three ERP experiments on
discourse comprehension in which predictions and explanations are inspired by the formal
analyses of part 1. These studies are the benchmark test for both the methodology of chapter
1 and the account of meaning in the brain of chapters 1-3. What does the latter look like? We
see discourse processing as highly incremental, opportunistic as it uses first whatever type
of information is available first (immediacy), non-monotonic as it allows the recomputation
of discourse models, and non-compositional in that the sources of input to on-line meaning
composition are not restricted to syntax and the lexicon. Each of the ERP studies reported
in the second part was designed to validate a bit of this view. The first experiment, on tense
violations (chapter 4), presents some ERP evidence for immediacy, and accounts for that in a
constraint-based theory of early stages of semantic processing. The second is an experiment
on aspect processing (chapter 5) in which ERP data are shown that are consistent with the
non-monotonic theory of the imperfective paradox described in chapter 2. The third study,
on complement coercion (chapter 6), presents evidence for enriched semantic composition
in computing event structures. The conclusions look back at the ERP findings in the light
of considerations of processing architecture, add some neural detail to the picture, and lay
down a tentative path for future work.
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Part 1
From semantics to neuroscience

CHAPTER 1
Philosophy and methodology
This chapter is a modified version of G. Baggio, M. van Lambalgen & P. Hagoort. Language, linguistics and cognition.
In R. Kempson & T. Fernando (Eds.), Handbook of Philosophy of Linguistics. Volume 14 of D. Gabbay, P. Thagard & J.H.
Woods (Eds.), Handbook of Philosophy of Science. Elsevier, to appear.
1. Introduction
Experimental research during the last few decades has provided evidence that language is
embedded in a mosaic of cognitive functions. An account of how language interfaces with
memory, perception, action and control is no longer beyond the scope of linguistics, and
can now be seen as part of an explanation of linguistic structure itself. However, although
our view of language has changed, linguistic methodology is lagging behind. This chapter
is a sustained argument for a diversification of the kinds of evidence applicable to linguistic
questions at different levels of theory, and a defense of the role of linguistics in experimental
cognitive science.
1.1. Linguistic methodology and cognitive science. At least two conceptual issues are
raised by current interactions between linguistics and cognitive science. One is whether the
structures and rules described by linguists are cognitively real. There exist several opinions
in this regard, that occupy different positions on the mentalism/anti-mentalism spectrum.
At one extreme is cognitive linguistics [31], endorsing both theoretical and methodological
mentalism. The former is the idea that linguistic forms are related causally and conceptually
to other mental entities. The latter calls for a revision of traditional linguistic methodology,
and emphasizes the role of cognitive data in linguistics. At the opposite side of the spectrum
lies formal semantics which, inspired by Frege’s anti-psychologistic stance on meaning and
thought [60, 125, 15], rejects both versions of mentalism. Somewhere between the two poles
is Chomsky’s [23] theoretical mentalism, which sees linguistic rules as ultimately residing
in the brain of speakers. However, his commitment to the cognitive reality of grammar does
not imply a revision of linguistic methodology, which is maintained in its traditional form
based on native speakers’ intuitions and the competence/performance distinction.
The second problem – partly dependent on the first – is whether experimental data on
language acquisition, comprehension and production have any bearing on linguistic theory.
On this point too, there is no consensus among linguists. The division between competence
and performance has often been used to secure linguistics from experimental evidence of
various sorts [14], while intuitive judgments of native speakers were regarded as the only
type of data relevant for the theory [23]. However, some authors have granted that at least
behavioral data should be allowed to inform competence theories, for instance if the linguist
is studying a language which is not her own native language [128]. Others have proposed
frameworks in which competence can be connected to performance mechanisms [99]. But
while these models account for how competence constrains performance [101], they seem to
overlook the possibility that the reverse is also the case: aspects of linguistic structure may
be the outcome of evolutionary processes leading to an adaptation of the brain to language
use, that is to performance [164]. Generative grammar and formal semantics have regarded
accounts of competence as shielded from data provided by experimental psychology and
neuroscience. A more inclusive attitude has been adopted by psycholinguists and cognitive
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brain scientists, driven by an increasing demand of theories and models that would account
for their data [16, 46, 64, 139, 140]. But despite these attempts, a methodological framework
relating linguistics, language processing and low-level neural models is still missing.
1.2. Language, lower and higher cognition. Most theories in cognitive linguistics and
neuroscience regard language as grounded in perception and action. For instance, cognitive
semanticists have proposed that the meanings of concrete nouns stored in memory include
stereotyped visual-geometric representations of the entities they refer to [97]. Analogously,
representations of action verbs might embrace aspects of the relevant motor programs [70].
It has also been suggested that the building blocks of semantics like the predicate-argument
structure originate in the functional and anatomical organization of the visual and auditory
systems [94]. Experimental work in cognitive neuroscience indicates that language has ties
with the sensory-motor systems, but methodology, specific data points and accounts of how
exactly language connects to ’lower’ cognition are still debated [168, 167, 169, 51, 86, 95, 156,
200, 199]. The interested reader may want to follow further these references: in this chapter
we will focus on language and ’higher’ cognitive domains such as planning and reasoning.
A motivation for this choice is that planning and reasoning shed light on the computation
of complex linguistic structures, which is where language really comes into its own, whereas
looking at the interactions between language and the sensory-motor systems gives us more
insights into representations and processes at the lexical level.
It has been proposed that the recursive organization of plans supplies a mechanism for
combinatory operations in grammar [191], and the goal-directed nature of planned actions
constrains cognitive constructions of time, causality and events, with consequences for the
semantics of tense, aspect and modality [191, 212]. Planning might as well be implicated in
the production and comprehension of discourses. Language processing requires adjusting
the current discourse model incrementally given the input. If further information counters
earlier commitments or expectations, a recomputation of the initial discourse model may be
necessary to avoid inconsistencies. This process is best accounted for by the non-monotonic
logic underlying planning, and more generally executive function, where the chosen action
sequence may be readjusted when obstacles are encountered along the way.
On a par with planning, reasoning is of special interest in this chapter. Some have seen
non domain-specific thought and reasoning as the most notable among the cognitive skills
subserved by language [18, 19]. This suggestion is sometimes implicit in logical approaches
to language since Boole [9, Ch. 2, p. 24] and bears some resemblance to the psycholinguistic
notion that reasoning follows and builds upon interpretation [105, 187]. In this perspective,
interpretation equals reading off of logical (often classical) form from a sentence’s surface
structure for subsequent elaboration involving inference. So there is a one-way dependency
of reasoning from interpretation: interpretation supports reasoning, though not vice versa.
Others have seen the relation between interpretation and inference as based on a two-way
interaction [194]: reasoning is involved in computing a model of what is said and in deriving
conclusions from it. Human communication is thus regarded as the foremost skill enabled
by language, and reasoning serves the purpose of coordinating different interpretations of
an utterance or different situation models across speakers [193].
2. Linguistics and cognitive data
2.1. A methodological paradox. It is often said that the relations between cognitive
science and linguistics began to be fully appreciated only after the publication of Chomsky’s
early writings, and in particular Aspects of the Theory of Syntax in 1965. This is certainly true
if what is at stake is theoretical mentalism – the notion that linguistic theory deals ultimately
with a system of representations and rules in the speaker’s mind/brain. However, although
this particular form of theoretical mentalism encourages and to some extent requires some
interaction between the two disciplines, the choice of regarding the study of competence
as in principle indifferent to the results of experimental research had the opposite effect,
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that of separating theories of meaning and grammar from models of language processing.
Many would agree that the contacts between linguistics and cognitive psychology have
not been as deep and systematic as they could have been, had various obstacles to fruitful
interaction been removed. What is more difficult to appreciate is the existence of a tension
in the very foundation of generative grammar, and the inhibiting effect it had on the growth
of linguistics within cognitive science. Before we move on, it may be worth recovering the
terms of this ‘paradox’ directly from Chomsky’s text.1
One side of the dilemma is represented by a number of remarks contained in §1 of the
first chapter of Aspects, where Chomsky writes:
We thus must make a fundamental distinction between competence (the speaker-
hearer’s knowledge of his language) and performance (the actual use of language
in concrete situations). Only under [. . . ] idealization [. . . ] is performance a di-
rect reflection of competence. In actual fact, it obviously could not directly reflect
competence. A record of natural speech will show numerous false starts, devia-
tions from rules, changes of plan in mid-course, and so on. The problem for the
linguist, as well as for the child learning the language, is to determine from the
data of performance the underlying system of rules that has been mastered by the
speaker-hearer and that he puts to use in actual performance. Hence, in the tech-
nical sense, linguistic theory is mentalistic, since it is concerned with discovering
a mental reality underlying actual behavior. [23, p. 4]
The task of the linguist is that of providing an account of competence based on performance
data, that is on normalized records of linguistic behavior. Chomsky grants that performance
data are essential to linguistic theorizing. But the issue to be settled, which in fact lies at the
heart of the paradox, is exactly what counts as linguistic behavior, or more precisely what
kind of performance data can form the empirical basis of competence theories. Generative
linguists would contend that it was never a tenet of their research program to admit data
other than native speakers’ intuitions, but this is not what Chomsky’s remarks suggest. On
the contrary, he seems to admit a variety of data types:
Mentalistic linguistics is simply theoretical linguistics that uses performance as
data (along with other data, for example, the data provided by introspection) for
the determination of competence, the latter being taken as the primary object of
its investigations. [23, p. 193]
The evidential base of linguistics consists of introspective judgments and performance data,
that Chomsky mentions here as if they were in an important sense different from intuitions.
Moreover, intuitions are alluded to here as a subsidiary source of evidence, and as part of a
larger class of data types. The question is precisely what should be considered performance
data. Is elicited and experimentally controlled behavior allowed to exert some influence on
accounts of competence? There are reasons to believe that Chomsky would have answered
”yes”, the most important of which has to do with his remarks on the limits of intuitions.
In 1955, in The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory [21] he wrote:
If one of the basic undefined terms of linguistic theory is ‘intuition’, and if we
define phonemes in this theory as elements which our intuition perceives in a
language, then the notion of phoneme is as clear and precise as is ‘intuition’.
[...] It should be clear, then, why the linguist interested in constructing a general
theory of linguistic structure, in justifying given grammars or (to put the matter
in its more usual form) in constructing procedures of analysis should try to avoid
such notions as ‘intuition’. [21, pp. 86-87]
An even more explicit position was expressed in the 1957 book Syntactic Structures, where
Chomsky suggests that hypotheses on properties of linguistic strings and their constituents
should be evaluated on the basis of controlled operational tests. Relying on native speaker’s
judgments or intuitions, he writes,
1Over the years Chomsky has entertained different opinions on these issues. Here we choose to focus on those
expressed in Aspects of the Theory of Syntax [23] because these have probably been the most influential. So we identify
Chomsky with this particular text rather than with the actual linguist.
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amounts to asking the informant to do the linguist’s work; it replaces an opera-
tional test of behavior (such as the pair test) by an informant’s judgment about his
behavior. The operational tests for linguistic notions may require the informant
to respond, but not to express his opinion about his behavior, his judgment about
synonymy, about phonemic distinctness, etc. The informant’s opinions may be
based on all sorts of irrelevant factors. This is an important distinction that must
be carefully observed if the operational basis for grammar is not to be trivialized.
[22, pp. 8-9]2
Controlled operational tests are thus necessary in order to overcome the difficulties arising
from relying exclusively on native speakers’ intuitions. This implies that introspective data
are dismissed as an inadequate source of evidence for linguistic theory. So here is one horn
of the dilemma: mentalistic linguistics rejects speakers’ intuitions and requires performance
data, including controlled behavioral tests, to constrain the theory of competence.
The other side of the paradox is represented by a series of remarks in §4 of chapter 1 of
Aspects, where Chomsky questions the nature of the empirical basis of competence theories:
There is, first of all, the question of how one is to obtain information about the
speaker-hearer’s competence, about his knowledge of the language. Like most
facts of interest and importance, this is neither presented for direct observation
nor extractable from data by inductive procedures of any known sort. Clearly, the
actual data of linguistic performance will provide much evidence for determining
the correctness of hypotheses about underlying linguistic structure, along with
introspective reports (by the native speaker, or the linguist who has learned the
language). [23, p. 18]
Experimental research based on controlled observation and statistical inference is seen as
providing facts of no ‘interest and importance’, and rejected as ineffective for the purposes
of the theory of competence. Interestingly, intuitions are treated as they were on a par with
performance data. Not for long, however, because Chomsky a few paragraphs later takes
an important step away from psychology:
The critical problem for grammatical theory today is not a paucity of evidence
but rather the inadequacy of present theories of language to account for masses
of evidence that are hardly open to serious question. The problem for the gram-
marian is to construct a description and, where possible, an explanation for the
enormous mass of unquestionable data concerning the linguistic intuition of the
native speaker (often, himself); the problem for one concerned with operational
procedures is to develop tests that give the correct results and make the relevant
distinctions. [. . . ] We may hope that these efforts will converge, but they must
obviously converge on the tacit knowledge of the native speaker if they are to be
of any significance. [23, pp. 19-20]
The door that seemed to be open for controlled experimentation is now closed. The range of
data that could affect the theory of competence has been narrowed down to intuitions, and
more specifically to those of the linguist. The task of experimental research, Chomsky says,
is to develop tests that would ultimately align with introspective data. The convergence of
linguistics and psychology is thus projected forward in time as a desirable outcome not of
the joining of efforts, but of their strict segregation. Not only are linguistics and psychology
now regarded as separate enterprises, but psychology is also required – in order to meet a
standard of explanatory adequacy – to provide results that are consistent with the theory of
competence as based on the linguist’s intuitions.
We should like to note that, whatever the methodological choices made by linguists,
this seems an unacceptable requirement for psycholinguists and neuroscientists alike, who
should instead be aided to deliver reliable data, no matter which theory or whose intuitions
2The circularity which Chomsky is alluding to here is also mentioned by Quine in his 1970 paper on linguistic
methodology: “We are looking for a criterion of what to count as the real or proper grammar, as over against an
extensionally equivalent counterfeit. [. . . ] And now the test suggested is that we ask the native the very question we
do not understand ourselves: the very question for which we ourselves are seeking a test. We are moving in an oddly
warped circle.” [174, p. 392].
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are eventually supported. If experimental research provides data which do not align with
the introspective judgments of linguists or other native speakers, then, following common
practice in science, there seems to be no other choice than to accept empirical evidence and
reject intuitions. What is perhaps most disturbing is Chomsky’s disregard toward any form
of experimental testing in linguistics:
In any event, at a given stage of investigation, one whose concern is for in-
sight and understanding (rather than for objectivity as a goal in itself) must ask
whether or to what extent a wider range and more exact description of phenom-
ena is relevant to solving the problems that he faces. In linguistics, it seems to me
that sharpening of the data by more objective tests is a matter of small importance
for the problems at hand. [23, p. 20]
The second horn of the dilemma is the following: linguistic theory is based primarily on the
intuitions of native speakers, and does not require controlled experimentation to constrain
accounts of competence.
2.2. The vagaries of intuition. For some linguists, in particular in generative grammar
and formal semantics, the intuitions of native speakers constitute the empirical basis of the
theory of competence. But the prominent place assigned to intuitions by modern linguistic
methodology seems at odds with the principles of mentalism. If competence is a system of
rules and structures realized in the speaker’s brain, and if behavior reflects the functioning
of such system, then a linguist constructing a competence theory – and perhaps analogously
a child learning a language – must solve an ‘inverse problem’, that of inferring the rules of
competence from observable performance. In order to solve this problem, the linguist might
need to take into account a broad range of data. So any reliable physiological or behavioral
measure of performance should, at least in principle, be allowed to contribute to the theory
of competence. The question is where should one draw a line between relevant (intuitions?)
and irrelevant (neurophysiology?) data, and why. Until convincing answers are found, the
more comprehensive one’s methodological framework, the better. Here is why mentalism
is to be preferred over traditional philosophies of language.
The conflict with mentalism is however not the only problem raised by introspective
judgments. Another source of concern is Chomsky’s claim that intuitions are not only the
starting point of linguistic theorizing, but also the standard to which any grammar should
conform:
A grammar can be regarded as a theory of language; it is descriptively adequate
to the extent that it correctly describes the intrinsic competence of the idealized
native speaker. The structural descriptions assigned to sentences by the gram-
mar, the distinctions that it makes between well-formed and deviant, and so on,
must, for descriptive adequacy, correspond to the linguistic intuition of the native
speaker (whether or not he may be immediately aware of this) in a substantial
and significant class of crucial cases. [23, p. 24]
Supposing the tension with mentalism were relieved, allowing other data types to influence
competence models, and introspective judgments were used only at the outset of linguistic
inquiry, intuitions would still pose a number of serious methodological problems. It is not
just the role of intuitions in linguistic theorizing that has to be put under scrutiny, but also
the very claim that intuitions offer a vantage point on tacit knowledge.
2.2.1. Intuitions in linguistics. If the system of linguistic rules in a speaker’s brain really
is “deeply unconscious and largely unavailable to introspection” [100, p. 652], one should
see discrepancies between overt linguistic behavior, that reflects ‘unconscious’ competence
rules, and the intuitions or beliefs that speakers have about these rules. This notion has been
substantiated by Labov [119], who collected evidence on a wide variety of cases in regional
American English. One example is the positive use of ‘anymore’ in various sections of the
Philadelphia white community, meaning that a situation which was not true some time in
the past is now true, roughly equivalent to ‘nowadays’:
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(1) Do you know what’s a lousy show anymore? Johnny Carson.
Labov interviewed twelve speakers who used the adverb freely and consistently with its
vernacular meaning exemplified in (1). He reported a majority of negative responses when
they were asked whether a sentence like (1) is acceptable, and surprisingly weak intuitions
on what the expression signifies in their own dialect, which contexts are appropriate for its
use, and what inferences can be drawn from its occurrences.
There are several other arguments for the unreliability of intuitions in linguistics. For
instance, Marantz [128] has observed that grammaticality is a technical term defined within
linguistic theories: a sound/meaning pair is grammatical or well-formed with respect to a
grammar if and only if that grammar generates or assigns a structural description to the pair
such that all relevant grammaticality or well-formedness constraints can be satisfied. In the
quote from Aspects above, Chomsky takes for granted that structural descriptions assigned
by some grammar to sentences can be checked for correspondence against native speakers’
judgments. However, native speakers of a language can hardly be said to have intuitions of
grammaticality in the technical sense, nor do they grasp other properties of strings as they
are defined within a formal grammar. Moreover, naı¨ve language users might conflate into
the notion of grammaticality different morpho-syntactic, semantic and pragmatic criteria of
felicitousness, and they might do so in a way that is beyond control for the linguist. Similar
observations would also apply to intuitive judgments of synonymy or truth-conditions, as
opposed to formal definitions within a semantic theory.
As a way out, one might argue that a caveat only applies to naı¨ve informants, and that
the intuitions of linguists, immune to pre-theoretical notions of grammaticality, synonymy,
and the like, are in fact reliable [38]. Relevant to this issue, is an experiment by Levelt [123]
in which the intuitions of twenty-four trained linguists were investigated. Participants were
presented with fourteen examples from their own field’s literature, among which:
(2) a. No American, who was wise, remained in the country.
b. The giving of the lecture by the man who arrived yesterday assisted us.
None of the linguists rated correctly the ungrammatical sentence (2a), and sixteen judged
the well-formed sentence (2b) as ungrammatical. Ungrammatical sentences had less chance
of being judged ungrammatical than grammatical items. Levelt warns against taking these
results too seriously, but he observes with some reason that “they are sufficiently disturbing
to caution against present day uses of intuition” [123, p. 25].
We could go on providing other examples of the problems that might arise with the use
of introspective reports in the analysis of specific natural language sentences. However, we
should now like to take a different approach, considering an argument targeted at the very
nature and scope of intuitions. The argument, introduced and discussed by Hintikka [90],
starts with the observation that intuitions of grammaticality, synonymy etc. always relate to
particular sentences (i.e. tokens), and not to entire classes of items or the common syntactic
or semantic structure they share (i.e. types). Hintikka writes that
intuition, like sense perception, always deals with particular cases, however rep-
resentative. [. . . ] But if so, intuition alone cannot yield the general truths: for
instance, general theories for which a scientist and a philosopher is presumably
searching. Some kind of generalizing process will be needed, be it inductive in-
ference, abduction, or a lucky guess. The intuitions [Chomsky] recommended
linguists to start from were intuitions concerning the grammaticality of particu-
lar strings of symbols, not concerning general rules of grammar. [90, p. 137-138]
Against Hintikka’s claim, one may argue that also paradigmatic variation is a proper object
of intuition. The linguist would then be able to generalize over the properties of linguistic
structures by constructing a paradigmatic set of sentences exhibiting those properties. This
view however can be countered with the observation that the supposed ‘intuitions’ about
paradigmatic cases are rather more similar to theory-laden hypotheses than to introspective
judgments of naı¨ve informants. The linguist, in order to construct such paradigmatic items,
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has to be able to control all irrelevant variables and systematically manipulate the factors of
interest. This, in turn, requires that the linguist knows details of the grammar or the logical
structure of the language which seem inaccessible to naı¨ve speakers. It is this knowledge,
which is often drawn from existing theories, that allows the linguist to have intuitions about
linguistic structure. And this leads us to Hintikka’s key statement, that competence theories
are not equipped with built-in devices for deriving abstract grammatical or semantic forms
from particular linguistic samples. That is,
reliance on generalization from particular cases is foreign to the methodological
spirit of modern science, which originated by looking for dependencies of differ-
ent factors in instructive particular cases (often in controlled experimental situa-
tions), and by studying these dependences by the same mathematical means as
a mathematician uses in studying the interdependencies of different ingredients
of geometrical figures in analytic geometry. [. . . ] transformational grammarians
and other contemporary linguists would do a much better job if, instead of rely-
ing on our intuitions about isolated examples, they tried to vary systematically
suitable ingredients in some sample sentence and observed how our ‘intuitions’
change as a consequence. Now we can see why such systematic variation is a
way of persuading our intuitions to yield general truths (dependence relations)
rather than particular cases. [90, p. 135]
If intuitions are to serve as a reliable starting point in linguistic inquiry, then they should
be proved to have systematic properties. Observing patterns of covariation of introspective
judgments and other factors – such as the structure, the content, the context of occurrence
of the sentence, the attitude of the speaker, and so on – would make the particular examples
under consideration instructive and thus effective as part of the empirical basis of linguistic
theories. The important consequence is that, in order to systematically alter the ingredients
of sample sentences, the linguist should be able to control these factors in a manner similar
to the manipulation of experimental variables in laboratory research. The solution offered
by Hintikka to the problem of intuitions points in the direction of infusing linguistic practice
with psychological experimentation. The linguist would as usual start from intuitions, but only
the systematic aspects of these as revealed by experimentation, and if necessary statistical
tests, would be preserved and transferred into the theory (see [14, pp. 158-163] for a similar
position).3 Hintikka offers an intriguing example, in which one tries to define the meaning
of an expression in Montague grammar on the basis of systematic dependencies between
subjects’ intuitions and the contexts of occurrence of the expression of interest. In particular,
he writes, if the notion of possible world is allowed in the theory,
then there is, in principle, no definite limit as to how far your experimentation
(construction of ever new situations) can carry you in determining the class of
scenarios in which the word does or does not apply. And such a determination
will, at least for a Montagovian semanticist, determine the meaning of the word.
Indeed, in Montague semantics, the meaning of a term is the function that maps
possible worlds on references (extensions) of the appropriate logical type (cate-
gory). And such functions can, in principle, be identified even more and more
fully by systematic experimentation with the references that a person assigns to
his terms in different actual or imagined scenarios. [90, p. 146]4
However, it may be a fair point in favor of introspective judgments in a broader sense to add
that Hintikka considers thought experiments on a par with genuine experimentation [90,
3Bunge [14, p. 168] pinpoints several methodological choices in generative linguistics which seem to diminish
its relevance in empirical science, such as the “conduct of linguistic inquiry in total independence from neuroscience,
social science, and even scientific psychology” and “a heavy reliance on intuition”. We too consider these as obstacles
to understanding language, but we disagree with the judgment that Bunge formulates based on these remarks – that
modern linguistics is (or has been) pseudo-scientific.
4Although we consider Hintikka’s an informative example of linguistic theorizing based on covariation patterns
of contextual factors and intuitions, we must also add that there are serious problems with the notion of meaning (that
is, Frege’s Sinn) in Montague semantics. For instance, since the theory allows for infinitely many possible worlds, it
becomes unclear whether we can even approximate the meaning of an expression using Hintikka’s method.
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p. 146]. Thus, instead of eliciting overt responses from subjects in a number of conditions,
the experimenter imagines herself in such situations. If the relevant variables are controlled
with as much care as one would exercise in an experimental setting, introspection can reveal
systematic aspects of language use, and thus contribute to theories of competence.
Hintikka’s argument can be made more explicit with reference to a number of studies
investigating the role of the most important of his ‘suitable ingredients’ – context. Linguistic
and psycholinguistic research has demonstrated that the context in which a sentence occurs
can affect judgments of acceptability. Bolinger [8] reported that sentences, which speakers
judge as semantically implausible when presented in isolation, are regarded as acceptable
when embedded in context. Consider the following examples:
(3) a. It wasn’t dark enough to see.
b. I’m the soup.
These sentences are typically judged as semantically deviant, although for different reasons:
(3a) because one normally needs light in order to see, and (3b) because the predicate ‘being
a soup’ cannot be applied to a human being. Now, consider the same sentences embedded
in a suitable discourse context, with (4b) being spoken at a cashier’s counter in a restaurant:
(4) a. I couldn’t tell whether Venus was above the horizon. It wasn’t dark enough to
see.
b. You’ve got us confused: you’re charging me for the noon special. The man in
front of me was the noon special. I’m the soup.
Examples (3) in an appropriate context seem perfectly acceptable. Because context has such
marked effects on intuitions, linguistic theory, if it has to rely on introspective judgments,
should explicitly take into account this fact. Mutatis mutandis, a similar observation applies
to experimental research on language comprehension and production.
2.2.2. Intuitions in psycholinguistics. The appeal to intuitions was not an explicit choice
of methodology in psycholinguistics and the cognitive neuroscience of language. In fact, the
method of introspection was discarded in scientific psychology after its failures in the 19th
century. However, it is adopted in language processing research as a means of establishing
differences between sentence types to be used as stimuli in actual experiments. The typical
procedure for setting up a language processing study is to start with a few sample sentences
differing with respect to some linguistic feature, the assessment of which is initially left to
the intuitions of the experimenter. For instance, let us consider one of the first ERP studies
on syntactic constraint violations, by Osterhout and Holcomb [151]. Here the starting point
is a pair – or a relatively small set of pairs – of sentences containing either an intransitive
(5a) or a transitive (5b) verb, using a direct object construction:
(5) a. The woman struggled to prepare the meal.
b. The woman persuaded to answer the door.
Up to this stage, the methodology is by and large the same as that of the linguist. However,
while the latter would then proceed with, say, formalizing the requirements of intransitive
and transitive verbs with respect to direct objects, the psycholinguist, to make sure there
is sufficient statistical power to test her processing hypotheses in a dedicated experiment,
would have to construct a large set of sentences with the same structure and properties of
(5a-b). In the next step, the sentences would be presented to subjects while the dependent
variables of interest are measured, which in the study of Osterhout and Holcomb were ERPs
and grammaticality ratings. Grammatical sentences like (5a) were judged to be acceptable
in 95% of the cases, and supposedly ungrammatical items like (5b) in 9% of the cases. One
may argue, as an academic exercise towards an explanation of the 9% figure, that (5b) does
have contexts in which it is both grammatical and semantically acceptable, for instance if it
is interpreted as a reduced relative clause (‘The woman who was persuaded to answer the
door’), and is uttered as an answer to a who question, as in the following dialogue:
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(6) A: Who stumbled on the carpet in the hallway?
B: The woman persuaded to answer the door.
We have already encountered this phenomenon discussing Bolinger’s examples above. In
a context such as (6), Osterhout and Holcomb’s ungrammatical sentence becomes perfectly
admissible. Acceptability judgments, therefore, depend on the range of uses (or contexts of
use) readers are willing to consider. In this sense, subjects’ intuitions may differ from those
of the experimenter. For example, a linguist would remind us that ‘The woman persuaded
to answer the door’ is an NP, and not a sentence. But what prevents naı¨ve language users
from including well-formed NPs into their notion of ’sentence’? Here the answer can only
be the linguist’s own notion of ‘sentence’. This also suggests that discrepancies between the
intuitions of naı¨ve informants and trained scientists may be more important than isolated
linguists’ intuitions when it comes to fully explaining a data set.
2.3. Beyond competence and performance. Intuitions are but one of the many sources
of concern for a thoroughly mentalistic approach to language. As Jackendoff [99, p. 29] has
pointed out, there is a conflict, which roughly coincides with the dilemma as we described
it above, between Chomsky’s theoretical mentalism and traditional linguistic methodology
as based on intuitions and on the competence/performance distinction. Mentalism requires
at least a revision of that distinction. Jackendoff [99] has addressed this issue, trying to find
a more accommodating formulation which allows a natural interplay of linguistics and the
cognitive sciences:
Chomsky views competence as an idealization abstracted away from the full
range of linguistic behavior. As such, it deserves as much consideration as any
idealization in science: if it yields interesting generalizations it is worthwhile.
Still, one can make a distinction between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ idealizations. A ‘soft’
idealization is acknowledged to be a matter of convenience, and one hopes even-
tually to find a natural way to re-integrate excluded factors. A standard example
is the fiction of a frictionless plane in physics, which yields important general-
izations about forces and energy. But one aspires eventually to go beyond the
idealization and integrate friction into the picture. By contrast, a ‘hard’ ideal-
ization denies the need to go beyond itself; in the end it cuts itself off from the
possibility of integration into a larger context.
It is my unfortunate impression that, over the years, Chomsky’s articulation of
the competence/performance distinction has moved from relatively soft [. . . ] to
considerably harder. [99, p. 33]
Jackendoff suggests we adopt a ‘soft’ competence/performance distinction, adding a third
component to the framework [99]. The theory of competence is seen as the characterization
of phonologic, syntactic and semantic data structures as they are processed and stored in the
brain of speakers during language acquisition. The theory of performance is the description
of the actual occurrence of such data structures in language comprehension and production.
The theory of neural instantiation is an account in terms of brain structures and processes
of competence and performance. Jackendoff provides an architecture in which competence
components (phonology, syntax and semantics, plus interface rules) interact in a manner
that is consistent with the incrementality and the ‘opportunism’ (his label for immediacy) of
language processing [101]. However, to solve the dilemma described above, it is not enough
to show that competence determines the state-space available to users of a language during
performance [99, p. 56]. The issue is, rather, whether there is interplay between competence
and performance, that is – turning Jackendoff’s tag line upside down – whether the logic of
processing dictates the logic of competence, and to what extent.
As we saw above, in his early writings Chomsky claimed that theories of competence
have nothing to learn from processing data [23]. Minimalists have suggested that syntax is
adapted to the requirements holding at the interface with other cognitive modules, such as
the sensory-motor and conceptual systems. However, they deny what functionalists on the
contrary accept, namely that syntax is well-designed for use [24, 87, 54]. Evidence against
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adaptation to performance is provided, according to minimalists, by memory limitations,
constructions such as garden-path and center embedding sentences, and so forth. Here two
remarks are in order. The first is that such phenomena do not constitute evidence against
adaptation per se, but rather (if anything like that is possible) against ‘perfect’ adaptation.
Minimalists seem to commit what optimality theorists have called the ‘fallacy of perfection’
[135], consisting in confusing optimal outcomes, which are the result of equilibria between
different variables, with best possible outcomes for just a subset of the factors involved, for
instance the absence of unstable or ambiguous constructions (see [164] for discussion). The
second remark is that, even if we assume that competence is neither perfectly nor optimally
adapted to use, it still seems conceivable that performance constraints shaped competence
rules. Therefore, the problem is not whether language is an adaptation – that some traits of
competence reflect the outcomes of adaptive evolutionary processes acting on actual brain
systems, including adaptation to communication needs, seems to be a widely accepted view
[87, 164, 54]. The problem is rather: (how) can we construct a methodological framework in
which it is possible to determine what aspects of competence can be explained adaptively?
The reason why generative linguistics does not seem capable of addressing this issue
is, in our opinion, to be attributed more to how performance is defined than to a rigid view
of the competence/performance distinction. Jackendoff [99, p. 30] rightly observes that in
Chomsky’s original proposal a large and heterogeneous set of phenomena were collapsed
into ‘performance’: errors, shifts of attention, memory limitations, processing mechanisms,
and so on. Only a very superficial assessment of the factors involved in language use could
justify the notion that a single, relatively compact theory of performance could account for
all those phenomena. It seems more reasonable to assume that different theories, developed
using different analytical approaches, are necessary to understand how language interacts
with memory and attention, how errors of different type and origin are produced (for also
language disorders give rise to performance failures), and so on. We agree with Jackendoff
on the characterization of competence and neural implementation, but we believe a more
appropriate intermediate level should be chosen.
2.4. Marr’s three-level scheme as applied to language. Jackendoff’s updated view of
the competence/performance distinction as a soft methodological separation, plus a theory
of neural realization, resembles Marr’s [131] tripartite scheme for the analysis of cognitive
systems [189]. Marr suggested that cognitive processes should be modeled at three, nearly
independent levels of analysis: a computational level (what is computed?), an algorithmic
level (how is computation carried out?), and a level of physical implementation (what are
the properties of the real machines that can execute the algorithms?). From this perspective,
Jackendoff’s trajectory away from Chomsky appears incomplete. So it may be worth asking
what are the advantages of taking one step further: replacing the competence/performance
distinction with Marr’s scheme.
An important consequence of this choice is that performance theory is now seen as an
intermediate level of analysis at which the algorithms and memory mechanisms supporting
specific linguistic computations are described. That might seem a rather abrupt move, as it
restricts the scope of performance to algorithms, and thereby leaves aside a large number of
phenomena which, some might suggest, cannot be adequately treated in algorithmic terms.
For instance, conscious inner speech is an important function of language [18, 19], and one
in which there seems to be no definite input-output mapping involved. On the other hand,
for those phenomena that are best treated as structured input-output processes, for example
language production and comprehension, Marr’s framework allows competence theories,
if properly construed, to be investigated as part of actual information processing systems.
Applications of this idea to semantics will be shown below and in chapters 2-3.
Does our appeal to Marr’s three-level scheme solve the problems associated with the
competence/performance distinction? It seems it does, because the variety of phenomena
that were collapsed into performance can now be understood in their distinctive features.
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For instance, working memory as involved in a given task can be examined at the level of
algorithms. The algorithmic analysis may suggest a description of the memory architecture
and the memory resources required by the system, and this constitutes a first step toward
an explanation in neural terms. Conversely, memory organization constrains the classes of
algorithms that can be computed by that machine, and the type of data structures that the
computational theory can assume. An example of bottom-up adjustment is Yngve’s [223]
explanation of the dominance of right-branching over left-branching and center-embedding
structures. Another example are ‘minimal models’ of discourse, as we shall see later.
Let us now apply this tentative methodological sketch to the semantics of tense, aspect
and event structure. Our goal is to devise semantic analyses that are formally specified and
cognitively motivated, that is, highlighting connections between the meanings of temporal
expressions, planning and reasoning. The semantic analyses should also be algorithmically
explicit, such that processing predictions, or general constraints on processing architecture,
can be formulated. We hope to show that our theory of tense, aspect, and event structure not
only meets these requirements, but can also be used to provide alternative explanations of
existing experimental data on language comprehension. In chapters 2-6, this approach will
be applied in more detail to other linguistic phenomena. Moreover, our own experimental
data will be collected and used to test the processing hypotheses suggested by the semantic
theory. The last part of this chapter puts our enterprise into a wider neuroscience-oriented
perspective, introducing the ‘binding problem for semantics’.
3. Planning, reasoning, meaning
3.1. The cognitive substrates of tense and aspect. We see it as the essential purpose of
tense and aspect to facilitate the computation of event structure as described in a narrative.
One consequence of this characterization is that, contrary to what generative and formal
semantic approaches maintain, it is not very useful to study tense and aspect at the sentence
level only. Tense, aspect and event structure really come into their own only at the discourse
level [26, 27]. Tense and aspect, however, cannot by themselves determine event structure,
and must recruit world knowledge. Examples (7a-c) will make clear what we have in mind.
French has several past tenses (Passe´ Simple, Imparfait, Passe´ Compose´), which differ
in their aspectual contributions. The following mini-discourses in French all consist of one
sentence in the Imparfait and one in the Passe´ Simple. However, the structure of the set of
events differs in each case.
(7) a. Il faisait chaud. Jean oˆta sa veste. (Imp, PS)
It was hot. Jean took off his sweater.
b. Jean attrapa une contravention. Il roulait trop vite. (PS, Imp)
Jean got a ticket. He was driving too fast.
c. Jean appuya sur l’interrupteur. La lumie`re l’e´blouissait. (PS, Imp)
Jean pushed the button. The light blinded him.
In the first example, the Imp-sentence describes the background against which the event
described by the PS-sentence occurs. In the second example, the PS-event terminates the
Imp-event, whereas in the third one the relation is rather one of initiation. These discourses
indicate that world knowledge in the form of knowledge of causal relations is an essential
ingredient in determining event structure. This knowledge is mostly applied automatically,
but may also be consciously recruited if the automatic processing leaves the event structure
underdetermined. It is the task of cognitive science to determine what this algorithm looks
like, and how it is actually implemented. The prominent role of causal relationships is (7a-c)
suggests a direction in which to look for that algorithm.
3.2. Planning, causality and the ordering of events. Stated bluntly, our hypothesis is:
The ability to automatically derive the discourse model determined by a
narrative is subserved by the ability to compute plans to achieve a goal.
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Here we present several converging lines of evidence which lend some plausibility to this
conjecture. Firstly, one distinguishing feature of human cognition is that it is goal-oriented,
with goals that range from very short-term (get a glass of water) to very long-term (having
sufficient income after retirement). In each case, the goal is accompanied by a plan which
produces an ordered collection of actions, be they motor actions or transfers of money to a
special account. The two cases differ in that the former plan is for the most part generated
automatically, whereas the latter may involve a good deal of deliberation. More precisely,
planning consists in
the construction of a sequence5 of actions which will achieve a given
goal, taking into account properties of the world and the agent, and also
events that might occur in the world.
In the literature, there have been numerous attempts to link the language capacity with the
planning capacity. The setting is usually a discussion of the origins of language. Even if it is
granted that some non-human primates have learned a primitive form of language, there is
still a striking difference in language proficiency between chimpanzees and ourselves. It is
still a matter of ongoing debate to determine exactly what this difference consists in. Some
would say that the difference is in the syntax: human syntax is recursive, the chimpanzee’s
syntax (if that is the word) is not. One may then point to an analogy between language and
planning. Language production can be characterized as transforming a semantic structure,
to which the notion of linearity may not be applicable, into linear form, that is an utterance.
Planning also involves linearization, and that is how the language-planning connection is
drawn. An alternative strategy, not inconsistent with the first, is to show that the recursive
structure of syntax is linked to the recursive structure (or hierarchical organization) of plans
[67, 191]. Non-human primates engage in planning for time spans not exceeding 48 hours,
as is known since Kohler’s 1925 observations [113]. This has also been attested in squirrel
monkeys in experiments by McGonigle et al. [138]. So complex planning sets humans apart
from non-human primates, and it probably is one factor in explaining the human linguistic
divergence with respect to other species.
A more direct path between language and planning was investigated experimentally
by Trabasso and Stein [202] in a paper whose title sums up their program: Using goal-plan
knowledge to merge the past with the present and the future in narrating events on-line. Trabasso
and Stein argue that “the plan unites the past (a desired state) with the present (an attempt)
and the future (the attainment of that state)” [202, p. 322], “[c]ausality and planning provide
the medium through which the past is glued to the present and future” [202, p. 347]. They
present the results of a study in which children and adults were asked to narrate a sequence
of 24 scenes in a picture storybook called Frog, where are you?, in which a boy tries to find
his pet frog which has escaped from its jar.6 The drawings depict various failed attempts,
until the boy finds his frog by accident. The aim of the study is to determine what linguistic
devices, in particular temporal expressions, children use to narrate the story as a function
of age. The authors provide some protocols which show a child of age 3 narrating the story
in a tenseless fashion, describing a sequence of objects and actions without relating them to
other objects and actions. None of the encoded actions is relevant to the boy’s ultimate goal.
Temporal sequencing comes at age 4, and now some of the encoded actions are relevant to
the goal. Explicit awareness that a particular action is instrumental towards the goal shows
up at age 5. At age 9, action-goal relationships are marked increasingly, and (normal) adults
structure the narrative completely as a series of failed or successful attempts to reach the
goal. We can see from this that there is some relation between children’s developing sense
of time and their ability to structure the narrative as the execution of a plan toward the goal
of finding the frog: the child of age 3 seems glued to the present; the child of 4 is capable of
5More complex plans are possible which may involve overlapping actions.
6This is a classic experimental paradigm for investigating the acquisition of temporal notions in children. See
Berman and Slobin [6] for methods, results and, last but not least, the frog pictures themselves.
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including causal relations between events, states of mind and actions; these causal relations
implicitly drive the narrative forward; the child of 5 can move from narrating some ongoing
action to mentioning a goal state to be attained in the future and back again. The following
quote suggests that there must be a gradual development of these capabilities:
Inferring goals and plans involves considerable social and personal knowledge
and places heavy demands on a narrator’s working memory. The child who
narrates events needs to attend to and maintain the current event in working
memory; to activate and retrieve prior knowledge relevant to events, either in
general or from earlier parts of the story, in order to interpret and explain the
current event; and to integrate these interpretations into a context within a plan,
all within the limitations of knowledge and working memory. In effect, over time
the child is engaged in dynamic thinking, actively constructing and evaluating
models and hypotheses about what is occurring. In so doing, the child creates
a changing mental model that results in a long-term memory representation of
what has occurred. [202, p. 327]
Working memory is thus essentially involved in this process of discourse integration, and
failures in its operation may show up as deficiencies in the use of temporal expressions.
What is interesting for our purposes is that the ingredients that jointly enable planning
have a prominent role to play in the construction of a discourse model. Take for instance
causality, shown to be involved in the interpretation of (7a-c). Planning essentially requires
knowledge of the causal effects of actions as well as of the causal effects of possible events
in the world. Accordingly, the planning capacity must have devised ways of retrieving such
knowledge from memory. Planning also essentially involves ordering actions with respect
to each other and to events occurring in the world which are not dependent upon the agent.
Furthermore, the resulting structure must be held in memory at least until the desired goal
is attained. The reader can easily envisage this by considering the planning steps that lead
to a pile of pancakes. For instance, causal knowledge dictates that one has to pour oil in the
frying-pan before putting in the batter, and this knowledge has to remain active as long as
one is not finished.
The fundamental logical connection between discourse processing and planning is that
both are non-monotonic. When we plan, deliberately or automatically, we do so in virtue of
our best guess about the world in which we have to execute our plan. We may plan for what
to do if we miss the bus, but we don’t plan for what to do if the bus doesn’t come because
the gravitational constant changes, even though that is a logical possibility. Similarly, the
computation of a discourse structure may be non-monotonic. For instance, the reader who
sees (8a) is likely to infer (that is, to read off from the discourse model) that Bill is no longer
a member, but that implicature can easily be canceled, as in (8b):
(8) a. Bill used to be a member of a subversive organization.
b. Bill used to be a member of a subversive organization, and he still is.
In cognitive terms, planning is part of ‘executive function’, an umbrella term for processes
responsible for higher-level action control which are necessary for maintaining a goal and
achieving it in possibly adverse circumstances. Executive function comprises maintaining
a goal, planning, inhibition, coordination and control of action sequences. Hence our main
hypothesis can be reformulated as follows: several components of executive function are
involved in comprehension and production of tense and aspect. A corollary is that failures
of executive function can show up in deviant use of tense and aspect and in impairments in
processing temporal discourse, for instance in ASD (Autistic Spectrum Disorder), ADHD
(Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, see section 3.2.2), and schizophrenia.
The link between planning and temporal semantics is provided by the notion of goal.
In both comprehension and production, the goal is to introduce the event corresponding to
the tensed VP into the event structure. This goal must have two components:
1. location of event in time;
2. meshing it with other events.
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An example will make this clearer. Consider what goes on in comprehending
(9) Max fell. John pushed him.
On one prominent reading, the event described in the second sentence precedes, indeed
causes, that described in the first sentence. The relevant goals are in this case:
update discourse with past event e1 = fall(m) and fit e1 in context
update discourse with past event e2 = push( j,m) and fit e2 in context
Planning must determine the order of e1 and e2, and to do so the planning system recruits
causal knowledge as well as the principle that causes precede effects.
To give the reader a detailed picture of what goes on in such computations, we have to
introduce some notation, borrowed from the Event Calculus [212], which will also be useful
for our discussion of experiments on language processing and the ‘binding problem’ later
in this chapter. We make a distinction between events (denoted e,e′, ...,e0, ...) and processes
or fluents (denoted f , f ′, ..., f0, ...). We say that events occur or happen at a particular time,
and represent this by the expression Happens(e, t). By contrast, processes do not occur, but
are going on at a particular time, and for this we use the predicate HoldsAt( f , t). Events
and processes can stand in causal relations. For instance, an event may kick off a process:
Initiates(e, f , t); or it may end one: Terminates(e, f , t). We will use these predicates to mean
the causal relation only. It is not implied that e actually occurs. Finally, a useful predicate
is Clipped(s, f , t), which says that between times s and t an event occurs which ends the
process f . The predicates just introduced are related by axioms, of which we shall see a
glimpse below. With this notation, and using ?ϕ(x) succeeds to abbreviate: ‘make it the
case in our discourse model that ϕ(x)’,7 we can write the two update instructions involved
in comprehending the discourse as:
(10) ?Happens(e1, t), t < now,Happens(e′, t ′) succeeds
(11) ?Happens(e2,s),s< now,Happens(e′′, t ′′) succeeds
Here e′ and e′′ are variables for event types in the discourse context which have to be found
out by substitution or, more precisely, unification. These two update instructions have to be
executed so that e′′ = e1 and s < t ′′. If ‘Max fell’ is the first sentence of the discourse, we
may disregard e′.8 In order to formulate the causal knowledge relevant to the execution of
these instructions, we introduce a process f (falling) corresponding to the event e1 = fall(m),
where f , e1 and e2 are related by the following statements:
(12) HoldsAt( f , t)→Happens(e1, t)
(13) Initiates(e2, f ,s)
The system processing the discourse will first satisfy the update request corresponding to
‘Max fell’ by locating the event e1 in the past of the moment of speech. The second sentence,
‘John pushed him’, is represented by the request (11) which contains the variable e′′. The
system will try to satisfy the goal by reducing it using relevant causal knowledge. Applying
(12) and unifying9 e′′ = e1 = fall(m), the second request (11) is reduced to:
(14) ?Happens(e2,s),s< now,Happens(e1, t ′′),HoldsAt( f , t ′′) succeeds
The system now applies a general causal principle, known as inertia, which says that, if an
event e has kicked off a process f at time t, and nothing happens to terminate the process
between t and t ′, then f is still going on at t ′. This principle rules out spontaneous changes,
that is changes which are not caused by occurrences of events. Inertia can be formulated as
the following axiom:
7This notation derives from logic programming. By itself, ?ϕ(x) denotes a goal or query, a request for a value a of
x such that ϕ(a) is true. The answer may be negative, if the database against which ϕ(x) is checked contains no such
individual. By ?ϕ(x) succeeds we mean that in such cases the database must be updated with an a making ϕ true.
These instructions or requests for updates are also known as integrity constraints.
8Here we regard context as provided by the preceding discourse, but one may conceive of ‘forward-looking’
notions of context as well.
9This form of unification will be important in our discussion of the ‘binding problem’ for language.
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(15) Happens(e, t)∧ Initiates(e, f , t)∧ t < t ′∧¬Clipped(t, f , t ′)→HoldsAt( f , t ′)
Using this axiom, the request (14) is further reduced to:
(16) ?Happens(e2,s),s< now,Happens(e1, t ′′),Happens(e, t), Initiates(e, f , t), t < t ′′,
¬Clipped(t, f , t ′′) succeeds
Using (13) and unifying e= e2 = push( j,m) and s= t we reduce this request to:
(17) ?Happens(e2,s),s< now,Happens(e1, t ′′),s< t ′′,¬Clipped(s, f , t ′′) succeeds
This is a definite update request which almost says that push precedes fall, except for the
formula ¬Clipped(s, f , t ′′), which expresses that f has not been terminated between s and t ′′.
If f were terminated between s and t ′′, we would have a situation as in:
(18) Max fell. John pushed him a second time and Max fell all the way to the bottom
of the pit.
Since we have no positive information to this effect, we may assume ¬Clipped(s, f , t ′′). This
form of argument is also known as closed world reasoning: ‘assume all those propositions to
be false which you have no reason to assume to be true’. Closed world reasoning is essential
to planning, and to discourse comprehension, as it allows one to discount events which are
logically possible but in practice irrelevant. The final update request is thus:
(19) ?Happens(e2,s),s< now,Happens(e1, t ′′),s< t ′′ succeeds
which is the instruction to update the discourse model with the past events e1 and e2 such
that e2 precedes e1.
Just as plans may have to be revised in mid-execution (for instance, if it turns out there
is not sufficient oil to produce the projected number of pancakes), discourse models may
have to be recomputed when additional information is provided. Suppose the discourse
does not stop after ‘John pushed him’ but, instead, continues:
(20) Max fell. John pushed him, or rather what was left of him, over the edge.
One obvious interpretation is that now e2 = push( j,m) comes after e1 = fall(m). This is the
result of a recomputation, since after the first ‘him’ the hearer may have inferred that e2
precedes e1. Let us give a brief, informal sketch of this recomputation. The phrase ‘or rather
what was left of him’ suggests Max is now dead, therefore the update request corresponding
to the second sentence is something like:
(21) ?Happens(e2,s),s< now,HoldsAt(dead(m),s),Happens(e′′, t ′′) succeeds
perhaps together with a requirement to the effect that the entire pushing event occurs while
dead(m) obtains. It now seems reasonable to assume that, at the start of falling (the process
denoted by f ), Max is still alive. Unifying e′′ = e1 and applying property (12), the request
reduces to finding instants s, t ′′ such that:
(22) ?Happens(e2,s),s< now,HoldsAt(dead(m),s),HoldsAt(alive(m), t ′′),
Happens(e1, t ′′) succeeds
can be satisfied. Since alive always precedes dead and not conversely, it follows that we must
have that e1 = fall precedes e2 = push.
In summary, what we have outlined here is a universal computational mechanism for
determining event structure based on planning. Temporal expressions (not only tense and
aspect, but also temporal connectives as will be seen in section 3.2.3) are hypothesized to
determine requests to be satisfied by an update of the current discourse model. Processing
these requests involves unification, search through semantic memory, as well as setting up
temporary structures in working memory. These computations might leave characteristic
traces on neurophysiological responses like event-related potentials (ERPs), a hypothesis to
which we will return later.
3.2.1. Computing event structures for (PS, Imp) combinations. Similar arguments apply to
the French examples with which we started this section:
(7) a. Il faisait chaud. Jean oˆta sa veste. (Imp, PS)
It was hot. Jean took off his sweater.
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Intuitively, this narrative determines an event structure in which hot acts as a background
which is true all the time, and the foregrounded event (taking off one’s sweater) is located
within this background. One arrives at this structure by means of the following argument.
World knowledge contains no causal link to the effect that taking off one’s sweater changes
the temperature. The goal corresponding to the first sentence dictates that it is hot at some
time t before now. By the principle of inertia, the state hot must either hold initially (at the
beginning of the narrative) or have been initiated. The latter requires the occurrence of an
initiating event, which is however not given by the discourse. Therefore, hot holds initially.
Similarly, no terminating event is mentioned, so hot extends indefinitely, and it follows that
the event described by the second sentence must be positioned inside hot.
The second example dates back to the bygone days when speeding cars were stopped
by the police instead of being photographed:
(7) b. Jean attrapa une contravention. Il roulait trop vite. (PS, Imp)
Jean got a ticket. He was driving too fast.
It is given that the event of getting a ticket occurred sometime in the past, and it is also given
that the fluent speeding was true sometime in the past. Hence, it holds initially or has been
initiated. We have to determine the relative position of event and fluent. World knowledge
yields that getting a ticket terminates, but does not initiate speeding. Because this is the only
event mentioned, speeding holds from the beginning of discourse, and is not reinitiated once
it has been terminated.
In the third example, the same order of the tenses yields a different event order, guided
by the application of causal knowledge:
(7) c. Jean appuya sur l’interrupteur. La lumie`re l’e´blouissait. (PS, Imp).
Jean pushed the button. The light blinded him.
One (occurrence of an) action is mentioned, pushing the light button, which has the causal
effect of initiating the light being on when its current state is off. No terminating event is
mentioned, therefore the light remains on. It also follows that the light must be off for some
time prior to being switched on, and that it must be off at the beginning of discourse. The
definite article in ‘La lumie`re’ leads to a search for an antecedently introduced light, which
successfully terminates after unification with the light introduced in the first sentence. As a
consequence, it is this light which is too bright.
3.2.2. Deviant verb tenses and ADHD. The preceding considerations can be applied to
those psychiatric disorders that are known to involve language impairments, sometimes of
a rather subtle kind. For instance, children with ADHD have trouble with retelling a story, a
task that involves presenting information so that it is organized, (temporally) coherent, and
adjusted to the needs of the listener. The ability to attend to these requirements presupposes
that one is able to retain goals in working memory while planning the necessary steps and
monitoring their execution. This ability requires executive function as defined above [170].
The theory presented here can be used to constrain predictions on deviant narration in
children with ADHD [214], who appear to have difficulty in maintaining goals in working
memory [65]. Recall that update requests, that is the goals to be satisfied, corresponding to
a VP’s tense and aspect, consist of two components:
1. location of an event in time;
2. meshing the event with other events.
If a child has trouble maintaining a goal in working memory, this may lead to a simplified
representation of that goal. In the case of verb tenses, the most probable simplification is of
‘location of event in time’ (never mind the meshing with other events), since this involves
the least processing (search through semantic memory and unification). This simplification
affects both comprehension and production, the case of interest here. Indeed, in producing
speech which is attuned to the needs of the listener, the speaker may construct a discourse
model of his own utterances, to determine whether it is sufficiently unambiguous. Now, a
typical finding in this area is summarized in the following quote by Purvis et al.:
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ADHD groups exhibited a higher frequency of sequence errors, which reflects a
breakdown in the global organization of story theme. The pure-ADHD group
[i.e. the group without reading disability] had difficulties in local organization,
reflected in ambiguous references [of pronouns referring to persons or events].
These are failures in cohesion which make it difficult for the listener to follow
the speaker’s train of thought. Ambiguous references can result from a failure to
organize and monitor the cohesion of sentences, as well as from a failure to take
into account the needs of the listener. [170, p. 141]
This seems to suggest that there is indeed a connection between language comprehension
and production, and the processing of goals.
3.2.3. Temporal connectives. Processing considerations suggested by the Event Calculus
can be used as alternative explanations of existing ERP data. Here is an example. Mu¨nte et
al. [147] recorded ERPs while participants read sentences that differed only in the temporal
connective, for instance:
(23) a. After the scientist submitted the paper, the journal changed its policy.
b. Before the scientist submitted the paper, the journal changed its policy.
An additional test assessing participants’ working memory span was carried out. Subjects
read aloud increasingly longer sequences of sentences. After each sequence, they attempted
to recall the last word of each sentence in the order in which these were presented. Scores
were then used to group subjects – high, medium and low working memory span. ‘Before’
sentences elicited a larger sustained negativity. The amplitude was maximal at left anterior
electrodes, where ERP responses to ‘before’ and ‘after’ diverged around 300 ms after word
onset. The effect lasted throughout the sentence, and was largest during the second clause.
The ERP difference between ‘before’ and ‘after’ sentences was positively correlated with
working memory spans: the higher the working memory scores, the larger the ERP effect.
According to Mu¨nte et al., the observed pattern of effects can be explained as follows.
As reported above, ERP waveforms diverged within 300 ms following sentence onset, that
is soon after the temporal connective was encountered. ‘After’ and ‘before’ rapidly activate
different chunks of conceptual knowledge stored in memory: in sentence-initial position,
‘after’ indicates that the events are presented in their actual order; ‘before’ indicates that the
order is reversed. As regards the larger sustained negativity elicited by ‘before’ sentences, it
is hypothesized that these require additional computations as a consequence of presenting
the events in reverse temporal order.
An important assumption, upon which the account of Mu¨nte et al. ultimately rests, is
that the order in which the events are mentioned in discourse is the only difference between
‘after’ and ‘before’ sentences. This follows from their claim [147, p. 71] that what is encoded
into the meanings of ‘after’ and ‘before’ are relations of temporal order between events, that
is temporal precedence and temporal consequence. A review of the linguistic literature on
the subject, however, suggests that there is more to the semantics of temporal connectives
than event order. There is indeed an asymmetry between the inferences licensed by ‘after’
and ‘before’. While ‘after’ always entails that the subordinate clause is true, ‘before’ allows
for the subordinate clause to be either true or false, depending on the information provided
by the main clause [3, 29]. (23b) suggest that the content of a ‘before’ clause, if the earlier
event is likely to prevent the later one from occurring, will be interpreted as false or, more
precisely, as non-veridical. In the situation described by (23b), the scientist might have not
been able to submit the paper precisely because of the journal’s policy change. The reading
in which the subordinate is interpreted as false is still consistent with the overall truth of
the sentence, hence non-veridical readings seem available to subjects.
Our analysis is based on the mathematical theory of tense and aspect proposed by van
Lambalgen and Hamm [212], which has been briefly described and applied in sections 3.1
and 3.2. In that framework, tense, aspect and temporal adjuncts are represented by integrity
constraints. Recall that these are instructions in the form of obligations and prohibitions to
update the current model such that a representation making discourse true is incrementally
28 1. PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY
computed. ‘After’ sentences must satisfy three integrity constraints. Two are introduced by
the subordinate clause and require an update of the unification space such that the relevant
activity (the submission process) holds in the past of the moment of speech and is finished
before t ′′, where the event occurring at t ′′ is to be specified by the subsequent main clause:
(24) a. ?HoldsAt(submit, t)∧ t < now succeeds
b. ?Happens(finish, t ′), t ′ < t ′′ < now,Happens(e′, t ′′) succeeds
The variable e′ denotes an event type, and has to be unified with the event described by the
main clause. Here finish is the culminating event and is followed by the goal state, that is a
complete submission. The main clause introduces the second integrity constraint:
(25) ?Happens(change, t ′′), t ′′ < now succeeds
where change denotes the journal’s policy change. The unification e′ = change leads to
(26) ?Happens(finish, t ′), t ′ < t ′′ < now, Happens(change, t ′′) succeeds
This is the only binding operation required by ‘after’ sentences. Condition (26) implies that
‘after’ licenses veridical readings only.
‘Before’ sentences introduce three analogous conditions. The first two are added to the
unification space by the subordinate clause. The second is derived from (24b) by replacing
the obligation with a prohibition:
(27) a. ?HoldsAt(submit, t)∧ t < now succeeds
b. ?Happens(finish, t ′), t ′ ≤ t ′′ < now,Happens(e′, t ′′) fails
Also in this case e′ is an event type to be unified with a token furnished by the main clause.
The third condition introduced by the main clause is identical to its ‘after’ counterpart (25).
The system will also in this case unify e′ = change, reducing (27b) to the request
(28) ?Happens(finish, t ′), t ′ ≤ t ′′ < now,Happens(change, t ′′) fails
Notice that (28) can be satisfied in different models, because the integrity constraint fails if
and only if at least one of its conjuncts fails. Suppose there is no information in declarative
memory to the effect that a journal’s policy change is a likely obstacle toward a submission.
Closed world reasoning yields ¬Terminates(change,submit, t). From this, it can be concluded
that the submission was completed, because the process took place as is required by (27a),
and it can moreover be assumed to be finite. As both events (the complete submission and
the policy change) took place, the only solution left for the system is to add t ′′ < t ′ < now
to the unification space in order to ensure that (28) fails. This corresponds to the veridical
reading in which the submission follows the journal’s policy change. Suppose however that
Terminates(change,submit, t) is retrieved from declarative memory. The submission process
is then interrupted before it is completed. This implies that the culminating event did not
take place, and that the goal state was not attained. The first conjunct of (28) fails, yielding
a non-veridical reading.
In order to consider the implications of our analysis at the algorithmic level we would
need the full computational machinery of the Event Calculus, combined with hypotheses
on the time-course of linguistic processes, for instance immediacy [133]. Here we can only
provide a qualitative description of the steps involved in interpreting temporal connectives.
Processing ‘after’ and ‘before’ sentences amounts to incrementally constructing discourse
models which satisfy (24) and (27). Processing ‘after’ clauses consists in computing a model
in which (24a) and the first two conjuncts of (24b) are satisfied – our version of immediacy
implies that processing algorithms can satisfy incrementally only the conjuncts of integrity
constraints of the form ?ϕ(x)1, ...,ϕ(x)n succeeds. Processing the main clause will involve
forcing an update satisfying (25) and unifying event variables, which automatically leads to
a model satisfying (26). Processing ‘before’ clauses starts with the computation of a model
in which (27a) can be satisfied. At that stage, however, none of the conjuncts of (27b) can
be satisfied, for the integrity constraint is of the form ?ϕ(x)1, ...,ϕ(x)n fails and as such can
lead to very different updates of the discourse model. The algorithm which should update
the model according to the information provided by the subordinate clause must either wait
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for the main clause to be interpreted, or it must commit to a defeasible interpretation of the
‘before’ clause – a veridical one, assuming closed world reasoning applies. The main clause,
and related causal knowledge retrieved from declarative memory, determines whether the
first conjunct of (27b) can be satisfied and so the second must fail, as in a veridical reading,
or whether it is the first conjunct that fails, as in a non-veridical reading. If the execution of
these updates is delayed, (27b) must be maintained in working memory until relatively late
before it can be evaluated. If a veridical reading is computed while processing the ‘before’
clause, a recomputation might take place when the subordinate clause is encountered. On
both accounts, ‘before’ sentences are more taxing on working memory resources available
for unification, especially during later processing stages when the interpretation of the two
clauses has to be finalized in a coordinated manner.
This rather sketchy formal analysis shows that semantic notions can be mapped onto
processing reality, and can provide alternative explanations of existing experimental data.
This suggests there is a role for semantics in generating hypotheses for the psycholinguist
and the cognitive neuroscientist to test. Obstacles to this kind of integration lie not so much
in our limited knowledge of language and the brain, as in research methodologies positing
strict separations between domains of inquiry, where in fact only differences between levels
of analysis exist.
4. The binding problem for semantics
The goal of a theory of language is to deliver analyses at each of Marr’s levels, and to bridge
them in a perspicuous manner. One way of achieving this is to define a notion that acts as
a ‘wormhole’ [94] connecting linguistic structures, algorithms, and neurobiological events.
A candidate notion is that of ‘unification’, which has been applied on several occasions in
this chapter and will be seen at work in later chapters too.
An influential statement of the ‘binding problem’ for cognitive representations is due to
von der Malsburg [219], who regarded the binding approach to brain function as a response
to the difficulties encountered by classical connectionist networks. Von der Malsburg [220]
refers to a well-known example by Rosenblatt [179] to illustrate the issue. Let us consider a
network for visual recognition constituted by four output neurons. Two neurons fire when
a specific shape (either a triangle or a square) is presented and the other two fire depending
on the shape’s position (top or bottom of a rectangular frame). So, if there is a square at the
top, the output will be [square, top]. If there is a triangle at the bottom, the output will read
[triangle, bottom]. However, if a triangle and a square are presented simultaneously, say,
the triangle at the top and the square at the bottom, the output would be [triangle, square,
top, bottom], which is also obtained when the triangle is at the bottom and the square at the
top. This is an instance of the ‘binding problem’. Malsburg writes:
The neural data structure does not provide for a means of binding the proposition
top to the proposition triangle, or bottom to square, if that is the correct descrip-
tion. In a typographical system, this could easily be done by rearranging sym-
bols and adding brackets: [(triangle, top),(square, bottom)]. The problem with
the code of classical neural networks is that it provides neither for the equivalent
of brackets nor for the rearrangement of symbols. This is a fundamental problem
with the classical neural network code: it has no flexible means of construct-
ing higher-level symbols by combining more elementary symbols. The difficulty
is that simply coactivating the elementary symbols leads to binding ambiguity
when more than one composite symbol is to be expressed. [219, p. 96]10
Examples of the binding problem are bistable figures such as Necker’s cube and Jastrow’s
duck-rabbit, where the exact same visual features of the stimulus lead to two incompatible
representations, depending on how these features are bound together. Since the availability
of different representations essentially depends upon the geometric properties of the figure,
10Different solutions to Rosenblatt’s problem are possible. See von der Malsburg [220] for a proposal in line
with the binding hypothesis and Riesenhuber and Poggio [176] for an alternative approach.
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rather than upon the constitution of perceptual systems as would be the case, for example,
for after images [131, pp. 25-26], bistability requires an explanation at Marr’s computational
level, where properties of stimuli are described and related to information processing goals.
Without a characterization of the geometric properties of the figure, and of the mappings
between the figure and the two different entities which it can stand for, there would be no
basis upon which to claim that the two representations are mutually exclusive.
There exist analogous cases of structural ambiguity in language:
(29) a. The woman saw the man with the binoculars.
b. Respect remains.
Example (29a) has two alternative syntactic representations, one in which the phrase ‘with
the binoculars’ is a PP attached to the NP ‘the man’ (the man that was seen by the woman
had binoculars), and another in which it modifies the VP (the woman used binoculars to see
the man). Here too the features of the stimulus lead to two interpretations, depending on
which attachment option is eventually pursued. These sentences typically result in specific
ERP effects, suggesting that syntactic binding is a genuine information processing problem
for the brain. Sentence (29b) also has two possible parses, and this has consequences for its
meaning: it can either be used as a directive speech act, if ‘respect’ is the verb and ‘remains’
the object noun; or it can be used as an assertion, if ‘respect’ is the object noun and ‘remains’
the verb. ‘Before’ sentences and accomplishments in the progressive (chapters 2-5) are also
examples of semantic bistability, as they allow two mutually exclusive interpretations.
There are some similarities between perceptual bistability in the visual and linguistic
domains, such as the fact that in both cases we seem to ‘flip’ between the two incompatible
representations. But there is also a deeper analogy between the two: structural ambiguity is
defined at the topmost level of analysis in both cases, as Marr pointed out [131, pp. 25-26].
Without an independent characterization it remains unclear why such representations are
mutually exclusive in the first place. Extending Marr’s line of argument, we emphasize that
the binding problem for semantics is best formulated at the computational level, although
attempted solutions are bound to require significant contributions at all levels of analysis,
including – perhaps most interestingly – the level of neural implementation [72, 73].
There is a computational formulation and solution of the binding problem for syntax
[71], which will be applied in chapter 4. However, a parallel piece of work for semantics is
still missing. The purpose here is not to lay out a full-fledged theory of semantic unification.
Rather, the three main principles of semantic unification will be examined in some depth,
combining formal semantic analyses with ERP data as exemplified in section 3.2.3. Here is
a summary of what the reader may expect from the remaining chapters:
Principle Research question Theory Experiment
Immediacy How do syntactic and semantic unification ch. 4 ch. 4
interact in early stages of tense processing?
Monotonicity Is semantic recomputation involved in ch. 2 ch. 5
processing progressive constructions?
Compositionality Is enriched composition involved in ch. 3 ch. 6
processing complement coercions?
CHAPTER 2
The processing consequences of monotonicity
This chapter is a modified version of G. Baggio & M. van Lambalgen. The processing consequences of the imperfective
paradox. Journal of Semantics 24, 2007: 307-330.
1. Introduction
Recently, a number of studies have brought experimental data to bear on semantic theories
(see, for instance, the work on quantifiers by Geurts and van der Slik [64] and McMillan et
al. [140, 141]). However, formal semantics and psycholinguistics have reached their most
important results independently, even when the issues at stake could have been addressed
more completely by joining efforts. One example is the study of discourse-based inference
in psycholinguistics, where formal notions of truth, entailment and veridicality have often
been neglected (see Cook et al. [28] and Frank et al. [57] among others).
One assumption behind this book is that there exists a relatively unexplored territory
in which the two disciplines can interact productively. Here we consider a small portion of
this territory: monotonicity and its processing consequences. We first apply Marr’s scheme
to semantics, and we introduce the principle of monotonicity in discourse processing. Next
we present the linguistic phenomenon which we shall be concerned with: the imperfective
paradox. In section 2, we provide an analysis of the paradox based on the Event Calculus
(EC) [212], a planning formalism characterizing a class of models that can be computed by
connectionist networks. In section 3, we report the results of a questionnaire that supports
the semantic theory and suggests that different aspectual classes of past progressive verbs
yield different entailment patterns. In section 4, a processing model is outlined combining
the Event Calculus with the psycholinguistic principle of immediacy in the framework of
recurrent networks. The model is used to derive predictions concerning the ERP correlates
of the computations described by the Event Calculus.
1.1. Methodological preamble. From a semantic analysis of a linguistic structure it
is usually not possible to derive predictions concerning the complexity and time-course of
the processes involved in producing and comprehending utterances in which the structure
occurs. There may be cases in which processing hypotheses can be formulated on the basis
of the semantic theory alone [64, 140], but this approach is unlikely to work in general. The
reason is that processing depends upon the particular algorithms and neural mechanisms
that, in a physical system such as the human brain, compute the linguistic structures posited
by the theory – or functionally equivalent ones. Since semantics typically does not describe
algorithms and neural mechanisms (nor perhaps it should), there is no direct way to relate
semantic theories to what is observed in language processing experiments.
The solution is to adopt a theoretical framework that allows formal semantic analyses
to be explicitly related to processing algorithms inspired by the available psycholinguistic
evidence, and ultimately to computational models of the kind investigated in neuroscience.
Marr’s [131] scheme for the analysis of cognitive systems seems an appropriate choice in
this regard. Some motivation for this choice was provided in chapter 1.
Marr argued that information-processing systems should be understood at three nearly
independent levels of analysis. The first level contains a description of the computations to
be performed by the system and, more precisely, a characterization of the goals that have to
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be attained in order to solve a particular information-processing problem. For example, a
sentence S can be seen as introducing a specific goal, namely the construction of a cognitive
model making S true. In the semantic analysis proposed below, the tense and aspect of VPs
like the past progressive are treated as instructions to update the current discourse model so
as to achieve that goal. We see it as the task of semantics to describe information-processing
goals and update instructions. The actual processing steps are described at the intermediate
level, where constraint-satisfaction algorithms, implemented in artificial neural networks
[132], and processing principles such as immediacy and incrementality are combined. Marr
adds a third level, at which the neurobiological architecture is described. We discuss issues
relevant for the computational level in section 2 and for the algorithmic level in section 4.
1.2. Estimating meaning: beyond monotonicity. Several basic facts about computing
discourse models are established in psycholinguistic research: semantic representations are
built up incrementally in close temporal contiguity with the input signal [133]; there is no
processing distinction (in terms of time-courses and type of neurophysiological responses)
between sentence- and discourse-level integration of word meanings [208]. However, some
fundamental issues regarding discourse processing remain unanswered. For instance: how
much information does a model contain, and is the revision of its content allowed?
We consider discourse models as ‘minimal’ in the sense that, information which is not
provided by what is said or cannot be inferred from it, is (temporarily) assumed to be false.
For example (inspired by Lascarides and Asher [122]; recall also the formal analysis given
in chapter 1), upon hearing
(1) Max fell.
a minimal model is computed in which Max fell and nothing else is the case. If the narrative
continues as in
(2) Max fell. John pushed him.
a new model is computed based on the lexical meanings of ‘John’ and ‘pushed’, and world
knowledge to the effect that, barring unforeseen circumstances, pushing causes falling. The
initial minimal model is extended with a representation of the pushing event as preceding
the falling event.
Incrementality means that processing ‘shadows’ the input signal, but not that models
are built up monotonically, without the need for revision. Precisely because interpretation
is incremental, and one has to face incomplete or uncertain information at some processing
stages, minimal models are estimates of the meaning intended by the speaker. For instance,
upon hearing (2), we may conclude that John’s pushing preceded Max’s falling, the former
event being the cause of the latter. However, if (2) were to continue, as in
(3) Max fell. John pushed him, or rather what was left of him, over the edge.
we would infer, on the contrary, that John’s pushing is part of an effort to dispose of Max’s
corpse, reversing the order of events suggested by (2).
Inferences that can be withdrawn based on further information are called non-monotonic.
Classical monotonic logic is assumed by most proposals in formal semantics: interpretation,
also when it is regarded as incremental, as in dynamic semantics [107, 69], proceeds via the
construction of a monotonic chain of models, where each preserves the semantic structure
of the preceding one. Still, non-monotonicity appears necessary in light of both linguistic
considerations [122, 124, 212] and experimental data [196]. The imperfective paradox seems
to be one such case in favor of non-monotonicity.
1.3. The imperfective paradox. Vendler [218] famously classified VPs as states (‘know’,
‘love’ etc.), activities (‘write’, ‘run’ etc.), accomplishments (‘write a letter’, ‘run a mile’ etc.)
and achievements (‘finish’, ‘reach’ etc.). Here we shall deal with the inferences licensed by
sentences containing activities and accomplishments in the past progressive. The following
example involves the accomplishment ‘write a letter’:
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(4) The girl was writing a letter when her friend spilled coffee on the tablecloth.
From (4) the reader would typically conclude that, barring unforeseen circumstances, the
girl attained the desired goal and would thus assent to the statement ‘The girl has written a
letter’. Such an inference is based on the assumption that spilling coffee on the tablecloth is
usually neutral with respect to the writing activity, that is, it is not a typical proximate cause
leading to its termination. It is possible to imagine scenarios in which writing is temporarily
interrupted or even terminated by the accident. Nonetheless, as the data reported in section
3 will demonstrate, failing to mention a disabling condition in the discourse is sufficient for
leading the reader to assume that there was no such obstacle to attaining the intended goal.
Inferences to a goal state are non-monotonic, i.e. they can be suppressed if the discourse
describes an event which terminates the relevant activity:
(5) The girl was writing a letter when her friend spilled coffee on the paper.
Assuming that writing was intended to occur on the same paper sheets on which coffee was
spilled, the accident is sufficient for terminating the activity, and it is therefore a disabling
condition for obtaining a complete letter. Accordingly, on the basis of (5) the reader would
be more likely to assent to ‘The girl has written no letter’.
One important observation is that suppression can obtain only with accomplishments,
and not with activities [180]. Since a sentence containing an activity in the past progressive,
such as ‘writing letters’, does not involve a canonical goal, it is interpreted as entailing that
‘The girl has written one or more letters’ regardless of the consequences of the second event
on the writing activity:
(6) The girl was writing letters when her friend spilled coffee on the tablecloth.
(7) The girl was writing letters when her friend spilled coffee on the paper.
Upon reflection, there is something paradoxical about examples (4) and (5) which is not
found in (6) and (7). Even though it belongs to the meaning of the accomplishment ‘writing
a letter’ that the writing activity is directed towards the goal state of the complete letter, the
actual occurrence of that goal state can be denied without contradiction. However, how can
a seemingly essential component of the meaning be denied without destroying the meaning
itself? This is known as the ‘imperfective paradox’. The semantic literature is replete with
attempted solutions of the paradox, which range from explaining the problem away [143] to
various invocations of possible worlds [42, 120, 36]. It is impossible to review all proposed
solutions here; we will focus on representative claims instead. Possible worlds analyses are
based on the idea that
the progressive picks out a stage of a process/event which, if it does not continue
in the real world, has a reasonable chance of continuing in some other possible
world. [36]
They differ however in the (largely informal) descriptions of the possible worlds used. For
example, Dowty [42] would claim that the following are equivalent:
a. ‘The girl is writing a letter’ is true in the actual world;
b. ‘The girl will have written a letter’ is true in all so-called ‘inertia worlds’, worlds
which are identical with the present world until ‘now’, but then continue in a way
most compatible with the history of the world until ‘now’.
These approaches are intensional in the formal sense of using possible worlds. In fact, most
authors (but not all) would agree that the progressive creates an intensional context: even
though the accident in (5) may have terminated the writing activity at a stage in which it
was unclear whether the girl was writing a letter or, say, a memo, still only one of
(8) The girl was writing a letter.
(9) The girl was writing a memo.
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is true of the situation described by (5). Explicitly denying that the progressive creates an
intensional context, Michaelis [143] argues that1
the Progressive sentence ‘She is drawing a circle’ denotes a state which is a sub-
part not of the accomplishment type She–draw a circle but of the activity type
which is entailed by the causal representation of the accomplishment type. Since
this activity can be identified with the preparatory activity that circle drawing
entails, circle drawing can in principle be distinguished from square drawing etc.
within the narrow window afforded by the Progressive construal [and] does not
require access to culmination points either in this world or a possible world.
We find this questionable, for without access to a person’s intention it may be very hard
to tell initially whether she is drawing a circle or a square, writing a letter or a memo. But
that person’s intention in performing an activity is characterized precisely by the associated
consequent state, even though the latter cannot yet be inferred from the available data.
Here the Event Calculus will come to our rescue, because the notion of goal or intention
is built into the semantics from the start. In particular, the meaning of a VP is represented
by a scenario which describes a plan for reaching the goal. However, unlike approaches such
as Parsons’ [157] where one quantifies existentially over events, the scenario is a universal
theory and does not posit the occurrence of the intended consequences. Although the plan
is appropriate for that purpose, attaining the goal is guaranteed only in a minimal model (in
which no unforeseen obstacles occur) of the scenario plus the axioms of the Event Calculus.
The meaning of the accomplishment as is embodied in the scenario involves a culminating
event type – which therefore must exist – but no existential claims are made concerning the
corresponding event token, which, as in example (5), may also fail to occur. Type and token
are handled by different mechanisms in the Event Calculus. These notions form the basis
of our semantic analysis of the imperfective paradox, to which we now turn.
2. Goals and completion inferences
The reference to goal states in the preceding section suggests that a semantic analysis of the
progressive can be based on a planning formalism which is able to talk about events and
goals, and which includes a theory of causality together with a principle of inertia [84]. Such
a formalism was developed by van Lambalgen and Hamm [212], and it consists of an Event
Calculus which has found applications in robotics, reformulated using the computational
machinery of Constraint Logic Programming.
The reader may wonder how can planning provide a source of inspiration to semantics.
The reason can be found in the nature of computation in planning, which typically proceed
as follows. First a goal is specified, which may be an action to be performed at a particular
location – for instance, pick up outgoing mail in an office building. Next a plan is devised,
that is a sequence of actions to get to the required location, derived by backward chaining
from the goal to obtain a sequence of subgoals, the last one of which can be executed in the
agent’s initial position and state. Planning requires a situation model (including a map of
the building, a causal theory of the agent’s actions, a specification of values of variables such
as ‘door open/closed’, the agent’s initial position and state, a record of its past and current
actions), a repertoire of possible actions (‘follow wall’, ‘go through door’) and observations
(‘door open/closed’). While the agent executes the plan, it also registers its observations
and actions in the situation model. Information about its actions may be important for the
agent to estimate its current position. Particularly relevant for our purposes is that a plan
might have to be recomputed in mid-course when the initial situation model is updated
due to new observations, for instance a closed door which was expected to be open on the
basis of the initial model, or a wrong estimate of the agent’s current position. Later on we
will see how this ‘recomputation’ relates to the imperfective paradox.
1Replace ‘drawing a circle’ with ‘writing a letter’ and ‘drawing a square’ with ‘writing a memo’ in Michaelis’
examples to see the connection with our examples.
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This concise description should be sufficient to enable the reader to see the connection
with language comprehension. The reader/hearer starts off with an initial discourse model
in which an incoming sentence or clause must be integrated. Suppose the main verb of the
sentence is non-stative, for example an activity. If the sentence is in one of the simple tenses,
it is unpacked in the relevant action and its participants and the discourse model is updated
accordingly. This is the analogue of updating the situation model with representations of
individuals and actions in planning. In more complex cases, such as sentences involving
accomplishments like (4) and (5), the VP is taken to express the existence of a goal-directed
plan. If, on the contrary, the main verb of the sentence is stative, the sentence can be viewed
as analogous to an observation report and the discourse model is updated with a property.
2.1. The Event Calculus. The Event Calculus is a planning formalism which allows
one to talk about actions, goals and causal relations in the world. Its function is to return
a plan given a goal, the initial state and causal relations. Formally, the Event Calculus is a
many-sorted predicate logic. It has two different sorts for events, viewed either perfectively
or imperfectively. The former are called event types and are symbolized by e,e′, ...,e0, .... The
latter are called fluents (Newton’s name for time-dependent variables) and are symbolized
by f , f ′, ..., f0, ... One may think of event types as action types, such as, for example, ‘break’
or ‘ignite’. Fluents can be thought of as time-dependent properties, such as ‘being broken’
or ‘writing’. The time parameter in fluents is implicit, but they can have further parameters,
for instance for the subject of ‘writing’. The real distinction between event types and fluents
comes from the different roles they play in the axioms of the Event Calculus. The universe
contains also sorts for individuals (‘the girl’), real numbers interpreted as instants of time,
and various other real quantities, such as position, velocity, or degree of some quality.
The primitive predicates comprise the minimum necessary to talk about two forms of
causality, instantaneous (as in a collision) and continuous (as when a force is acting):
(10) a. Initially( f ) : ‘fluent f holds at the beginning of the discourse’
b. Happens(e, t) : ‘event type e has a token at time t’
c. Initiates(e, f , t) : ‘the effect of event type e at time t is the initiation of f ’
d. Terminates(e, f , t) : ‘the effect of event type e at time t is the termination of f ’
e. Trajectory( f1, t, f2,d): ‘if f1 holds from t until t+d, then at t+d f2 holds’
f. Releases(e, f , t) : ‘event type e releases the continuously-varying fluent f ’2
g. HoldsAt( f , t) : ‘fluent f holds at at time t’
While (10a-d) are the predicates required by instantaneous change, (10e-f) are used to model
continuous change.
Three further notions will be deployed in the semantic analysis presented below. The
first is that of scenario.3 Whereas the axiom system EC provides a macro-theory of causality,
scenarios provide micro-theories stating the specific causal relations obtaining in a given
situation. Scenarios can be used to describe the causal environment of actions and events at
the level of granularity expressed in natural language, such as for instance writing a letter
or drawing a circle. Scenarios can be taken to represent in a tenseless fashion the meaning
of VPs. For example, the scenario for the accomplishment ‘writing a letter’ specifies that the
writing activity is causally related to the amount of letter produced, that the termination of
the activity is temporally contiguous to the completion of the letter and so on.
The second notion is that of integrity constraint. As we said above, we regard a sentence
as introducing an information-processing goal (‘Make S true’) to be achieved by updating
2The predicate Releases is used to reconcile the two notions of causality. While instantaneous change leads to
one form of inertia, where properties do not change their value between the occurrences of two events, continuous
change requires that variable quantities may change value without concomitant occurrences of events. The solution
of this conflict is to exempt, by means of the predicate Releases, those properties which we want to vary continuously
from the inertia of the first form of causation.
3See the related notions of ‘frame’ by Minsky [145] and ‘script’ by van Dijk [211]. For a more explicit connection
with planning, see Schank and Abelson [185].
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the current discourse model or constructing a new one. Integrity constraints regiment such
updates. They can take the form of either obligations ‘?ϕ succeeds’, requesting an update
of the discourse model satisfying ϕ, or prohibitions ‘?ϕ fails’, blocking updates of the
discourse model satisfying ϕ. While scenarios describe the meaning of VPs in a tenseless
fashion, integrity constraints specify the contribution of tense, aspect and temporal adjuncts
to the semantics of VPs.
The third notion is that of minimal model. The axioms of the Event Calculus constitute
a correct theory of causality if and only if the following two conditions are satisfied:
1. The discourse model contains only those occurrences of events forced to be there
by the discourse and the axioms;
2. The interpretation of the primitive predicates is as small as is consistent with the
discourse and the axioms.
These two requirements define minimal models. They imply that no unforeseen events are
allowed to happen, and that all causal influences are as expected. The choice to work with
minimal models instead of all models leads to non-monotonicity in discourse interpretation:
adding a new sentence or clause to the discourse may invalidate a conclusion derived from
the initial minimal model. As shown by van Lambalgen and Hamm [212], it is precisely the
possibility to retract previously inferred conclusions which allows a rigorous treatment of
the imperfective paradox. The most important meta-theorem concerning the EC formalism
is that minimal models exist and can be computed efficiently [212, 194, 196]. Furthermore,
minimal models can be computed (or approximated, depending on the expressiveness of
the logical language) by connectionist networks – a topic to which we return in section 4.3.
2.2. The semantics of the progressive. The semantics of the VP ‘was writing a letter’
can be decomposed into the tenseless lexical meaning of ‘write a letter’ and the temporal
and aspectual contribution of the past progressive. The lexical meaning is represented by
the following scenario:4
(11) a. Initially(letter(a))
b. Initiates(start,write, t)
c. Initiates(finish,letter(c), t)
d. Terminates(finish,write, t)
e. HoldsAt(write, t) ∧ HoldsAt(letter(c), t)→ Happens(finish, t)
f. Releases(start,letter(x), t)
g. HoldsAt(letter(x), t)→ Trajectory(write, t, letter(x+g(d)),d)
Here write is the activity fluent, letter(x) is a parametrized fluent for the completion stage
x of the letter, a is a constant for the stage at which writing is initiated, c is a constant for
the stage at which the letter is considered finished, and letter(c) is the fluent for the goal
state. The dynamics of the scenario is formalized by (11g), which says that, if the stage
of completion of the letter at time t is x, then the writing activity, lasting from time t until
t + d, will result in a letter whose stage of completion at time t + d is x+ g(d), where g
is a monotone increasing time-dependent real-valued function relating the activity to the
completion stage.5 Accomplishments are distinguished from activities by the statements
regimenting the behavior of the goal state, here (11c) and (11e): because no canonical goal
is involved in activities, such as ‘write letters’, their scenario will not contain these clauses.
The contribution of the past progressive is represented by the integrity constraint
(12) ?HoldsAt(write, R) ∧ R< S succeeds
which forces an update of the discourse model such that the activity fluent write holds at
the reference time R located in the past of the moment of speech S [175]. As we noted about
4See Andrade-Lotero [2] for the algorithms deriving scenarios from discourse representation structures in DRT
[107] and from constructions in Construction Grammar [66].
5The way g is defined depends upon the particular VP (or plan) at issue. For instance, ‘erasing the blackboard’
or ‘dismantling the engine’ may be represented using a monotone decreasing function.
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examples (4)-(7), different inferences can be drawn from activities and accomplishments in
the past progressive. In the Event Calculus, this follows from the fact that updating the
initial model according to (12) leads to different models depending on whether the scenario
represents an activity or an accomplishment. The statement below provides information on
the inferences licensed by discourses containing an accomplishment in the past progressive.
COMPLETION INFERENCE Let D be a discourse consisting of scenario (11).
Suppose D is extended to D ′ so that the query ?HoldsAt(write, R) ∧ R < S
succeeds in D ′. Suppose also limt→∞ g(t)≥ c. Then there is a unique minimal
model ofD ′ and in this model there is a time t ≥ R for which HoldsAt(letter(c),
t). By virtue of the stipulation Letter(letter(c), t), there will be a letter at t.6
If write holds at R, as required by (12), it must either hold initially or have been initiated. The
latter requires an event start which initiated the writing activity. Since the starting event is
not provided by discourse, we must assume that write holds initially. The clause (11g) states
that the writing activity will increase the stage of completion of the letter. As time tends to
infinity, the latter will be at least equal to c (the final completion stage). We have stipulated
that a letter whose stage of completion is c is a finished letter. Hence, there must be a time at
which the letter is considered finished. The writing activity will stop as soon as a complete
letter is obtained, as is guaranteed by (11d-e). Notice that this holds for accomplishments,
but not for activities: if the VP is the activity ‘writing letters’, (11c) and (11e) are not part of
the scenario and writing will continue also after one letter has been completed – in fact, it
will continue indefinitely, if no terminating event is introduced.
We have just seen how the Event Calculus deals with the interpretation of VPs in the
past progressive. Now we have to discuss the contribution of subordinate ‘when’ clauses to
the meaning of (4)-(7). Because spilling coffee on the tablecloth usually does not terminate
the writing activity, the dynamics of the scenario will lead to a complete letter in (4) and
to an indefinite number of letters in (6). The situation is different for examples (5) and (7).
Spilling coffee on the paper is typically sufficient for terminating the writing activity. This
bit of world knowledge can be expressed by the following addition to scenario (11):
(13) Terminates(spill,write, t)
But what is more important here is the integrity constraint introduced by the ‘when’ clause
(14) ?Happens(spill,R) ∧ R< S succeeds
which requires the accident to occur at R, while the writing activity was taking place. Since
during the writing process there is no complete letter (yet), spilling coffee on the paper will
terminate the activity before the letter is finished. Therefore, there will be no complete letter
in the final discourse structure. As for (7), the theory is consistent both with the situation in
which the writing activity was terminated before even a single letter had been completed
and with the case in which one or more letters were finished when the accident happened.
The proposed semantics predicts that readers would assent to ‘The girl has written a letter’
in (4), to ‘The girl has written no letter’ in (5) and to ‘The girl has written one or more letters’
in (6). This is consistent with received semantic wisdom about entailments of activities and
accomplishments in the progressive. Data supporting this view are presented below.
To summarize, the attainment of the consequent state is derived in a minimal model of
a discourse containing an accomplishment in the progressive. However, the computation
of discourse models is non-monotonic: if the minimal model is extended with a sentence or
a clause describing an event which terminates the relevant activity (what we have called a
disabling condition), the derivation of the goal state is blocked. Non-monotonicity affords
a neat solution of the imperfective paradox, because there is no contradiction in assuming
that the representation of the goal state is both essential to the meaning of the progressive
VP (as an event type in the scenario) and suppressible on the basis of additional discourse
information (as an event token in the minimal model).
6See van Lambalgen and Hamm [212] for a more rigorous statement and a computational proof.
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3. An entailment questionnaire
In the preceding sections, we have argued that accomplishments and activities in the past
progressive behave differently as regards entailment. An accomplishment such as ‘writing
a letter’ implies that ‘The girl has written a letter’, provided that no obstacles are described
in discourse. Failing to mention a disabling condition is sufficient for concluding that there
is no such obstacle to attaining the goal. If however a disabling condition is introduced, the
accomplishment will imply that ‘The girl has written no letter’. An activity such as ‘writing
letters’ implies that ‘The girl has written one or more letters’ regardless of further discourse
information. Since disabling conditions affect the possibility of attaining a predefined goal,
and such predefined goals are part of the meaning of accomplishments but not of activities,
accomplishments will be sensitive to the presence of a disabling condition in the discourse
context, whereas activities will not. We administered an entailment questionnaire aimed at
testing this claim.
3.1. Subjects. Thirty two Dutch native speakers (mean age 22.5, 27 female) completed
the cloze probability test (see below) and thirty six (mean age 22.5, 28 female) the entail-
ment questionnaire. Participants were selected from the database of the Donders Centre for
Cognitive Neuroimaging in Nijmegen. The two sets of subjects were disjoint.
3.2. Materials. The set of Dutch materials used in the experiments included 160 items.
Each item comprised two context sentences (O) providing a neutral setting for the events
described by target sentences,7 four target sentences (A)-(D) and two probe pairs (E)-(F):
(O) De deur van de woonkamer was gesloten. Binnen speelde de radio klassieke muziek.
The door of the living-room wasPST closedPRT . Inside playedPST the radio classical music.
‘The door of the living room was closedPST PRT . Inside the radio playedPST classical music.’
(A) Het meisje was brieven aan het schrijven toen haar vriendin koffie op het tafelkleed morste.
The girl wasPST letters on the to-writeINF when her friend coffee on the tablecloth spilledPST .
‘The girl was writingPST PRG letters when her friend spilledPST coffee on the tablecloth.’
(B) Het meisje was brieven aan het schrijven toen haar vriendin koffie op het papier morste.
The girl wasPST letters on the to-writeINF when her friend coffee on the paper spilledPST .
‘The girl was writingPST PRG letters when her friend spilledPST coffee on the paper.’
(C) Het meisje was een brief aan het schrijven toen haar vriendin koffie op het tafelkleed morste.
The girl wasPST a letter on the to-writeINF when her friend coffee on the tablecloth spilledPST .
‘The girl was writingPST PRG a letter when her friend spilledPST coffee on the tablecloth.’
(D) Het meisje was een brief aan het schrijven toen haar vriendin koffie op het papier morste.
The girl wasPST a letter on the to-writeINF when her friend coffee on the paper spilledPST .
‘The girl was writingPST PRG a letter when her friend spilledPST coffee on the paper.’
(E) Het meisje heeft een of meer brieven geschreven.
The girl hasPRS one or more letters writtenPRT .
‘The girl has writtenPRS PRF one or more letters.’
Het meisje heeft geen brief geschreven.
The girl hasPRS no letter writtenPRT .
‘The girl has writtenPRS PRF no letter.’
(F) Het meisje heeft een brief geschreven.
The girl hasPRS a letter writtenPRT .
‘The girl has writtenPRS PRF a letter.’
Het meisje heeft geen brief geschreven.
The girl hasPRS no letter writtenPRT .
‘The girl has writtenPRS PRF no letter.’
Target sentences were constructed manipulating the aspectual class of the VP in the past
progressive (activity or accomplishment) and the causal type of the condition introduced
by the subordinate ‘when’ clause (neutral or disabling with respect to the event described in
the progressive clause). Activities and accomplishments differed only in the object NP: an
indefinite (‘een brief’) was used for accomplishments, a bare plural (‘brieven’) was used for
7That is, no disabling condition for the event described by the progressive VP was introduced by context items.
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activities. Disabling and neutral conditions differed only in the prepositional or object NP,
for example ‘papier’ for the former and ‘tafelkleed’ for the latter. The distinction between
neutral and disabling conditions was made according to the authors’ judgment. The probes
(E) were used with activities, (F) with accomplishments.
The following linguistic properties of target sentences were normed. The mean length
and the raw frequency of the differing words in the NP of subordinate ‘when’ clauses were
matched using the CELEX corpus [4]. To determine the cloze probabilities of the verbs in
the subordinate clauses, context items followed by a target sentence with the final word
blanked were presented to the subjects. Participants were asked to fill in the blank with the
first word that came to their mind. Four versions (40 items per condition) randomized and
balanced across conditions were constructed. Mean cloze probabilities were not different
across conditions (T-tests, all comparisons P>0.05). This was established for each version
as well as for the entire set of experimental items. Therefore, the same materials and test
versions were used in the entailment questionnaire.
3.3. Procedure. Copies of the questionnaire were given to all subjects in the database
meeting the following criteria: they had to be native speakers of Dutch with an age between
18 and 50 and with no history of neurological, psychiatric or cognitive disorders. The first
36 subjects who returned a completed questionnaire where included in the analysis.
The first page of the booklet contained the test instructions. Participants were informed
that the questionnaire consisted of 160 short texts and that each comprised three sentences
(the two context sentences and the target sentence) and was followed by a pair of probes.
Subjects were instructed to read each sentence carefully and select the probe which they
deemed correct on the basis of their expectations (‘verwachtingen’) about the continuation
of the text (‘over het vervolg van de tekst’). Participants were asked to respond as quickly
and accurately as possible and to write a brief comment on their answer in the blank space
following the probes.
The reference to ‘expectations’ in the test instructions requires some explanation. Note
that we are not interested in what ‘subjects semantically know’ given a progressive clause –
presumably that the writing activity was taking place some time in the past and that only a
part of the letter was then completed. For this would amount to asking subjects what is true
at the reference time, which is captured by the integrity constraint (12) above and requires
no inference based on the relevant models. Rather, we are interested in what subjects infer
about the outcomes of an action described using the progressive. That is, we want to know
how subjects reason about goals and, more precisely, what is the projected course of events after
the reference time. In order to achieve this, we constructed the probe pairs (E) and (F) using
the Dutch present perfect (which focuses on the present consequences of a past event), we
avoided probes of the form ‘The girl has written a part of the letter’, and we asked subjects
to decide which of the two probes (positive or negative) matched their ‘expectations’ about
the continuation of the narrative. Participants’ written explanations provide no evidence
that (E) and (F) were insufficient for giving accurate responses, such that, for instance, a
probe of the form ‘It is unclear whether the girl has written a letter’ was necessary. Rather,
subjects’ comments suggest that, if the discourse implied that only a part of the letter was
completed, as in (D), then the negative probe in (F) had to be selected.
3.4. Data analysis. Subject-based and item-based statistical analyses were carried out.
For the former, we used a repeated-measures ANOVA model with Subject as the random ef-
fect, Aspectual Class (Activity/Accomplishment) and Condition Type (Neutral/Disabling)
as fixed effects, and the mean number of negative responses as the dependent variable. In
order to generalize over both subjects and test items, we used a parallel repeated-measures
ANOVA model in which Test Item (as defined above, that is, as a set of context, target and
probe sentences) was the random effect, Aspectual Class and Condition Type were the fixed
effects and the mean number of negative respondents (subjects giving a negative response)
was the dependent variable. Univariate F-tests were computed in both cases.
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Subject-based analysis Item-based analysis
Aspectual Class F(1,35)=64.763 F(1,159)=619.240
P<0.001 P<0.001
Condition Type F(1,35)=112.560 F(1,159)=237.270
P<0.001 P<0.001
Aspectual Class × Condition Type F(1,35)=61.832 F(1,159)=100.210
P<0.001 P<0.001
TABLE 1. Summary of ANOVA statistics for the questionnaire data.
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FIGURE 1. Results of the questionnaire. (a) Boxplot for the subject-based
analysis. Solid lines within the boxes represent the median, box height is
equal to the interquartile range, whiskers indicate adjacent values, empty
circles denote outliers. The maximum of potential negative judgments is
40. (b) Interaction plot for the subject-based analysis. Traces endpoints
represent the mean number of negative responses in each experimental
condition. The maximum of potential negative judgments is 40.
3.5. Results. The subject-based analysis revealed significant effects of Aspectual Class
and Condition Type and a significant interaction between the two factors (table 1). Neutral
activities (A) had the lowest mean of negative responses (M=2.72, SD=3.22), followed by
disabled activities (B) (M=8.06, SD=7.05), neutral accomplishments (C) (M=10.03, SD=9.23)
and disabled accomplishments (D) (M=25.14, SD=8.02). Except for neutral activities (A), the
distribution of the data in the different conditions appears rather similar, as indicated by
standard deviations (SDs) as well as box height and whisker length in figure 1-a. Figure 1-b
shows that the pattern of responses is largely as predicted by the theory: accomplishments
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are more sensitive than activities to the presence of a disabling condition in the discourse
context. A similar pattern of effects was revealed by the item-based analysis (see table 1).
Neutral activities (A) had the lowest mean of negative respondents (M=2.35, SD=4.13), fol-
lowed by disabled activities (B) (M=7.13, SD=7.24), neutral accomplishments (C) (M=9.54,
SD=7.09) and disabled accomplishments (D) (M=22.62, SD=9.04).
4. Immediacy and non-monotonicity
In the preceding sections we have proposed an analysis of the imperfective paradox based
on the Event Calculus and we have presented some behavioral data supporting the theory.
Recall that we chose to design the semantic theory as a computational analysis in Marr’s
sense. We are now ready to move on to the intermediate level of analysis, and consider the
processing steps subserving the computation of discourse models.
The processing model is based on the combination of Event Calculus and Constraint
Logic Programming by van Lambalgen and Hamm [212]. The algorithms that are presented
there specify in an abstract manner the computational steps involved in satisfying integrity
constraints or, more precisely, they spell out the derivation (the proof) of a given statement
within the theory. In order to derive predictions about the complexity and the time-course
of the relevant computations, it is necessary to add an explicit processing component to the
formal machinery of the Event Calculus: the principle of immediacy.
4.1. The principle of immediacy. In a paper discussing language processing models
and their neural realizations, Hagoort [74] proposed “six general architectural principles
for comprehension beyond the word level”. One of these, also known as the ‘principle of
immediacy’, is particularly relevant in this context. Immediacy has often been debated in
the psycholinguistic literature [133, 99], where it is viewed as a hypothesis about the time-
course of the access and integration of lexical meanings in a sentence structure and is often
contrasted with syntax-first models [58, 61]. Immediacy is defined by Hagoort [74] as
the general processing principle of unification. Semantic unification does not
wait until all relevant syntactic information (such as word class information) is
available, but starts immediately with what it derives on the basis of the bottom-
up input and the left context. The corollary of immediacy is incrementality: out-
put representations are built up from left to right in close temporal contiguity to
the input signal.
This statement cannot be directly related to our Event Calculus analysis, the reason being
that it covers only lexical integration (‘unification’) and not the computation of denotations
and discourse models. Hagoort’s notion of immediacy is sufficient for deriving processing
predictions concerning semantic composition. However, to be relevant for describing the
construction of discourse models, the principle of immediacy must be thus reformulated:
IMMEDIACY The algorithms updating a minimal model so as to satisfy an
integrity constraint are executed as soon as the integrity constraint is given as
input.
The proposed definition of immediacy is a general hypothesis about the time-course of the
construction of discourse representations. It implies that minimal models are computed as
soon as update instructions, in the form of integrity constraints, are fed into the system by
means of the relevant lexical and morpho-syntactic material.
4.2. The recomputation hypothesis. Let us now consider the processing steps leading
to the construction of discourse models for (C) and (D). The first update instruction, in the
form of integrity constraint (12), is introduced by the progressive VP. Since at that stage the
information provided by discourse amounts to the context (O) and the main (progressive)
clause of (C) or (D), it is assumed there is no obstacle for the activity. Immediacy implies
that (12) will be satisfied as soon as the progressive VP is processed, and the Event Calculus
guarantees that a minimal model is computed: there is a time at which the consequent state
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holds. The prediction is that, when an accomplishment in the past progressive is processed,
a minimal model is immediately computed in which the goal state is attained.
Considering the subordinate clause, we can distinguish two processing steps. The first
is carried out by adding (13) to the scenario (11), updating the discourse model according
to (14), and deriving the existence of a time later than the initiation of the writing activity at
which writing was brought to an end. The second step computes the suppression of the goal
state inference by deriving the further statement that there is no time at which a complete
letter was obtained. These are two distinct operations: for activities that are terminated by
a disabling condition, such as (B), only the first step is carried out when the subordinate is
processed because there is no goal state to be canceled; for disabled accomplishments, such
as (D), both steps are implemented. Recall that the satisfaction of the goal state is derived
in a minimal model of the progressive VP. As a consequence, the hypothesis licensed by
the theory is that, when an accomplishment in the progressive is followed by a subordinate
clause describing a disabling condition, the initial minimal model is recomputed to the effect
that, in the new discourse structure, there is no time at which the goal state holds.
Recomputation is thus the main processing consequence of the imperfective paradox.
Predictions concerning the complexity and the time-course of semantic computations for
sentences like (A)-(D) can be derived from our processing model. The theory implies that
the subordinate clause in (D) involves the recomputation of the minimal model computed
while processing the progressive clause, while in (C) the initial model is simply extended
(we return on the difference between ‘recomputation’ and ‘extension’ in 4.3). Furthermore,
the activity cases (A) and (B) will also involve a monotonic extension of the initial model,
such that the termination of the writing activity is computed for (B), but no cancelation of
the goal state, because no canonical goal is involved in activities. In short, the subordinate
clause in (D) might be more complex to process compared to (A)-(C), as no recomputation
is triggered in the latter conditions. As regards time-courses, the Event Calculus requires
the causal and temporal information carried by the verb ‘morste’ to activate the additional
scenario clause (13), satisfy (14), and derive the failed occurrence of the consequent state.
Therefore, recomputation is expected to surface only at the final word in (D).
4.3. Recomputation and perceptron learning. The reader may ask why computing
a model that is incompatible with a previous structure (recomputation) would be different
from, and in particular more complex than, computing a minimal model that monotonically
extends the initial one. The answer can be found in the behavior of the neural networks that
compute minimal models. Due to the syntactic restrictions inherent in Logic Programming
[39], the models characterized by the Event Calculus can be viewed as the stable states of
the associated neural networks. Recurrent neural networks can compute minimal models
for propositional logic programs [194, 196], and for any propositional logic program there
exists a 3-layer feedforward network of binary threshold units that computes the semantic
operators on which the construction of minimal models is based [91]. The language of the
Event Calculus is not propositional but is a many-sorted predicate logic (see section 2.1),
with matters being further complicated by the use of integrity constraints. Recent research
suggests however that recurrent networks can also approximate the semantic operators for
first-order logic programs and their fixed points [91]. Furthermore, integrity constraints can
be modeled via a form of back-propagation called ‘perceptron learning’ [196, 179, 178].
In this framework, any computation on a given minimal model, such as adding a logic
program clause (a scenario clause), will somehow bring the network from its initial stable
state to another stable state, corresponding to the updated minimal model. Nonetheless, if
the neural representation proposed by Stenning and van Lambalgen [196] is approximately
correct, there is a large difference in neural activity between, on the one hand, a monotonic
extension of a minimal model and a non-monotonic recomputation of a minimal model on
the other. Consider first the case of a monotonic extension as envisaged by our processing
model. Retrieving a clause such as (13) from semantic memory, assuming that spill denotes
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‘spilling coffee on the tablecloth’, will result in the activation of a number of units (‘neurons’)
which were previously silent; but the activation state of the remaining units, including those
representing the goal state (the complete letter), will remain the same. However, retrieving
a different clause from semantic memory, for instance (13) where spill now denotes ‘spilling
coffee on the paper’, will result in the activation of neurons which were silent but also in the
readjustment of the activation patterns of units which were previously active. For instance,
the neurons representing the consequent state (the complete letter) will no longer be active.
This change in activation is achieved in the neural network by applications of perceptron
learning. The difference between monotonic extension and non-monotonic recomputation
can therefore be found in the occurrence of the readjustment of connection strengths driven
by perceptron learning. Efforts towards a more realistic neural implementation of minimal
models and non-monotonic computation will be discussed in later chapters.
These considerations imply that non-monotonic recomputation in (D) has more drastic
consequences on neural processing as compared to the monotonic extension of a minimal
model in (C). We must now show that a processing model based on monotonic semantics
would not predict a similar effect. In a strictly monotonic progression of structures, the goal
state is necessarily not represented, for otherwise the model may have to be recomputed,
which is not allowed by the monotonic logic underlying the theory. In the Event Calculus
framework, this means that the predicates and axioms for continuous change are not used,
at most those for instantaneous change. In addition, because the chain of discourse models
is monotonic, one never actually computes minimal models.8 So, under the assumption of
monotonicity, little semantic computation is going on. In particular, (C) and (D) will both
lead to monotonic extensions of the initial model, and both extensions will be computed at
about the same time, that is, when the final verb is encountered: in (C) the update will give
rise to a model in which (given the results of our entailment questionnaire) the consequent
state is represented as being attained, in (D) it will lead to a model in which the consequent
state does not hold. Because there is no principled semantic or processing reason to assume
that one final model would be more complex to compute than the other, it seems to follow
that a strictly monotonic semantics predicts no difference between the conditions.
The recomputation hypothesis can be tested in a dedicated electrophysiological study.
An ERP experiment using the materials of our questionnaire as stimuli would allow us to
determine whether recomputation occurs or, more precisely, whether there is a processing
difference between (D) and (C) which cannot be accounted for in terms of lexically-bound
factors such as frequency, cloze probabilities, ambiguity etc. Preliminary ERP evidence for
recomputation is presented in chapter 5.
8Formally, one never computes the completion of the scenario plus the EC axioms. For the notion of ‘comple-
tion’, see [212].

CHAPTER 3
The processing consequences of compositionality
This chapter is a modified version of G. Baggio, M. van Lambalgen & P. Hagoort. The processing consequences of
compositionality. In W. Hinzen, E. Machery & M. Werning (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Compositionality. Oxford
University Press, to appear.
1. Introduction
It is often said that the principle of compositionality is formally vacuous: any grammar can
be given a compositional semantics [102, 224, 109, 222], which implies the principle is also
empirically vacuous: if a compositional treatment of any linguistic structure can be given,
then compositionality is always upheld by the data. To be sure, the meaning of any complex
expression can be viewed as a function of the meanings of its constituents and the syntactic
mode of combination, provided enough complexity is built into the structures involved, i.e.
syntax and the lexicon. These need not be motivated on independent grounds, since their
characterization serves the sole purpose of yielding a compositional theory [69].
The need for an independent motivation of theories of syntax and lexical semantics is
precisely the issue here. Our aim is to show that, even though there often is a way to salvage
compositionality in the face of empirical data, the choices one has to make in order to do
so have consequences which may be implausible given the cognitive and neural constraints
on language comprehension, production and acquisition. Let us start with the most basic of
questions: why compositionality? We will now give a sketch of the main arguments, which
will be refined in the course of the discussion.
1.1. The productivity argument. One familiar argument in favor of compositionality
starts from the perceived tension between the infinity of language and the finiteness of the
brain. There are infinitely many sentences in any natural language, but the brain has only
finite storage capacity, and it therefore falls to syntax to give a finitely describable procedure
for generating an infinite class of sentences. Furthermore, so the argument goes, a speaker
of any language is able to understand a sentence she has never heard before, or to express
a meaning she has never expressed before, and in that sense she knows the infinitely many
different meanings of the infinitely many sentences of that language. Therefore, semantics
is also under the obligation to come up with a finitely describable engine that generates all
possible sentence meanings for the given language [108].
Compositionality provides a seemingly efficient way to satisfy these desiderata. There
are only finitely many words in the lexicon and syntax can have only finitely many rules of
combination. Here compositionality comes into play:
PRINCIPLE OF COMPOSITIONALITY The meaning of an expression is a func-
tion of the meanings of its parts and of the way they are syntactically combined.
If meanings are generated in such a way that compositionality is satisfied, then it seems that
all possible sentence meanings can be finitely generated. Now, although compositionality
is a guiding principle of formal semantics, the standard motivation as sketched above partly
appeals to such psychological notions as comprehension and production, while at the same
time invoking the patently non-psychological infinity of language. A quick way to dismiss
the argument from productivity is therefore to deny that language is infinite, even in the
sense of potential infinity. A moment’s reflection shows however that the issue is not really
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about infinity – substituting a large finite number for infinity does not change the essence
of the productivity argument, which is that not every sentence that can be understood or
produced given human cognitive limitations is stored. So, while there is no reason to have
a semantic theory that explains comprehension of nested center embeddings of arbitrary
depth, it is also not the case that all sentences with center embeddings with depth, say, ≤ 6
can be stored. In other words, psychologically speaking, the real issue is the balance between
storage and computation, and the role compositionality should play there. It might seem that
compositionality always leads to the most efficient architecture in this respect.
That this is not necessarily so, can be illustrated using an example from Keenan [110].
In an adjective–noun construction, the noun is the argument fed into the adjective, which is
viewed as a function. Keenan observes that the interpretation of the function word seems to
be determined by its argument: compare for instance the different meanings of the adjective
‘flat’ in ‘flat tyre’, ‘flat beer’, ‘flat note’ etc. It is of course technically possible, as Keenan
notes, to replace the single function ‘flat’ by a disjunctively defined function, where each of
the disjuncts corresponds to a separate meaning for ‘flat’, with suitable selection restrictions
on the argument. However, this technical solution is surely paradoxical. Compositionality
was invoked to account for productivity, which seemed hard to explain in terms of storage
only. But, in this case, compositionality can apparently be salvaged only by increasing the
demand on storage. From a processing perspective, it would be much better if there were
a single computational mechanism generating the meaning of a flat + noun construction,
starting from a single basic meaning of ‘flat’. These considerations show that the principle
of compositionality is affected by its ambiguous status: as a formal desideratum on the one
hand, and a processing hypothesis on the other.
1.2. The systematicity argument. A second argument in favor of compositionality is
based on the observation that languages are systematic, that is, the ability to understand
certain utterances is connected to the ability to understand certain others. For instance, any
native speaker of English that understands ’John loves Mary’ understands also ’Mary loves
John’.
SYSTEMATICITY Anyone who understands the complex expressions e and e′
built up through the syntactic operation F from the constituents e1, . . . ,en and
e′1, . . . ,e
′
n respectively, can thereby also understand any other expression e′′
built up through F from expressions among e1, . . . ,en,e′1, . . . ,e
′
n.
Systematicity seems to entail compositionality, but the issue here is whether languages are
systematic in the technical sense. For instance, anyone who understands ’The dog is asleep’
and ’The cat is awake’ can certainly understand ’The dog is awake’ and ’The cat is asleep’.
However, would everyone who understands ’within an hour’ and ’without a watch’ also
understand ’within a watch’ and ’without an hour’? The definition presupposes that e′′ is a
meaningful expression, and that e1, . . . ,en,e′1, . . . ,e
′
n can be freely combined and substituted
while keeping F constant. But the fact that we can hardly make sense of ’within a watch’
and ’without an hour’ suggests that this is not the case, thus languages are not systematic
in the sense of the definition above. Let us suppose for a moment that this difficulty can be
overcome. Would then systematicity force compositionality upon us? It seems it wouldn’t,
for systematicity says that, given the sentences ’The dog is asleep’ and ’The cat is awake’,
from the meanings of ’the dog’, ’the cat’, ’is asleep’ and ’is awake’ plus the syntax, one is
able to understand the meaning of ’The dog is awake’. Compositionality makes however
a stronger claim, namely that the meanings of ’the dog’ and ’is awake’ plus the syntax are
sufficient to do that. Thus, even if systematicity held, it would not buy us compositionality
(see Johnson [104], Szabo´[198], and Pullum and Scholz [166] for a discussion).
1.3. The methodological argument. A third argument assumes that compositionality
is needed as a constraint on doing semantics, that is, as an essential part of the explanatory
enterprise [103, 37]. For instance, if one has to explain why in the ‘donkey sentence’
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(1) If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it.
the DP ‘a donkey’ has universal force, it won’t do to say: ”well, in this context it simply has
universal force”. An account that starts out with the existential reading of the DP, and then
shows how its being embedded in the antecedent of a conditional changes its interpretation
from existential to universal, has at least the appearance of an explanation.
The trouble with the methodological argument is that compositionality is highly theory-
dependent [159]. Ideally, when looking for an explanation of a linguistic phenomenon, one
assumes the syntax and the semantics to be fully specified formal systems. In that case, it is
a definite question whether that phenomenon allows for a compositional treatment, and if
so, to what extent. If it does not, one may take this as a cue for changing the semantics. In
practice, however, the explanation of a new phenomenon of interest often leads to changes
in both syntax and semantics. Compositionality becomes a soft constraint indeed.
The much-needed methodological constraints have to be sought elsewhere, in a tighter
regimentation of syntactic and semantic theories. From our perspective, these constraints
should be cognitively motivated, in the sense that formal theories of syntax and semantics
should be viewed as ‘computational level theories’ in Marr’s [131] sense of actual syntactic
and semantic mechanisms. In the ideal case, it is then an empirical question whether syntax
and semantics communicate as compositionality says they do.
1.4. The modularity argument. A fourth argument for compositionality is suggested
by a notion of the language faculty as a ‘cognitive module’. Fodor [55] lists nine properties
characterizing modular systems: domain specificity, fast and mandatory operation, limited
central access to representations in a module, informational encapsulation, shallow outputs,
fixed neural architecture, specific breakdown patters, and characteristic ontogenic pace and
sequencing. Of these, the most relevant for our purposes is informational encapsulation. This
is the idea that perceptual systems – language included – are relatively impenetrable to the
bulk of the knowledge that is internally represented. Informational encapsulation says that
there are tight constraints on the flow and the handling of extra-modular information within
a module prior to the production of an output.
To a certain extent, informational encapsulation is assumed by any cognitive model of
language – which is not to say that all component-based architectures [98] are modular in
Fodor’s sense. Fodor’s – and Chomsky’s – original view of modularity is that a grammar’s
generative power can be captured by a single module, which comprises a finite repository of
lexical meanings and a finite repertoire of syntactic rules.1 Rules for semantic computation
(inference is a paradigmatic case) would then fall within the province of central systems. It
can be easily seen that the computations performed by this kind of modular machine are
those regimented by compositionality: the output produced by the module (the meaning of
a complex expression) is a function of the knowledge accessible to the module (the lexicon
and the syntax). But this is not the only modular architecture supporting compositionality.
For instance, one could postulate two modules: a module which produces syntactic analyses
of clauses, which are then fed into a second module that contains meanings for the lexical
items and combination procedures that mirror syntactic operations, and outputs a semantic
representation of the clause.2 Compositionality would then constrain the kind of traffic that
can occur between the two modules.
Regardless of the choice of modular architecture, compositionality seems to be relevant
insofar as it acts as a counterpart of information encapsulation at the level of description of
linguistic form. The connection between compositionality and informational encapsulation
can be made more explicit: if the composition of meanings is not affected by extra-modular
knowledge, then one can characterize the meaning of any complex expression as a function
of the meanings of its constituents and syntactic rules only, all of which are readily available
1The module also contains mechanisms for phonological decoding, but we ignore these for simplicity.
2For a modular view of semantics, see among others Borg [10] and Robbins [177] for a critical discussion.
48 3. THE PROCESSING CONSEQUENCES OF COMPOSITIONALITY
within the module.3 Clearly, this hinges very much on what one assumes is contained in the
module(s) – and this will be a recurrent theme in this chapter. What bears some emphasis
here is that the degree to which a system is informationally encapsulated can be determined
only based on empirical data. Hence, with this ‘argument from modularity’ in place, it also
becomes possible to treat compositionality as a processing principle, that is, as a constraint
on the range of data structures involved in language processing.
2. Compositionality as a processing principle
2.1. A first approximation. How can one constrain and refine compositionality based
on experimental data and cognitive considerations? One may start from the observation
that ‘function’ in the definition of compositionality needs to refer to some computable
input-to-output mapping, and that the input – lexical meanings and syntactic constraints
or rules – must be given incrementally:
INCREMENTAL COMPOSITION The meaning of a complex expression at some
processing stage σ is computed based on the constituent expressions processed
at σ and the syntactic structure built up at σ.4
This definition is silent as to whether meaning assembly involves the lexicon and the syntax
only, or whether other sources of information could enter the composition process. For this
we need another definition, which can be combined with the former:
SIMPLE COMPOSITION (i) The meanings of elementary expressions are the
only constraints on content in the computation of the meaning of a complex
expression. (ii) The syntax of elementary expressions is the only constraint on
structure in the computation of the meaning of a complex expression.
The notion of ‘weak’ or ‘enriched composition’ [171, 98] follows from the choice to allow
further constraints on content and structure. The distinction between content and structure
is admittedly vague, and it can only be made clearer based on particular formal theories of
syntax and semantics: recall compositionality’s theory-dependence [159]. We could go even
further and observe that, at least in formal approaches to grammar, the distinction vanishes,
and one is left with a purely syntactic analysis of meaning in some logical language. Still, it
remains a distinction worth keeping, especially because the brain appears to honor it, as is
reflected by the different electrophysiological traces left by morphosyntactic and semantic
manipulations [117, 151, 78]. Let us now see how two of the arguments for compositionality
presented above fare in light of the new definitions.
2.2. Productivity and modularity reconsidered. The plausibility of compositionality
is usually argued for by means of a rhetorical question, like ”what other mechanism could
explain the productivity of language?”, as if posing the question would already dictate the
answer. To address this point, it pays to be more precise regarding the technical implications
of simple composition. Consider two supposed consequences, due to Hintikka [89]:
CONTEXT INDEPENDENCE THESIS The meaning of an expression should not
depend on the context in which it occurs.
INSIDE-OUT PRINCIPLE The proper direction of a semantic analysis is from
the inside out; from the bottom up; from elementary to complex meanings.
Taken together, these notions suggest that we ought to take the concept of a ‘function’ in the
formulation of the principle very seriously. Semantic computation of complex expressions
is function application, so the meanings of simple expressions are not changed by virtue of the fact
3Jackendoff [98] makes the same point: “The hypothesis of syntactically transparent semantic composition has
the virtue of theoretical elegance and constraint. Its effect is to enable researchers to isolate the language capacity –
including its contribution to semantics – from the rest of the mind, as befits a modular conception.”
4For simplicity, we may assume that each word corresponds to a processing stage, and vice versa. An important
theoretical question is whether assuming finer-grained processing steps would lead to local inconsistencies between
incrementality and compositionality.
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that they occur as arguments of the function.5 This shows that the principle of compositionality
is tied to one very particular form of linguistic productivity, exemplified by the usual rules:
if S is a sentence, one can form a new sentence ‘I think that S’; if S1, S2 are sentences, one
can form ‘S1 and S2’; etc. But there exist other forms of productivity in natural languages,
which do not have this function-like character. An example is the progressive construction
in English when applied to stative verbs [30]:
(2) a. She resembles her mother.
b. She is resembling her mother.*
c. She is resembling her mother more and more every day.
‘Resemble’ is a stative verb, and this seems to be clinched by (2b), which clearly shows
the progressive is not applicable. Still, in a suitable context the progressive is applicable, as
in (2c), where it imposes a dynamic meaning upon ‘resemble’. Here resemblance comes in
degrees that can change over time. Therefore, the meaning of ‘resemble’ depends upon the
context in which it occurs, contradicting context independence. This variability of meaning
can still be predicted once one assumes that the progressive construction has a meaning of
its own, which it imposes upon that of the verb. This imposition of meaning is productive
in that it applies to several stative verbs. Simple composition as made precise by Hintikka
can account for this particular form of productivity only by assuming multiple meanings of
stative verbs, where the progressive selects for a dynamic meaning.
While compositionality can be salvaged formally, experiments on language processing
may well rule out such ad hoc maneuvers. There is a very different computational account of
what goes on in comprehending sentences such as (2c) that emphasizes the recomputation
of the meaning of ‘resemble’ which takes place when the adverbial phrase ‘more and more
every day’ is processed [212, chapter 11]. The two accounts thus differ in their processing
consequences. Simple composition in the Hintikka sense leads to a search and selection of
the appropriate meaning though not to recomputation, as the second account instead does.
These operations might give rise to different neurophysiological responses, as is suggested
by the data reported in chapter 5. The two accounts can be tested experimentally.
If recomputation were to be supported, where would that leave compositionality and
the work it is supposed to do? The strict reading embodied in Hintikka’s principles presents
semantic composition as entirely inside-out/bottom-up. The recomputation account is also
partially outside-in/top-down. In theory, this has the consequence that the meaning which
is assigned to an expression is always provisional, a situation that cannot occur on a literal
reading of compositionality (but see 3.1). However, there is room for both accounts, because
the productivity of language is a two-dimensional phenomenon. On the vertical dimension,
there is productivity due to increased syntactic complexity: here simple composition has an
important role to play. There is however also a horizontal dimension to productivity: here it
is not so much the syntactic complexity that increases, but new meanings of a given clause
are produced by varying syntactic or semantic aspects of other clauses. Thus, if we replace
the adverbial ‘more and more every day’ in (2c) with ‘in broad daylight’, the progressive is
no longer felicitous, because the verb ‘resemble’ then gets its default stative meaning. The
horizontal dimension of productivity seems to call for some form of enriched composition,
that is, ways of combining meaning that allow top-down influences and recomputation.
Two forms of top-down computation are consistent with informational encapsulation,
and thereby with its analog compositionality. First, information that is fed back comes from
and remains within the module, as when it is stored in the lexicon. Second, information is
fed back into the module from another module or from a central system after the production
of an output; this is a rather trivial way to preserve informational encapsulation in the face
of top-down computation. The former can be dismissed using an argument due to Hodges
[92], based on what we might call ‘top-down composition’. It takes its cue from Frege [59]:
5Just as the number 2 has the same meaning, whether it occurs as argument in the function 3x or in the function
3+ x. This is obvious in mathematics, but not in natural language, as we shall see.
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CONTEXT PRINCIPLE Elementary expressions do not have meaning in isola-
tion, but only in the context of (as constituents of) complex expressions.
In briefest outline, Hodges’ proposal is this. The syntax is defined in terms of constituent
structure in such a way that, if e is an expression occurring in a sentence S, then S can be
viewed as G(e), where G(x) is a syntactic frame with open slot x. Now define an equivalence
relation ∼ on expressions by putting
e∼ f iff for all G(x): G(e) is a sentence iff G( f ) is, and G(e) is acceptable in the same
contexts as G( f ).
The Fregean value of e is the equivalence class of e modulo ∼. Hodges shows that taking the
Fregean value of e as its meaning yields a compositional semantics. Therefore, if we assume
that the module contains all Fregean values, modularity is restored. Moreover, this notion
of meaning is pleasingly context-sensitive. Hodges gives the example of sentences which
have different social connotations, for instance ‘he is intoxicated’ vs. ‘he is pissed’ [92]. The
contexts in which these sentences are acceptable are very different. In this sense, these two
sentences have different meanings in Hodges’ semantics, whereas they would be treated as
synonymous with ‘he is drunk’ in a more standard framework.
Although Hodges’ proposal formally restores compositionality, it does so in a way that
upsets the balance between storage and computation, and renders it unclear how meanings
could be acquired. The Fregean value of e is defined by means of all possible uses of e, and
it is doubtful that these are available to a young language learner. In other words, learning
meanings is a gradual process, thus Fregean values should be partial objects, in the sense
of being defined by means of a subset of all possible uses of e, and being subject to update
and revision as learning proceeds – which is not what Hodges suggests. The point can be
amplified by considering what it means to know the Fregean value of e. There seem to be
two components to this:
(i) one must know which f are equivalent to e, which means that for all G(x) such
that G(e) is a sentence iff G( f ) is, G( f ) is acceptable in exactly the same contexts as
G(e) – this requires one to know for all sentences G(e) and all contexts C, whether
G(e) is acceptable in C;
(ii) one must know which f are not equivalent to e, which means that for all G such
that G(e) and G( f ) are sentences, one must know a context in which G(e) is ac-
ceptable and G( f ) is not, or vice versa.
Natural (as opposed to formal) languages may not incorporate the concise representations
generating the knowledge required. This implies that the storage component must already
contain a great deal of information about the sentences that can be constructed from e, and
the contexts in which these are acceptable. Intuitively, this goes against the very purpose of
a modular architecture, and it also goes against the original motivation for compositionality
as easing the burden on storage – recall the argument from productivity. We therefore tend
to read Hodges’ result, when applied to natural languages, as showing the implausibility of
an architecture in which context sensitivity is achieved by storing extra information within
the module, rather than by relaxing informational encapsulation to allow cross-module talk.
In brief, the a priori arguments considered here show that simple composition is not enough
to account for the full range of factors which make language productive. Let us now ask if
similar considerations are suggested by experimental work bearing on compositionality.
3. Compositionality and processing data
3.1. Semantic illusions. An assumption that underlies many semantic theories is that
only full lexical representations are used in meaning composition. In most proposals, this
choice is forced by the ontology: a lexical meaning is a placeholder for a typed entity, which
explains why inputs cannot be partial objects. Therefore, meaning assembly reduces to type
composition. This accounts for the fact that inputs are still recognizable in the end product.
In lexical semantics, by contrast, lexical meanings are complex, and yet compact structures,
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such as algorithms [144], feature or conceptual structures [96] etc. One possible refinement
of compositionality would then be to allow partial representations to be recruited during
processing.
Relevant to this issue is the well-known psychological phenomenon called the ‘Moses
illusion’ [45]. When asked ‘How many animals of each sort did Moses put on the ark?’, sub-
jects tend to respond ‘two’, without questioning the (false) presupposition that Moses was
the biblical character who did that. Similar results have been obtained with questions such
as ‘After an air-crash, where should the survivors be buried?’ [5] and ‘Can a man marry his
widow’s sister?’ [183]. Hearers seem to be processing these sentences superficially enough
to miss the false presuppositions, but Ferreira et al. [49, 50] go as far as suggesting that these
data challenge compositionality. Indeed, the meaning of the Moses question computed by
hearers and the meaning derived compositionally are in some important respect different.
For if the former were a function of the meanings of the constituents and the syntax, then
‘Moses’ would mean Moses and hearers would notice the false presupposition. This seems
an instance of a non-compositional process.
One might argue against this conclusion by emphasizing that these data just show that
not every word in the sentence need contribute its full meaning [184]. The ‘full meaning’ of
‘Moses’ may not be retrieved, but only some feature made salient by the context [184, 183].
This may be ‘biblical character’, ‘patriarch’, or another feature responsible for the semantic
proximity of ‘Noah’ and ‘Moses’ [215]. Feature sharing is, on this account, what gives rise
to the illusion. Crucially, the fact that the lexicon may be a locus of shallow processing (or
retrieval, as the case may be) does not speak against compositionality. Simple composition
entails that the lexicon is the only provider of content for complex meanings, though not
that full lexical representations must be used. The latter would be too strong a requirement
to force upon either simple or enriched composition. For if there exist such entities as ‘full
lexical meanings’ – and there are reasons to be suspicious about that – they can hardly be
used on most processing tasks, because of the massive amount of information, presumably
continuous with non-lexical knowledge, that would be fed into the composition process.
Incremental, context-sensitive feature selection during word meaning retrieval seems to be
a much more plausible default assumption. Semantic illusions can thus be seen as a special
case, in which some critical semantic feature is shared between the word triggering a true
presupposition (‘Noah’) and the word triggering a false presupposition (‘Moses’). In brief,
pace Ferreira et al., compositionality can be refined to accommodate semantic illusions, by
allowing the composition process to make use of partial lexico-semantic representations.
3.2. Lingering misinterpretations. Ferreira et al. studied cases of misinterpretation in
language processing. Some of these involve garden-path sentences:
(3) While Anna dressed the baby played in the crib.
The ‘garden-path model’ [58] hypothesizes that ‘the baby’ is initially parsed and interpreted
as a direct object of ‘dressed’. Only when the verb ‘played’ is encountered are the syntactic
and semantic representations revised to the effect that ‘the baby’ is the subject of ‘played’.
One issue here is whether the initial representation, featuring ‘the baby’ as a direct object,
is at all maintained in memory. Christianson et al. [25] show that, while readers correctly
respond for the affirmative to ‘Did the baby play in the crib?’, they also answer positively
to ‘Did Anna dress the baby?’. No grammar or parser on the market would allow the same
token NP to play two functional roles, subject and direct object. Nonetheless, this appears
to be precisely the interpretation arrived at by readers. Ferreira et al. [49] take this as “clear
evidence that the meaning people obtain for a sentence is often not a reflection of its true
content” – that is, it is not built up compositionally.
Does the existence of ‘lingering misinterpretations’ demonstrate that the processing
of garden-path sentences is non-compositional, as suggested by Ferreira and colleagues?
There are at least two ways of accounting for the data, from which different answers ensue.
On one account, the last interpretation subjects come up with is that while Anna dressed,
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the baby played in the crib, which corresponds to the revised parse whereby ‘the baby’ is the
subject of ‘played’, and is no longer the direct object of ‘dressed’. Interpretation is therefore
non-monotonic, that is, entailing the revision of an earlier structure. This however requires
a refinement of compositionality that was introduced earlier on – incremental composition.
On this view, both the initial and the revised interpretations can be derived compositionally,
and simple composition seems enough in this case. The persisting misinterpretation would
be taken as an effect of memory architecture or neural implementation. One aspect of the
data of Christianson et al. [25] which supports this story is that misinterpretations are more
frequent when the head of the misanalyzed phrase occurs early. That is, misinterpretations
are more likely to persist the longer they have been part of the initial discourse model.
On the second account, the final interpretation is that Anna dressed the baby while the
baby played in the crib. This meaning can hardly be derived compositionally. First, because
there is just a single token of ‘the baby’ among the constituents of the sentence, whereas the
final interpretation of the sentence contains two occurrences of it: one as the recipient of the
dressing action, the other as the agent of the playing activity – hence the ‘constituent parts’
aspect of the definition of compositionality is out. Second, because syntax does not allow a
phrase to play two distinct functional roles simultaneously – therefore the ‘syntax’ part of
the definition is out. To derive the meaning above, one needs a mechanism that copies the
token ‘the baby’ and makes both instances available for interpretation. Such a mechanism
does make processing non-compositional [49, 50]. Thus, misinterpretations of garden-path
sentences challenge compositionality, unless we assume that early semantic material lingers
in memory also during later stages, but is not part of the discourse model computed on the
basis of the revised syntactic analysis.
3.3. Event-related brain potentials. ERPs have already been mentioned in chapter 1.
Here we will skip technical details as much as possible and focus on the relevance of known
ERP components for compositionality. One key aspect of enriched composition is that the
stored meanings of elementary expressions are not the only source of content for complex
meanings. This challenges informational encapsulation, if one can demonstrate that such
additional semantic information is handled by the module before an output is produced [55].
ERPs allow one to make timing inferences of the kind required to address this issue [210].
An ERP component that is particularly relevant here is the N400. This is a negative shift
starting around 250 ms after word onset, peaking at 400 ms and lasting until approximately
550 ms. Every content word elicits an N400, but the amplitude of the component, relative to
some control condition, is dependent upon the degree of semantic relatedness of the given
word with its sentence [117, 118, 76] or discourse context [208, 209]. There is evidence that
the N400 does not merely reflect lexical access, but also the integration of a word’s meaning
into the unfolding semantic representation [75]. Tentatively, the N400 can be considered as
an index of the complexity of initial attempts to combine the meaning of a given word with
the meanings of the expressions already processed.
Another ERP effect that is of interest here is the P600. This is a positive shift starting
around 500 ms following the onset of the word and lasting for about 500 ms [151, 78]. Larger
P600 effects are elicited by sentences containing violations of syntactic constraints (such as
phrase structure, subcategorization and agreement), temporarily syntactically ambiguous
sentences, garden-path sentences, and constructions which show high syntactic complexity
[77, 61, 71]. In relation to incremental composition, we can regard the P600 as an index of
the time and resources involved in attaching a given word to the syntactic representation
computed thus far [71]. How do N400 and P600 data bear on compositionality?
3.4. World knowledge. Relevant to this question is an ERP experiment by Hagoort et
al. [79], using true (4a), false (4b) and semantically anomalous (4c) sentences:6
6The stimuli were in Dutch and participants were native Dutch speakers.
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(4) a. Dutch trains are yellow and very crowded.
b. Dutch trains are white and very crowded.
c. Dutch trains are sour and very crowded.
The words ‘white’ and ‘sour’ evoked very similar N400s, in both cases larger than the N400
elicited by ‘yellow’. Integrating the meanings of ‘white’ and ‘sour’ in the ongoing semantic
representation is thus relatively hard. This suggests that, upon encountering ‘Dutch trains’,
features are retrieved which code for the color of Dutch trains – typically yellow-blue – and
are responsible for the additional processing costs associated with ‘white’.
Although it is notoriously hard to define ‘core’ semantic features, separating linguistic
from world knowledge, it seems nonetheless possible to single out features that are invariant
across possible contexts of use, as well as across the individuals and communities using the
expression in question. That ‘sour’ cannot be predicated of trains is one such bit of invariant
knowledge, and in that sense it is a fact of ‘linguistic knowledge’. However, trains differ in
color and other properties in space and time, hence that ‘white’ cannot be applied to Dutch
trains reflects a contingent state of affairs which not all users of the expressions ‘train’ and
‘Dutch train’ may be aware of (‘world knowledge’). The N400 effects found by Hagoort et
al. show that ‘white’ is hard to integrate into its sentence context, which in turn suggests
there is some aspect of the meaning of ‘Dutch trains’ which makes integration hard. This
must be knowledge that Dutch trains are yellow and blue, not white. It therefore seems that
during processing, meanings are computed – for instance of the compound ‘Dutch trains’
– that encompass invariant and community-specific semantic information, that is, linguistic
and world knowledge.
As regards compositionality, these data may have two consequences, depending on
one’s view of the lexicon: either the lexicon encompasses declarative memory in its entirety,
and then simple composition seems enough to account for the similarity between the N400
effects, or the lexicon includes invariant meanings only, and then enriched composition –
the thesis that the lexicon is not the only source of semantic content – is necessary to explain
the observed N400s. If the lexicon is merely a theoretical construct for the linguist’s benefit,
then it seems one is free to choose one’s favorite view, and perhaps salvage compositionality
by adopting the first notion. If however ‘the lexicon’ refers to a natural kind (a functionally
segregated component of declarative memory), then enriched composition seems the only
option consistent with the empirical data. It is conceivable that brain research will be able
to settle the issue of the separability of the lexicon within the human memory system, and
thus place constraints on the scope of compositionality with respect to processing data.
3.5. Co-speech gestures. At least one other ERP experiment reporting modulations of
the N400 seems relevant to our discussion of compositionality. O¨zyu¨rek et al. [155] showed
that N400 effects are elicited by co-speech gestures which do not match the semantic content
of the accompanying sentence. This demonstrates that semantic information from different
modalities – in this case speech and co-speech gesture – is integrated in the same time frame.
The choice mentioned above between two views of the lexicon applies here too. If gesture
representations are stored in declarative memory – assuming the latter is entirely contained
in the lexicon – then simple composition seems enough to explain the data. However, there
exist experimental data showing that subjects attribute different meanings to a given iconic
gesture, providing evidence for the non-conventionalized nature of gesture meanings [20].
If indeed gesture schemes are not part of the lexicon, some form of enriched composition
must occur, which means the semantics of elementary linguistic expressions is not the only
source of content for complex meanings. This basic choice between two views of the lexicon,
and its consequences for the status of compositionality, illustrates how severe the problem
of compositionality’s theory-dependence is, and how pressing the need for more realistic
constraints on the components of the grammar.
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3.6. Fictional discourse. The data we have discussed so far might not constitute direct
empirical evidence for or against compositionality, but they reveal the existence of richer
meanings that embrace world knowledge or perceptual cues. Experimental research shows
that discourse is not only another source of content beyond lexical meanings, but can even
modify invariant semantic representations (as defined above) attached to lexical items. One
such extreme case of context-sensitivity can be found in fictional discourse. Nieuwland and
van Berkum [148] show that sentences which are otherwise sensible, like
(5) The peanut was salted.
are perceived as anomalous if they are embedded in a context where the inanimate subject
(‘the peanut’) is attributed animate features. So, in a narrative in which the peanut danced,
sang and met an almond it liked, ‘salted’ resulted in a larger N400 compared to ‘in love’:
(6) The peanut was in love.
This is taken to show that discourse can override even such deep-rooted semantic features
as animacy. These findings can also be read as a challenge to Hintikka’s principles, for they
seem to suggest that meaning is context-dependent, and semantic composition can proceed
from the outside-in, that is, from the discourse to lexical meaning.
Processing sentences such as (6) in a fictional context might indeed involve some form
of top-down composition which, if it cannot fall back on the mental lexicon as a repository
of contextual values of expressions (recall Hodges’ argument), then it has to exploit some
form of enriched composition, or perhaps give up a share of informational encapsulation –
which is the same. But there seems to be another way out for compositionality. One might
ask, not what is changed in the meaning of ‘peanut’ in the context in which it is depicted as
animate, but what is preserved of the original, invariant meaning of the word. There is no
evidence that any of the original semantic features of ’peanut’ are maintained. Therefore,
the word form ‘peanut’ in the fictional context at issue here may just be used as a label for
an animate subject or, more precisely, as a proper name with a reference but no (or perhaps
very little) sense. This could easily be handled in a compositional semantics. Processing the
adjective ‘salted’, given the plausible combination with ‘peanut’, might recover its original
sense, and this would explain the larger N400. This does not detract from the interest of the
data, nor from the explanation proposed by Nieuwland and van Berkum. It does exemplify,
however, the kind of problems one encounters when trying to put compositionality to test,
and in particular the exceptional elbow room the principle leaves to its own application. It
is precisely this resilience which has been taken by many as empirical vacuity.
3.7. Semantic attraction. The strict reading of compositionality implies that only two
sources of constraints can interact to produce complex meanings: syntax and the lexicon. A
further assumption is that the syntax is an analysis of the sentence as is given, for instance a
formal decomposition into constituents.7 Combining lexical meanings (representations or
types, depending on one’s ontology) based on the syntactic structure will produce an input
for interpretation. In this sense, meaning is often said to be dependent on the syntax. Kim
and Osterhout [111] designed an ERP study to test the extent to which syntax is actually in
control of the composition process. They presented participants with sentences like
(7) a. The hearty meal was devouring the kids.
b. The hearty meal was devoured by the kids.
and found that ‘devouring’ in (7a) elicited a larger P600 compared to ‘devoured’ in (7b). If
the syntax were taken as is given in the sentence – in well-formed sentences, that is – and if
it were only proposing input to the semantics, an N400 to ‘devouring’ should be expected:
indeed (7a) is syntactically well-formed, whereas a semantic constraint (animacy) appears
to be violated. The P600 indicates that (7a) is perceived as a syntactic violation, originating
from the impossibility at ‘devouring’ of building a passive construction. At the verb’s stem
7The extent to which a syntactic analysis is allowed to deviate from the surface form of an expression is a matter
of considerable debate. For a discussion, see Culicover and Jackendoff [32, 33].
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‘devour-’, the passive is the only continuation compatible with a plausible meaning for the
sentence, as is testified by (7b). The data therefore show not only that semantic attraction to
a more plausible interpretation is an important source of constraints in sentence processing
– which could also be concluded if ‘devouring’ induced a larger N400 – but also that such
constraints can override syntactic cues as these are given in the input – which is what the
P600, as a syntax-related effect, shows. Compositionality can be salvaged only by assuming
that semantic attractors, such as ‘kids devour hearty meals’, are configurations of the lexical
network and not, as would seem more intuitively appealing, the result of inference. But this
move is once again paradoxical. Compositionality was introduced to explain productivity,
and therefore to ease the burden on storage. Now it seems we need a growing inventory
of stored semantic notions to maintain compositionality. The same holds, mutatis mutandis,
for the cases involving world knowledge and co-speech gestures discussed above.
3.8. Coercion. A phenomenon that is often taken as a challenge to compositionality is
complement coercion. Consider the following sentences:
(8) a. The journalist began the article after his coffee break.
b. The journalist wrote the article after his coffee break.
The intuitive difference between (8a) and (8b) is that, while in ‘wrote the article’ the relevant
activity (writing) is mentioned as part of the asserted content, it is not in ‘began the article’.
So, if a full event sense is to be recovered from (8a), the activity must be inferred based on
other semantic cues present in the sentence and stored knowledge. One candidate analysis,
due to Pustejovsky [171], focuses on the NP as the source of the difference between the two
sentence types. On this view, ‘the article’ is an entity-denoting expression, which combined
with verbs such as ‘begin’ denotes an event. Coercion is seen as an instance of type-shifting,
where types specify a basic ontology of entities, events etc. An alternative analysis centers
around the VP, and posits event structures of varying complexity depending on the VP’s
aspectual class [212]. Each VP is represented semantically by a quadruple < f1, f2,e, f3 >,
where f1 represents a force being exerted, f2 the object or state driven by the force, e the
goal toward which the exertion of the force is directed, and f3 the state of having achieved
that goal. There may be empty slots in the quadruple, again depending on the Aktionsart
of the VP. Accomplishments such as ‘write an article’ feature a full event structure, while
achievements such as ‘begin an article’ include only a punctual event e (the beginning of
an unspecified activity involving the article) and a consequent state (of having begun that
activity). In this analysis, coercion is formalized as the transition to a richer event structure,
in which the activity f1 is also represented.8 Both proposals rely on some form of enriched
composition, as in both cases an operation of meaning assembly that is not syntactic in
nature (type-shifting or transition to a richer event structure) is postulated.
An interpretation of (8a) in which the activity remains unspecified is conceivable, and
it falls to experimental research to provide evidence for or against the existence of enriched
composition in cases of complement coercion. A series of studies have shown that coercing
sentences result in increased processing costs compared to controls [137, 205, 204, 136, 173],
and some ERP evidence for complement coercion will be presented in chapter 6. These data
seem to challenge simple composition.9 A compositional analysis may still be applicable if
the operation responsible for generating enriched meanings (for instance, type-shifting) is
incorporated into the syntax. However, this choice can be criticized on different grounds.
On empirical grounds, because it predicts that ‘article’ in (8a) would result in a P600 effect,
which correlates with syntactic complexity. However, the available data show a different
effect than the P600 (see chapter 6 and indirectly the MEG study by Pylkka¨nen and McElree
[173]). On theoretical grounds, because a syntactic reduction of coercion requires syntactic
representations which resemble less and less a formal decomposition into constituents [32]:
8This transition is in fact based on inference and unification, as we will show in chapter 6.
9Evidence for enriched composition in cases of aspectual coercion has also been found [163, 162].
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the simplicity and theoretical elegance which are gained by reintroducing compositionality
are lost at the level of description of syntactic structure.
4. The balance between storage and computation
In this chapter we have tried to show that compositionality, properly operationalized, can
be tested against empirical data. We have also seen that behavioral and neurophysiological
data undermine compositionality (simple composition), unless the balance between storage
and computation is upset in favor of storage. It now seems appropriate to ask whether there
is any interesting sense in which compositionality can be said to hold.
Compositionality (simple composition) remains effective as an explanation of cases in
which processing complexity increases due to syntactic factors only. However, it falls short
of accounting for situations in which complexity arises from interactions with the sentence
or discourse context, perceptual cues, and stored knowledge. The idea of compositionality
as a methodological principle is appealing, but imputing the complexity to one component
of the grammar or another, instead of changing the notion of composition, is not always an
innocuous move that leads to fully equivalent theories. One may be tempted to believe that
equivalent theories in this sense are in principle indistinguishable in the face of empirical
data. Nevertheless, neuroscience grants us restricted selective access to linguistic processes
and representations in the brain, as exemplified by the difference between N400 and P600.
Therefore, there is at least a chance that what appear to be neutral methodological choices
are in fact controvertible given the data. Compositionality sets also an upper bound on the
degree of informational encapsulation that can be posited by modular or component-based
theories of language: simple composition ties in with a strongly modular take on meaning
assembly, which is seen as sealed off from information streams other than the lexicon and
the syntax. Empirical data seem to suggest that this upper bound is not always attainable.
This implies a weakening of the notion of compositionality, but also more complex traffic
either within a module or between modules. So compositionality is also crucial for issues of
architecture of, and connectivity within, the language system. Perhaps the most important
of these issues is the balance between storage and computation. Compositionality can often
be rescued by increasing the demand on the storage component of the architecture, whereas
it must be abandoned if one puts more realistic constraints on storage. In the latter case, of
course, the demand on the computational component is increased.
Part 2
The electrophysiology of meaning

CHAPTER 4
Processing temporal constraints
This chapter is a modified version of G. Baggio. Processing temporal constraints: An ERP study. In M. Gullberg & P.
Indefrey (Eds.), Time to Speak: Cognitive and Neural Prerequisites for Time in Language. Wiley-Blackwell, 2008. Appeared
also in Language Learning 58, 2008: 35-55.
1. Introduction
Reference to time is ubiquitous in natural language, to the point that nearly every assertion
involves the location of some event within a temporal coordinate system. Much attention
has been paid to the linguistic structures used to encode temporal information, which range
from prepositional phrases (‘before the dawn’) to verb suffixes (‘-ed’ in the English regular
simple past), to expressions borrowed from technical languages, for instance mathematics
(‘10−35 seconds into the expansion phase’). Linguists have provided precise accounts of the
functioning of these devices, often using the formal tools made available by modern logic.
However, comparatively little is known about how expressions of time are represented and
used to compute temporal reference in the brain. Our aim here is to contribute to this line
of research by combining a formal analysis of tense with ERP data on tense processing.
1.1. An analysis of tense and temporal adverbials. In this section, we will present a
linguistic analysis of sentences in which tense is correctly or incorrectly used, like:
(1) a. Last sunday Vincent painted the window frames of his country house.
b. Last sunday Vincent paints the window frames of his country house.*
These sentences recognizably form a minimal pair of the kind customarily used in language
processing experiments. The formal treatment of tense outlined below is intended to drive
the interpretation of the ERP data presented in section 3.2. The main theoretical claim will
be that processing sentences such as (1a) involves solving a constraint satisfaction problem
where the relevant temporal constraints are introduced by the semantics of the adverbial
‘last sunday’1 and of the verb ‘painted’. Conversely, processing a sentence such as (1b) leads
to a failure to solve simultaneously such constraints. Even though the analysis developed
here brings semantics center stage, tense has ramifications in morphology which can hardly
be ignored. Before we turn to semantics, some notes on morphology are therefore in order.
1.1.1. Morphology. Comrie [27] defined tense as the “grammaticalization of location in
time”. Unpacked, this definition reads that tense is concerned with the location of events
in time – or, possibly, a cognitive representation of time – and that the expression of time is
(i) obligatory and (ii) morphologically bound on verbs. Notice, however, that this can only
be taken to imply that verbs obligatorily carry temporal information via morphemes, and
not that there are morphological rules which determine, for any given verb form, whether
tense is correctly used. Let us try to clarify this point with reference to examples (1).
1Syntactically, expressions that denote temporal frames, for instance ’last sunday’, are NPs and not adverbs.
On the other hand, these expressions seem to modify the main verb, and in this sense they function like adverbs.
The syntactic analysis presented in 4.1 reconciles these two views by postulating a silent preposition, e.g. ’on’, which
makes it possible to attach ‘last sunday’ in the syntactic structure as a prepositional phrase, that is, as an adjunct of
time. In what follows, we will call these expressions ’adverbials’ to distinguish them from genuine adverbs of time
like quantification and frequency adverbs.
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The verb forms ‘painted’ in (1a) and ‘paints’ in (1b) convey, via the suffixes ‘-ed’ and
’-s’, the information that the painting event is located, respectively, in the past and in the
present of the moment of speech. Importantly, both forms are morphologically correct, in
the sense in which, for instance, the over-regularized verb form ‘goed’ (past of ‘to go’) is not.
What makes ‘paints’ incorrect in the context of (1b) is a mismatch between its semantics,
that is, the fact that it refers (at least by default) to a present event, and that of the adverbial
‘last sunday’, that defines a time window in the past of the moment of speech in which the
main event is to be located.
From these considerations, two views on the processing consequences of the violation
in (1b) ensue. On the first, (1b) is perceived by the language system as a semantic violation,
and not as a morphological one, because, as we have seen, ‘paints’ is in fact morphologically
well-formed. On the second, ‘paints’ in (1b) is perceived as a morphological anomaly, even
though its origin is semantic. This option requires the additional hypothesis that the system
is endowed with an interface component, in Jackendoff’s [99] sense, that mediates between
semantics and morphology, and that, on the basis of the meaning of ‘last sunday’, constrains
the set of suffixes which the verb stem ‘paint-’ – or any other verb stem, for that matter – can
take. In this chapter, we wish to remain neutral with respect to this issue, despite its obvious
importance. Instead, we will consider the processing consequences of the observation that,
regardless of which hypothesis is correct – that is, regardless of whether (1b) is perceived as
containing a semantic or a morphological anomaly – it is the mismatch between the semantic
features of the adverbial and the verb which determines that tense is used incorrectly.
1.1.2. Semantics. In the coming paragraphs, we will present an analysis of sentences
like (1a) and (1b), trying to add formal detail to the claim that tense violations are semantic
in nature. The analysis is based on a lightweight adaptation of the theory of tense and aspect
of van Lambalgen and Hamm [212], which has been introduced in previous chapters. The
formalism adopted by van Lambalgen and Hamm is an Event Calculus – different though
from the event calculi developed in the Davidsonian tradition, for instance by Parsons [157]
or Larson and Segal [121] – reformulated using the computational machinery of Constraint
Logic Programming.
The Event Calculus is a many-sorted predicate logic with sorts for eventualities viewed
either perfectively, called events, or imperfectively, call fluents. As we shall see soon, fluents
can be used to represent both processes and temporal intervals such as, for instance, the
period denoted by ‘last sunday’. Temporal and causal relations are modeled using predicates
and constraints, combined in formulae called either clauses or integrity constraints. Here we
will employ two predicates only: Happens(e, t), which means that event type e has a token at
time t, and HoldsAt(f , t), meaning that the fluent f holds at time t. Constraints are equalities
(x= y) or inequalities (xR y) whose function is to relate the values of the temporal variables
that occur as arguments of the predicates.
Discourse comprehension involves the construction of a model making discourse true
[212, 194]. More precisely, as each word is processed, an estimate of the meaning intended
by the speaker is computed, that is, a representation making most of what his heard or read
true and consistent with the grammar and stored knowledge. This process is incremental,
in that each new incoming word results in an update of the model computed during the
preceding stage. Lexical meanings can be formalized as sets of clauses, of which an example
will be given soon (see also the scenario for ‘writing a letter’ in chapter 2), and updates are
regimented by integrity constraints. Recall that these are statements that can take the form of
obligations ‘?ϕ succeeds’, forcing an update of the model satisfying ϕ, or prohibitions ‘?ϕ
fails’, blocking updates of the model satisfying ϕ.
The tenses can be treated as integrity constraints which instruct the system to update
the current discourse model so as to locate the relevant event in the past, present or future
of the moment of speech [212]. Further characterization of the event may involve integrity
constraints for aspectual profiles (perfect/imperfective; chapter 2). The following integrity
constraints may serve as a first approximation of the meaning of the past tense:
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(2) a. ?Happens(e, t) ∧ t < now succeeds
b. ?Happens(e, t) ∧ t = now fails
While (2a) forces the system to update the current discourse model such that e is located at
t, in the past of the moment of speech now, (2b) captures the implicature that the event e lies
entirely in the past. However, as has often been observed (see the classic Partee [158]), the
past tense is anaphoric, for it requires an anchor expression, such as a temporal adjunct, in
the preceding discourse context. Thus, the sentence ‘Vincent painted the window frames of
his country house’, uttered without a prior temporal context, would be under-informative
(‘When exactly did he do so?’) [68]. This suggests that (2) should be refined as follows:
(3) a. ?HoldsAt(f , t) ∧ Happens(e, t) ∧ t < now succeeds
b. ?HoldsAt(f , t) ∧ Happens(e, t) ∧ t = now fails
The meaning of the present tense is captured by the following integrity constraint (see van
Lambalgen and Hamm [212] for a more rigorous analysis):
(4) ?HoldsAt(f , t) ∧ Happens(e, t) ∧ t = now succeeds
The fluent f in (3) and (4) has to be unified with material from the preceding context,
for example a temporal adverbial. ‘Last sunday’ can be analyzed as proposed by Hamm et
al. [83]. We first partition the time line in seven segments of equal length, corresponding to
the days of the week: f Su, fMo, ..., f Sa. Next we stipulate that the meaning of the adverbial is
given by the clause (5), where fCPSu denotes the closest past sunday:
(5) HoldsAt(fSu, s) ∧ s< now ∧ |now− s| ≤ 7 days→ HoldsAt(fCPSu, s)
Unification works as follows. Upon encountering a sentence like (1a) or (1b), the system is
incrementally confronted with a constraint satisfaction problem. Let us first consider (1a).
Processing the phrase ‘last sunday’ results in a model in which the query ?HoldsAt(fCPSu, t)
succeeds, that is, in which the antecedent of (5) holds. When the verb ‘painted’ is processed,
the system tries to satisfy (3). This is done by unifying f in (3) with fCPSu in (5) (f =fCPSu) and
t in (3) with s in (5) (s= t). All constraints set up by (1a) can be satisfied, as no inconsistency
follows. Let us now turn to (1b). Processing the phrase ‘last sunday’ leads again to a model
in which the antecedent of (5) holds. When the verb ‘paints’ is processed, the system tries to
satisfy (4). However, unifying s with t (s= t) would lead to an inconsistency. While s< now
has been satisfied when processing the adverbial, (4) requires on the contrary that t = now
(or equivalently, under the proposed unification, s = now) succeeds. These two constraints
cannot be satisfied simultaneously. This leads to the following definition of ‘tense violation’:
there is a mismatch between an temporal modifier and verb’s tense, or two verbs’ tenses,
when the unification of the temporal variables set up by the relevant expressions fails.
1.1.3. Consequences for ERP studies of tense. The definition just proposed can be used in
a critical assessment of the ERP literature on tense. The first attempt at investigating tense
violations using ERPs was made by Kutas and Hillyard [116]. In this experiment, a group
of English speakers was presented with sentences like the following:
(6) a. Most of the earth’s weather happens in the bottom layer of the atmosphere
called the troposphere.
b. Most of the earth’s weather happens in the bottom layer of the atmosphere calls
the troposphere.*
c. The eggs and meat of this turtle are considered choice food by many people.
d. The eggs and meat of this turtle are consider choice food by many people.*
e. This allows them to stay under water for a longer period.
f. This allows them to stayed under water for a longer period.*
Incorrect sentences elicited a positive shift peaking at about 300 ms following the verb and
approaching significance at parietal sites, and a negative wave in the 300-400 ms window,
suggestive of an N400 effect [117]. Leaving a functional account of these effects aside, there
are two issues with this study. First, (6b), (6d) and (6f) are not instances of tense violations,
as none of these sentences contains a temporal expression, such as a temporal adverbial or a
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temporal preposition phrase, with which the verb’s tense fails to agree. Second, anomalies
are realized in rather different ways: in (6b) the present indicative ‘calls’ replaces the past
participle ‘called’; in (6d) the infinitive ‘consider’ replaces the past participle ‘considered’;
and in (6e) the past participle ‘stayed’ replaces the infinitive ‘stay’.
Osterhout and Nicol [154] investigated the ERP correlates of “verb tense violations” in
modal constructions, presenting to a group of English speakers sentences like:
(7) a. The cats won’t eat the food that Mary leaves them.
b. The cats won’t eating the food that Mary leaves them.*
c. The expensive ointment will cure all known forms of skin disease.
d. The expensive ointment will curing all known forms of skin disease.*
e. The new fighter planes can fly faster than anyone had expected.
f. The new fighter planes can flying faster than anyone had expected.*
In the 300-500 ms window, incorrect sentences were more positive at posterior sites of the
midline, whereas the LAN (Left Anterior Negativity) elicited by anomalous verbs did not
differ significantly from the effect evoked by correct verbs. In the 500-800 ms time interval,
incorrect sentences were more positive at mid-line and posterior sites, consistently with the
distribution of the P600 [151, 78]. The ERPs elicited by sentence-final words in the violation
condition were more negative-going compared to those observed in correct sentences, they
started 200 ms following the sentence-final word and continued throughout the epoch. Also
in this case, it should be noted that sentences (7) do not contain tense violations. The verbs
lack an anchor point in the preceding discourse with respect to which tense agreement can
be evaluated.
In an ERP study by Allen et al. [1], “syntactic (tense) violations” were investigated in
sentences containing either high-frequency (HF) or low-frequency (LF) verbs:
(8) a. The man will work on the platform. (HF)
b. The man will worked on the platform.* (HF)
c. The man will sway on the platform. (LF)
d. The man will swayed on the platform.* (LF)
Correct low-frequency verbs elicited a larger N400, ungrammatical verbs a larger P600, and
low-frequency anomalous verbs a bi-phasic increase of N400 and P600. In the 500-900 ms
window a significant main effect for grammaticality was found, maximal on posterior sites
as is typical of the P600. Unfortunately, (8*) do not contain tense violations, contrary to the
authors’ claim that the “sentences ‘He will walked’ and ‘He will swayed’ are equally and
unconditionally ill-formed with respect to tense” [1].
In brief, the experiments of Kutas and Hillyard [116], Osterhout and Nicol [154] and
Allen et al. [1] did not bring into play genuine tense violations. In none of these studies
stimulus sentences were such that the anomalous verb located the event described by the
main clause outside a frame specified by an anchoring temporal expression.
Genuine tense violations have been investigated in two ERP studies. Fonteneau et al.
[56] presented a group of French speakers with sentences like:
(9) a. Demain l’e´tudiant lira le livre.
b. Demain l’e´tudiant lisait le livre.*
The adverbial modifier ‘demain’ specifies a temporal frame within which the eventuality
denoted by the main clause is taken to occur. Because the lapse of time denoted by ‘demain’
is located after the moment of speech, the tense of the verb should be future as in (9a). In
(9b) the verb ‘lisait’ locates the event in the past, thus outside the temporal frame specified
by ‘demain’. Based on the definition given above, (9b) is therefore a genuine tense violation.
Anomalous verbs evoked a bi-phasic wave in the 450-550 ms interval following the onset
of the critical word, with a negative maximum over posterior sites and a positive anterior
peak. Given current knowledge of ERP components as modulated by linguistic processes,
it is hard to make sense of these effects, for they do not fall within any of the (E)LAN, N400
or P600 classes. Also, given the semantics of the Imparfait and its cognitive-computational
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consequences [212], the Passe´ Simple ‘lut’ might have been a more suitable candidate for
realizing tense violations without aspectual confounds.
Steinhauer and Ullman [192] presented their subjects with sentences like:
(10) a. Yesterday, I sailed Diane’s boat to Boston.
b. Yesterday, I sail Diane’s boat to Boston.*
In (10), ‘yesterday’ specifies a past time frame for the occurrence of the main event. In (10b),
‘sail’ locates the event in the present, thus outside the period denoted by ‘yesterday’. In the
400-900 ms time window following verb onset, tense violations elicited a consecutive LAN
(400-500 ms) and P600 (600-900 ms), taken by the authors as signatures of morpho-syntactic
processing. Regardless of whether ‘sail’ was perceived as semantically or morphologically
anomalous (see 1.1.1), the LAN observed by Steinhauer and Ullman indicates that semantic
information, in the form of temporal constraints – or anything functionally equivalent – set
up by the adverbial, is used by the system as early as 400 ms after verb onset. The results
of the experiment reported below suggest that the ERP effects of tense violations might be
even earlier than this.
2. Method
2.1. Materials. The Dutch materials used in the experiment were 80 critical sentences,
40 correct and 40 tense violations, and 240 fillers. All sentences had the following structure:
a past temporal adverbial was followed by the main, simple past or present tensed verb, a
subject NP and an object NP, in most cases modified by a PP. Below are some examples of
the stimuli used:
(A) Afgelopen zondag lakte Vincent de kozijnen van zijn landhuis.
Last sunday painted Vincent the window-frames of his country-house.
‘Last sunday Vincent painted the window frames of his country house.’
(B) Afgelopen zondag lakt Vincent de kozijnen van zijn landhuis.*
Last sunday paints Vincent the window-frames of his country-house.
‘Last sunday Vincent paints the window frames of his country house.’
The temporal adverbials were ‘Vorige week’ (‘last week’), ‘Vorige maand’ (‘last month’),
‘Vorig jaar’ (‘last year’), ‘Vorige eeuw’ (‘last century’), ‘Afgelopen N’ for each day of the
week, each month and each season. Each adverbial was used at most three times. Eighty
verbs were used, 40 regulars and 40 irregulars, 20 activities, 25 accomplishments and 35
achievements. The mean length (correct: M=7.41, SD=2.56; violation: M=6.79, SD=2.25) and
raw word frequency (correct: M=6898.34, SD=34220.5; violation: M=7174.91, SD=44939.35)
of the verbs were normed using the CELEX corpus for Dutch [4]. There were no differences
between conditions (T -tests, P > 0.9 in all comparisons). All non-critical words, including
sentence-final words, and sentence length were the same across conditions as illustrated by
(A)-(B). Fillers were 160 grammatically well-formed sentences containing the prepositions
‘after’ and ‘before’ and 80 verb-adverbial sentences (40 correct and 40 tense violations) sim-
ilar to critical items but constructed using different lexical material. Two test versions were
constructed, consisting of pseudo-randomized lists of critical and filler items.
2.2. Participants. Twenty five students participated in the experiment. One was left
out of the final analysis due to a high number (> 20%) of trials contaminated by artifacts, so
there remained 24 participants (mean age 24.6, 14 female; with no history of neurological,
psychiatric or cognitive disorders). Subjects were selected from the database of the Donders
Centre for Cognitive Neuroimaging at the Radboud University Nijmegen. They received e
6 per hour or course credits for taking part in the experiment.
2.3. Procedure. After applying the electrodes (see 2.4), participants were conducted
into the experimental room and were asked to sit in front of a video monitor. The stimuli
were presented on the screen word-by-word (600 ms SOA, 300 ms word duration, white on
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black background), and were followed by a fixation cross presented for 1500 ms. Partici-
pants were instructed to read each sentence carefully and to blink or move only when the
fixation cross was shown. The experiment took about 50 minutes to be completed and was
divided into 4 blocks of 80 trials each.
2.4. Recording. The EEG/EOG was recorded from 32 sintered Ag/AgCl electrodes.
Two electrodes were placed at the outer canthi of the left and right eyes. One electrode
below the left eye monitored vertical eye movements. The remaining 29 electrodes were
arranged according to American Electrophysiological Society conventions at the following
locations: Fp1, Fp2, F7, F3, Fz, F4, F8, FC5, FC1, FCz, FC2, FC6, T7, C3, Cz, C4, T8, TP10,
CP5, CP1, CP2, CP6, P7, P3, Pz, P4, P8, O1, O2. The left mastoid electrode served as true ref-
erence. All electrodes were re-referenced off-line to a linked mastoid. Electrode impedance
was kept below 5 kΩ throughout the experiment. The EEG/EOG was amplified by a mul-
tichannel BrainAmp DC system, with the following settings: 500 Hz sampling rate, a low
pass filter at 70 Hz, and a 10 s time constant.
2.5. Data Analysis. The data was analized using FieldTrip,2 a MATLAB package for
processing EEG/MEG data. Several transforms were applied to each participant’s data-set.
Segments corresponding to the verb and the sentence-final word were extracted from the
EEG with an interval of 200 ms before and 1000 ms after stimulus onset. Baseline correction
was based on a 200 ms pre-stimulus interval. Two FieldTrip functions were used for artifact
rejection. The first rejected all trials containing activity exceeding a threshold of ±100 µV .
The second function discarded trials contaminated with eye movements or blinks based on
thresholding the z-transformed value of the raw data in the EOG channels, preprocessed
using a band-pass filter at 1-15 Hz. A 30 Hz low-pass filter was applied to the segmented,
artifact-free data. ERPs were obtained for each participant by averaging over trials in each
experimental condition. A 5 Hz low-pass digital filter was used to produce the waveforms
shown in figures 1-2. Topographical plots and statistical analyses used the 30 Hz low-pass
filtered data. Statistical analyses were based on a non-parametric randomization procedure
[129, 130] which took as input mean amplitude values in each condition in time bins of 100
ms, starting from the onset of the relevant word and ending 1000 ms after, and returned a
cluster of electrodes in which the difference between the conditions was significant in each
time bin, the sum of T statistics in that cluster, and Monte Carlo estimates of P-values.
3. Results
A visual inspection of ERP waveforms elicited by the verb (figure 1-b) reveals a negative
deflection that peaks at approximately 100 ms after verb onset, and is followed by a positive
shift with a trough around 200 ms. The amplitude of these two components, referred to as
N100 and P200 respectively, in not affected by the experimental manipulation: there are
no electrode clusters between 0 and 200 ms after verb onset at which the mean amplitude
difference between tense violations and correct sentences is significant (table 1). The P200 is
followed by a negative shift, larger for tense violations over left-anterior scalp sites, starting
around 200 ms from verb onset and lasting for approximately 200 ms (figure 1-b). There are
clusters of electrodes in which the negativity is significant between 200 and 400 ms (table
1, figure 1-a), and marginally significant between 400 and 500 ms. We refer to this effect as
a left-anterior negativity (LAN). Around 600 ms following verb onset, the waveforms are
characterized by a bi-phasic (positive-negative) response (figure 1-b), which however is not
different between conditions in either the 500-600 ms or the 600-700 ms intervals (table 1).
A positive shift, larger for tense violations at right-posterior electrodes sets on at about 700
ms and lasts for the entire epoch (figure 1). However, only marginally significant positive
clusters were found between 700 and 1000 ms (table 1). This effect is an instance of P600
[151, 78].
2For more information, see http://fieldtrip.fcdonders.nl/
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(A) Afgelopen zondag lakte Vincent de kozijnen van zijn landhuis. (Tense correct) 
(B) Afgelopen zondag lakt Vincent de kozijnen van zijn landhuis. (Tense violation) 
"Last sunday Vincent painted the window frames of his country house.# 
"Last sunday Vincent paints the window frames of his country house.# 
FIGURE 1. (a) Grand-average (N=24) topographies displaying the mean
amplitude difference between the ERPs evoked by the verb in tense viola-
tions and in correct sentences. (b) Grand-average (N=24) ERP waveforms
from frontal, central and parietal electrode sites time locked to the onset
(0 ms) of the verb in tense violations and correct sentences. Negative
values are plotted upwards.
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FIGURE 2. (a) Grand-average (N=24) topographies displaying the mean
amplitude difference between the ERPs evoked by the sentence-final
word in tense violations and correct sentences. (b) Grand-average (N=24)
ERP waveforms from frontal, central and parietal electrode sites time
locked to the onset (0 ms) of the sentence-final word in tense violations
and correct sentences. Negative values are plotted upwards.
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The waveforms evoked by sentence-final words show similar N1-P2 complexes (figure
2-b). The amplitude of these early, largely endogenous components is not affected by verb
tense (table 1). The P2 is followed by a negative shift, peaking at about 400 ms following the
onset of the sentence-final word (figure 2-b). There are no significant clusters between 200
and 400 ms, but the negativity becomes significantly larger for tense violations between 400
and 700 ms (figure 2, table 1). The effect bears some superficial resemblance with the N400,
in particular in its polarity and central distribution [117]. However, it has a later maximum
and is more sustained compared to the N400. In what follows, we will refer to this effect as
sentence-final negativity (SFN).
Time Verb Sentence-final word
Negative clusters Positive Clusters Negative clusters Positive Clusters
200-300 ms T (22) =−9.97
P= 0.046
300-400 ms T (22) =−14.46
P= 0.026
400-500 ms T (22) =−7.81 T (22) =−15.33
P= 0.056 P= 0.022
500-600 ms T (22) =−34.62
P= 0.006
600-700 ms T (22) =−6.66
P= 0.038
700-800 ms T (22) = 5.01
P= 0.09
800-900 ms T (22) = 4.44
P= 0.064
900-1000 ms T (22) = 6.70
P= 0.05
TABLE 1. Summary of cluster-based T -statistics for the ERP data. Tense
violations and correct sentences are compared at the verb and at the
sentence-final word in time bins of 100 ms starting from word onset. The
first significant effects occurred at 200-300 ms. Empty cells denote the
absence of (marginally) significant clusters.
4. Discussion
As the reader may recall from chapter 1, relations between linguistic theory and processing
data are notoriously problematic [165]. In particular, the notion that behavioral and brain
data can constrain linguistic theories, and that the theory of ‘competence’ can be shaped by
‘performance’ data, seems far from accepted, even though it is sometimes granted that the
converse is the case [99]. Following Jackendoff [101], we assume that a linguistic theory can
be chosen over its competitors also based on its capacity to account, at the appropriate level
of analysis [131], for data on language processing and acquisition. Here we will outline a
theory of tense at the syntax-semantics interface that meets this requirement. The model is
moreover consistent with the observation that the constraints set up by a temporal adverbial
are used to process a main verb as early as 200-300 ms after the onset of the latter.
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4.1. Tense, parsing and comprehension. A missing piece in the analysis of temporal
expressions in section 1.1.2 is syntax. Here we adopt a lexicalist parser developed by Vosse
and Kempen [221], and applied by Hagoort [71] to account for syntax-related ERP effects.
The parser assumes that syntactic information is stored in the mental lexicon as three-tiered
unordered trees (‘syntactic frames’) that specify the admissible syntactic environment of a
particular word. The syntactic frames associated with ‘last’, ‘sunday’, ‘Vincent’ and ‘paint’
are shown in (11), and ‘on’ is assumed to be silent as in (1). The topmost tier of each frame is
constituted by a single root node which contains phrasal information (NP, S etc.) and which
dominates a set of functional nodes in the second tier. For instance, an S node dominates four
functional nodes, that is, subject, head, direct object and modifier; an NP node will have at
most three functional nodes, namely determiner (if it is not associated with a proper name),
head and modifier; and so forth. The third tier contains again phrasal nodes, called foot nodes,
to which the root node of another syntactic frame can be attached.
(11) PP4
 HH
hd
prep
on
obj
NP1
AP2
hd
Adj
last
NP1


HH
HH
det
DP
hd
NP
sunday
mod
AP2
NP3
 HH
hd
NP
Vincent
mod
Adj
S


   @@ PP
PPP
subj
NP3
hd
VP
paint
dobj
NP
mod
PP4
Parsing consists in (i) checking agreement features of words such as number, gender, tense
etc., (ii) checking word order, and (iii), only if these checks are passed, in unifying frames
with identical root and foot nodes. Subscripts in the labels of root and foot nodes are used
to indicate unification links in (11). Unifying root and foot nodes with the same subscripts
yields the syntactic structure of (1) up to and including the verb ‘painted/paints’.
Vosse and Kempen [221] assume that functional nodes carry features upon which the
agreement checking (i) is based. For example, the subject node of ‘paints’ carries the features
Case=nominative, Person=third and Number=singular. These are compatible with the features
carried by the root node of the frame associated with ‘Vincent’. Therefore, the check yields a
positive result and the two frames can be unified. Tense could be treated analogously using
an additional level of features in the frames of verbs and temporal prepositions. However,
the resulting feature structure would then have to be interfaced with the semantics of verbs
and temporal adverbials to ensure that the value of the Tense feature is consistent with that
of the temporal variables in (3)-(5). This implies that three levels of representation have to
be coordinated: the syntactic frame, the feature structure, and the semantic structure.
A more parsimonious option is to handle the check for temporal agreement within the
semantics. Consider (1a). Suppose that the parser has constructed a syntactic representation
for the adverbial ‘last sunday’, which amounts to unifying the root and foot nodes NP1 of
‘on’ (which we assumed is silent) and ‘sunday’, and the root and foot nodes AP2 of ‘sunday’
and ‘last’. Moreover, suppose the system has rapidly constructed a semantic representation
for the adverbial ‘last sunday’, which amounts to forcing the query ?HoldsAt(fCPSu, t) to
succeed. This leads to a minimal model in which the antecedent of (5) holds (recall section
1.1.2). Note that this model satisfies the constraint s< now. When ‘painted’ is encountered,
the syntactic frame for ‘paint’ is retrieved from declarative memory. The root and foot nodes
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PP4 of ‘last sunday’ and ‘paint’ are unified as soon as the agreement check is passed. This
is carried out within the semantics, by simply updating the initial model according to the
integrity constraints (3). Because the unification s= t can be made to succeed, the temporal
agreement check is passed, and the two frames can be unified. Consider now (1b). In this
case, when ‘paints’ is encountered, the initial model is updated according to (4). Whereas
the adverbial satisfies the constraint s< now, the verb satisfies t = now, which entails that s
and t cannot be unified. The agreement check (i) is not passed, which results in a failure to
unify the syntactic frames of ‘last sunday’ and ‘paints’.
4.2. A functional account of the LAN. Negative shifts in the ERPs different from the
N400 [117] have been reported by several studies. These effects are typically referred to as
(early) left anterior negativities, or (E)LANs. The onset of (E)LANs varies as a function of
stimulus characteristics, ranging between 150 and 300 ms [61]. ELANs (150-200 ms) have
been observed in response to rapidly detectable violations of word-category. LANs (300-500
ms) are elicited by morphological anomalies involving case, number and gender [61, 71].
The theory of tense at the syntax-semantics interface presented above seems capable of
accounting for the early response to tense violations. One key observation in this regard is
that an effect which sets on between 200 and 300 ms after the onset of the stimulus arguably
does not reflect feed-back or recurrent computations. Rather, it is most probably related to
the disruption of a largely automatic, feed-forward spread of activation from sensory areas
(visual cortex), through brain regions subserving semantic memory (left temporal cortex),
towards more anterior language areas (left frontal cortex) [72]. Hagoort [71] suggested that
(E)LANs reflect the failure to bind two syntactic frames as a result of a negative outcome
of the agreement check, or of a failure to find two matching root and foot nodes. The LAN
observed in the ERP experiment reported here can be taken as reflecting the failure in the
tense agreement check, that is, a failure to solve simultaneously the temporal constraints
set up by the adverbial and the verb. This account appears consistent with the time-course
of the LAN, for it only requires that the constraint t = now, associated with the tense suffix
of the verb ‘paints’, is accessed in semantic memory. From this, given the constraints set
up by the adverbial in the preceding processing stages, it follows that s = t (a condition of
temporal coherence within the sentence) cannot be satisfied. Note that this account does not
require (i) that the meaning of the verb ‘paints’ is reconstructed from semantic memory, as
only the semantic contribution of the tense suffix ‘-s’ is necessary, and (ii) that any form of
syntactic structure assembly takes place, because the constraint satisfaction stage actually
precedes the unification of syntactic frames.
Although in-depth experimentation and modeling are lacking, the temporal profile of
the LAN suggests that checking the satisfiability of a set of temporal constraints – or at least
detecting an inconsistency – may have a purely feed-forward neural implementation. This
can be contrasted with the (re)computation of a discourse model, which requires a recurrent
network architecture [91, 194] and gives rise to qualitatively different neurophysiological
effects, as we shall see in the next chapter.
4.3. A functional account of the SFN. A number of studies have reported negative
shifts in the ERPs in response to sentence-final words in syntactically ill-formed sentences,
even when the anomalous word does not occupy the sentence-final position [151, 78, 152,
153, 139, 149, 150]. Osterhout and Nicol [154] reported negativities in response to sentence-
final words preceded by semantic or syntactic violations. Moreover, at some electrode sites,
the SFN elicited by doubly (syntactically and semantically) anomalous sentences was an
additive function of the SFNs evoked by syntactic and semantic violations.
Osterhout and Holcomb [151] argued that the SFN may be an electrophysiological
marker of either (i) the perceived ungrammaticality of the sentence, or (ii) the system’s effort
to find an acceptable syntactic structure for the sentence, or (iii) the semantic, message-level
consequences of the sentence-internal violation. As for the SFN elicited by tense violations,
(i) seems to imply either that (a) the incorrect use of tense was not perceived when the verb
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was encountered, but only at the sentence-final word, or that (b) the ill-formedness of the
sentence (as opposed to the VP) was perceived at the sentence-final word, as only then it
becomes evident that the entire sentence, which consists of a single VP, is ungrammatical.
Both these implications seem to be untenable. The LAN elicited by the verb indicates that
the violation was in some sense perceived, which rules out (a). Furthermore, any sentence
containing an ungrammatical phrase is itself ungrammatical, which makes (b) untestable.
The second hypothesis (ii) implies that, at the sentence-final word, the system computes a
plausible syntactic representation for the anomalous sentence (1b), eventually unifying the
root and foot nodes PP4 of ‘last sunday’ and ‘paint’. However, computing a new syntactic
representation does not solve the sentence-internal problem, which is semantic in nature.
Either at the sentence-final stage syntactic unification does away with the agreement check,
and then unifying frames does not guarantee that tense and other agreement features are
consistent across the representation, or the agreement check is still required, and then it is
the semantic constraints that must be readjusted.
This brings us to (iii), according to which the SFN reflects either (a) the disruption of
a process involved in computing a model of the sentence, or (b) the attempt of the system
to construct a model in which all constraints can be satisfied. One key feature of the Event
Calculus is that satisfying a set of constraints actually produces a model which verifies the
linguistic material that is given as input [212]. Thus, in this framework, the LAN reflects
the failure to unify s and t (adding the constraint s= t), and therefore indexes the disruption
of the processes which would have otherwise led to a model. This rules out (a). According
to (b), the SFN would reflect the readjustment of the constraints set up by the verb in order
to make the full set of constraints satisfiable. In semantic terms, this can be characterized as
forcing the integrity constraints (3) also in the present tense case (1b), yielding a ‘narrative
present’ reading of the sentence. In neural terms, reworking a set of constraints to produce
the desired output can be seen as an instance of perceptron learning via back-propagation
[179], an operation which requires a recurrent architecture. Such feed-back process seems
consistent with the time-course of the SFN (400-700 ms), especially in light of the hypothesis
proposed above that the LAN (200-400 ms) reflects a feed-forward computation.
CHAPTER 5
Computing and recomputing discourse models
This chapter is a modified version of G. Baggio, M. van Lambalgen & P. Hagoort. Computing and recomputing
discourse models: An ERP study. Journal of Memory and Language 59, 2008: 36-53.
1. Introduction
In the past three decades, experimental research using event-related potentials (ERPs) has
provided numerous insights into word, sentence and discourse comprehension. However,
as has been noted, “a cognitive neuroscience approach to language has not as yet merged
with linguistic and psycholinguistic research programmes” [13]. One research program in
linguistics that may contribute to understanding the basis of meaning in the human brain
is semantic theory. Logicians and formal semanticists since the ‘dynamic turn’ [160] have
shifted their attention from describing semantic competence to modeling cognitive update
and information exchange. An example is a recent proposal by van Lambalgen and Hamm
[212] which regards comprehension as an incremental, yet non-monotonic process whereby
temporary structures are set up in working memory, and may be later revised on the basis of
additional discourse information. Although there is some evidence for semantic reanalysis
[17, 197], the issue has received less attention than it deserves. The aim of this chapter is to
contribute to filling this gap. We used ERPs to test the recomputation hypothesis presented
in chapter 2.
1.1. ERP research on semantic processing. Event-related brain potentials have proved
useful to address a number of issues concerning the relative complexity and time-course of
semantic processes. Kutas and Hillyard [117] conducted the first ERP experiment in which
linguistic factors were successfully manipulated, in this case the semantic plausibility of a
word given the preceding sentence context:
(1) a. The officer shot the man with a gun.
b. The officer shot the man with a moon.
Compared to ‘gun’, the anomalous noun ‘moon’ resulted in a larger negative shift starting
around 250 ms after word onset, peaking at 400 ms, and lasting for approximately another
150 ms. This ERP component, called N400 because of its polarity and peak latency, is known
not to be affected by other unexpected events, such as variations in the physical properties
of the stimuli. Larger N400s are also triggered by semantically plausible words which are
judged as less preferred in a given sentence context [118, 76], for example ‘pocket’ in (2b):
(2) a. Jenny put the sweet in her mouth after the lesson.
b. Jenny put the sweet in her pocket after the lesson.
The amplitude of the N400 is also modulated by lexical items which provide information
conflicting with the discourse context [208, 209] or world knowledge [79]. In sum, although
every content word evokes an N400, the amplitude of the negative shift is affected by the
degree of semantic fit of a lexical item with the preceding context and the knowledge base
relevant for its integration.
Semantics-related negative shifts different from the N400 have also been reported. Van
Berkum et al. recorded ERPs while participants read [207] and listened to [206] discourses
in which a particular NP in a target sentence could denote either a single referent introduced
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in the preceding discourse, or two equally suitable referents. For instance (3c), containing
the NP ‘the girl’, could follow either the single-referent context (3a) or the double-referent
context (3b):
(3) a. David had told the boy and the girl to clean up their room before lunch time.
But the boy had stayed in bed all morning, and the girl had been on the phone all
the time.
b. David had told the two girls to clean up their room before lunch time. But one
of the girls had stayed in bed all morning, and the other had been on the phone
all the time.
c. David told the girl that ...
Referentially ambiguous NPs, such as ‘the girl’ in (3c) following (3b), elicited a sustained
anterior negativity (SAN) that emerged 300-400 ms after noun onset and lasted for several
hundreds of milliseconds. The SAN differed from typical instances of the N400 in duration
(‘sustained’) and scalp distribution (‘anterior’). Following earlier proposals [142, 146], the
time-course and the topographical distribution of the observed ERPs are taken to suggest
that “at least some of the processing consequences of referential ambiguity may involve an
increased demand on memory resources” [206].
An ERP study by Mu¨nte et al. [147], which we discussed in light of formal semantics in
chapter 1, also reported sustained anterior negativities. ERPs were recorded while subjects
read narratives differing in the initial temporal connective:
(4) a. After the scientist submitted the paper, the journal changed its policy.
b. Before the scientist submitted the paper, the journal changed its policy.
‘Before’ sentences elicited a larger sustained negativity, maximal over left anterior sites. At
the left frontal electrode, ERP responses to ‘before’ and ‘after’ diverged approximately 300
ms after sentence onset. The effect lasted throughout the sentence, and was largest during
the second clause. The anterior negativity difference between ‘before’ and ‘after’ sentences
was positively correlated with participants’ working memory span. Mu¨nte et al. argue that
the slow negative shift evoked by ‘before’ sentences reflects working memory operations
involved in computing a model for (4b) in which the events are represented in their actual
order of occurrence. That is, in contrast with (4a), (4b) requires additional memory resources
as the two events are mentioned in reverse temporal order.
The connection between sustained anterior negativities and working memory is made
explicit in the papers of van Berkum et al. [207, 206] and Mu¨nte et al. [147]. However, there
is as yet no agreement upon a functional account, based on linguistically-informed notions,
of these findings. For instance, while van Berkum et al. suggest that the sustained anterior
negativity reflects ‘referential processing’, Mu¨nte et al. would rather argue that ‘additional
discourse-level computations’ of the temporal and causal profiles of the events described
by ‘before’ and ‘after’ sentences are responsible for the observed slow potentials. Matters
are further complicated by the finding that sustained anterior negativities are also elicited
by constructions in which complexity at the syntax-semantics interface is increased, as in
long-distance wh-dependencies [112, 146, 53, 48, 161].
Despite the differences between the conditions in which sustained anterior negativities
have been observed, candidate functional processes can be brought under a single umbrella
term, which we shall refer to as ‘computing a discourse model’. Formal semantics, at least
since Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) [107], has assumed that interpreting definite
and indefinite NPs, resolving anaphoric pronouns, determining event order, establishing
long-distance wh-dependencies, and other cross-clause and cross-sentence processes concur
in the construction of a discourse model, that is, a cognitive representation making a given
narrative true. More recent proposals, which build upon DRT and add some sophistication
to it, regard discourse comprehension as a process in which lexical meanings, context and
world knowledge interact to produce discourse models [212, 83]. Pragmatic constraints and
causal/world knowledge are brought to the fore by these accounts. Furthermore, discourse
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models as envisaged by the theory (called ‘minimal models’) can be efficiently computed by
artificial neural networks, which account for some capabilities and limitations of working
memory [194]. Therefore, in this framework it becomes possible to raise and to some extent
address a number of issues concerning the complexity of computing discourse models in
working memory. To see in some detail how this could be done, we must first introduce the
linguistic phenomenon with which we shall be concerned, giving a pre´cis of the treatment
of the imperfective paradox presented in chapter 2.
1.2. The imperfective paradox. Verb phrases (VPs) can be semantically classified as
states (‘know’, ‘love’ etc.), activities (‘run’, ‘write’ etc.), accomplishments (‘write a letter’,
‘bake a cake’ etc.), achievements (‘finish’, ‘reach’ etc.), and points (‘flash’, ‘hop’ etc.) [190].
Accomplishments always involve some activity, from which they can be derived by adding
a direct object. For instance, the accomplishment ‘write a letter’ is constituted by the activity
‘write’ and the direct object ‘a letter’, which need not refer to an existing entity, but provides
information about the goal toward which the writing activity is directed. We use the term
‘activity’ to denote both the aspectual class of VPs such as ‘write’ in the above classification,
and the atelic (i.e. non-goal-directed) process involved in accomplishments. ‘Progressive’
and ‘imperfective’ will be used interchangeably here to allow readers to see the connection
between the semantics of the progressive and the imperfective paradox, although this is not
entirely correct [26].
Let us consider accomplishments first:
(5) The girl was writing a letter when her friend spilled coffee on the tablecloth.
From (5) the reader would typically conclude that, barring unforeseen circumstances, the
girl will attain the desired goal and would thus assent to the statement ‘The girl has written
a letter’ (see chapter 2 and below for evidence supporting this claim). Such an inference is
based on the assumption that spilling coffee on the tablecloth is usually neutral with respect
to the writing activity, that is, it is not a typical proximate cause leading to the termination
of the activity. It is quite possible to imagine situations in which writing was temporarily
interrupted or even terminated by the accident. However, as is shown by the data reported
in sections 2.2.2 and 3.1, failing to explicitly mention an obstacle in the discourse is sufficient
to lead the reader to assume that there was no such obstacle to attaining the intended goal.
We hypothesize that the inference to a goal state is defeasible or non-monotonic, that is, it
can be suppressed if the discourse describes an event which terminates the relevant activity:
(6) The girl was writing a letter when her friend spilled coffee on the paper.
Assuming that writing was intended to occur on the same paper sheets upon which coffee
was spilled, the accident is sufficient to terminate the activity and it is therefore a disabling
condition for obtaining a complete letter. Accordingly, on the basis of (6) the reader would
assent to ‘The girl has written no letter’.
Suppression can obtain only with accomplishments, not with activities [180]. In most
accomplishments, the object NP ‘a letter’ expresses the existence of a natural culmination
point, or ‘canonical goal’, toward which the writing activity is directed, namely a complete
letter. Activities, for instance ‘writing letters’, do not involve any such canonical goal. Here
the use of the bare plural ‘letters’ indicates that the number of letters is (for the speaker
and the hearer) unspecified and that, as a result, the activity has no natural culmination
point. A narrative containing the activity VP ‘writing letters’ will therefore be interpreted
as entailing that ‘The girl has written one or more letters’, regardless of the consequences of
the second event on the writing activity:
(7) The girl was writing letters when her friend spilled coffee on the tablecloth.
(8) The girl was writing letters when her friend spilled coffee on the paper.
There appears to be something paradoxical about (6) in its relation to (5), which is not
found in the pair (7)-(8). Whereas it belongs to the meaning of the accomplishment ‘writing
a letter’ that the writing activity is directed toward the goal state of a complete letter, the
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actual occurrence of that consequent state can be denied without contradiction. How can
an essential component of the meaning be denied without destroying meaning itself? This
is the so-called ‘imperfective paradox’. We now turn to its processing consequences.
1.3. Minimal models, inference in the limit, recomputation. Language processing
amounts to incrementally computing a discourse representation given lexical, syntactic and
contextual constraints [74]. To make computation tractable, discourse models are assumed
to be ‘minimal’ – in a definite mathematical sense, the simplest possible structures making
a narrative true. Minimal models behave like ‘closed worlds’: only the propositions which
are asserted in discourse, or which can be inferred from it or from background knowledge,
are represented as true in the model. For the remaining cases, a distinction must be drawn.
The propositions that are mentioned in discourse, but are not asserted and do not follow
from what is said or from background knowledge (e.g. the antecedent of a conditional), are
represented as false in the minimal model. In logical terms, these propositions still belong to
the finite language upon which the construction of the minimal model is based. But as long
as nothing forces their truth, they will be taken as false. The propositions that are not part
of the finite language – because they do not occur in the discourse context or in background
knowledge – are not included in the minimal model, that is, they are not represented as true
or false.
One important upshot of the theory is that the occurrence of a goal state can be inferred
from a minimal model of a discourse containing an accomplishment in the past progressive.
As soon as the sentence ‘The girl was writing a letter’ is processed, the system constructs
a minimal model in which the goal state (a complete letter) is attained at some time later
than the interval referred to by the progressive. Two remarks concerning this crucial point
are in order. First, interpretation is based on the ‘closed world assumption’: if no disabling
condition is described in discourse (so far), it will be (temporarily) assumed that there is no
obstacle interfering with the writing activity. Second, the conclusion that eventually a letter
is accomplished is an instance of predictive inference or, more precisely, inference in the limit:
given that writing is asserted to hold some time in the past, that it can be assumed there
are no obstacles for the writing activity, that some form of inertia holds (writing continues
if it is not hindered by external forces), and that a letter is a finite object, it can be expected
that the process will converge – ‘in the limit’ – to a complete letter. The formal definition
of a ‘completion inference’ given in chapter 2 captures this idea in a rigorous manner. This
inference is drawn for both neutral (5) and disabled (6) accomplishments. If, however, the
initial model is extended with a ‘when’ clause describing an event which terminates the
writing activity (that is, a disabling condition), the completion inference is suppressed. The
subordinate clause ‘when her friend spilled coffee on the paper’ will lead to the retrieval of
causal knowledge from semantic memory to the effect that the coffee accident terminated
the writing activity. Spilling occurred during the writing process, from which follows that
the accident took place before a complete letter was obtained. Here the writing event can be
imagined as an open interval, where the goal state (a complete letter) is no longer part of the
structure. We will use the term ‘recomputation’ to refer to the suppression of the goal state
inference when the subordinate clause in (6) is processed. Because (5) describes a neutral
scenario, the goal state derived while processing the progressivized VP is maintained in the
final model. In conclusion, whereas (5) involves an extension of the initial discourse model,
(6) might induce a recomputation. Because (7) and (8) do not involve a canonical goal, they
will require an extension only.
1.4. Predictions for ERPs. The only difference between neutral and disabled activities
(e.g. ‘writing letters’) is the noun in the subordinate clause, ‘tablecloth’ or ‘paper’. In both
cases the initial model is simply extended, therefore we expect to observe only a local ERP
difference related to the integration of the differing nouns. ‘Tablecloth’ is less semantically
expected in the context of the other lexical items occurring in the sentence compared to
‘paper’, so we expect a larger N400 for the former compared to the latter word.
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Processing a ‘when’ clause following an accomplishment (e.g. ‘writing a letter’) involves
integrating the differing nouns and, in the disabling case, recomputing the initial discourse
representation. Also in this case, the neutral noun ‘tablecloth’ is predicted to evoke a larger
N400 compared to the disabling ‘paper’, reflecting a lower degree of semantic relatedness
with the preceding context. In our ERP study, Dutch materials were used where the verb in
subordinate clauses occupies the sentence-final position (see 2.1). The temporal and causal
information provided by verbs in ‘when’ clauses is necessary to initiate the recomputation
process. Thus, the ERP effects of what we have analyzed as recomputation are expected to
surface at the sentence-final verb ‘spilled’ (‘morste’ in the Dutch case; recall chapter 2, and
see below).
One additional prediction is that the amplitude of the ERP effect evoked by disabled
accomplishments is correlated with the relative frequency with which readers infer that the
goal state was not attained. Recomputation is expected to consistently evoke a time-locked
shift in the EEG in every trial in which a negative judgment concerning the attainment of
the goal is made. Therefore, the higher the frequency of such inferences – that is, the larger
the number of trials in which recomputation occurred – the larger the amplitude of the ERP
component. The method and results of an ERP study in which these predictions were tested
are described below.
2. Method
2.1. Materials. The Dutch stimuli used in the experiment comprised 160 test and 160
filler items. The set of materials was the same as that used in the behavioral study of chapter
2. Test items included two context sentences (O) providing a neutral setting for the events,
four target sentences (A)-(D) and two probe pairs (E)-(F) (see table 1). Target sentences were
constructed varying the aspectual class of the progressive VP (activity or accomplishment)
and the effects of the event introduced by the ‘when’ clause (neutral or disabling) on the
event described in the main progressive clause. All VPs in the progressive were instances
of the Dutch periphrastic ‘was/waren NP aan het Vinf’ construction. This solution is to be
preferred to the use of the Dutch simple past which, in some cases, is aspectually ambiguous
between perfective and imperfective readings. Accomplishments differed from activities in
the object NP only: an indefinite (‘een brief’/‘a letter’) was used for accomplishments, and
a bare plural (‘brieven’/‘letters’) was used for activities. Disabling and neutral subordinate
clauses differed only in the prepositional or object NP, for instance ‘papier’ and ‘tafelkleed’.
Events were classified as neutral or disabling based on the experimenters’ judgment (see
however chapter 2 and section 2.2.2 for some data supporting these choices). Probe pairs
(E) were used with activities and (F) with accomplishments (table 1).
Fillers were 160 sentences of varying length, structure and content. Analogously to test
items, fillers were preceded by two neutral context sentences and followed by a probe pair.
Target sentences described an event consistently, as in (9), or inconsistently, as in (10), with
factual knowledge (see Hagoort et al. [79] for an experiment based on these stimuli):
(9) Dutch trains are white and very crowded.
(10) Dutch trains are yellow and very crowded.
Probes were of the type ‘Trains in the Netherlands are white.’/‘Trains in the Netherlands
are yellow.’ These fillers were chosen to add some variety to the materials while using the
same task as that of test items.
Four test versions were constructed. Each of these was a randomized lists of test and
filler items. The task was identical for critical and filler sentences. Participants had to select
the correct probe based on the information provided by the context and target items. Mean
length, raw and lemma frequency of the differing nouns in the NP of subordinate clauses
were matched using the CELEX Dutch corpus [4]. Mean length was 7.9 letters (SD=2.46) for
neutral and 7.75 (SD=2.79) for disabling nouns, and was kept below 12 letters in any case.
Raw frequency per million words was 1113 (SD=2462) for neutral and 1096 (SD=2792) for
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disabling nouns. Lemma frequency per million words was 1730 (SD=3559) for neutral and
1666 (SD=3585) for disabling nouns. The length of sentence-final verbs was identical across
conditions and was kept below 12 letters in any case.
Context sentences
(O) De deur van de woonkamer was gesloten. Binnen speelde de radio klassieke muziek.
The door of the living-room was closed. Inside played the radio classical music.a
‘The door of the living room was closed. Inside the radio played classical music.’b
Target sentences
(A) Het meisje was brieven aan het schrijven toen haar vriendin koffie op het tafelkleed morste.
The girl was letters on the to-write when her friend coffee on the tablecloth spilled.a
‘The girl was writing letters when her friend spilled coffee on the tablecloth.’b
(B) Het meisje was brieven aan het schrijven toen haar vriendin koffie op het papier morste.
The girl was letters on the to-write when her friend coffee on the paper spilled.a
‘The girl was writing letters when her friend spilled coffee on the paper.’b
(C) Het meisje was een brief aan het schrijven toen haar vriendin koffie op het tafelkleed morste.
The girl was a letter on the to-write when her friend coffee on the tablecloth spilled.a
‘The girl was writing a letter when her friend spilled coffee on the tablecloth.’b
(D) Het meisje was een brief aan het schrijven toen haar vriendin koffie op het papier morste.
The girl was a letter on the to-write when her friend coffee on the paper spilled.a
‘The girl was writing a letter when her friend spilled coffee on the paper.’b
Probe sentences
(E) Het meisje heeft een of meer brieven geschreven.
The girl has one or more letters written.a
‘The girl has written one or more letters.’b
Het meisje heeft geen brief geschreven.
The girl has no letter written.a
‘The girl has written no letter.’b
(F) Het meisje heeft een brief geschreven.
The girl has a letter written.a
‘The girl has written a letter.’b
Het meisje heeft geen brief geschreven.
The girl has no letter written.a
‘The girl has written no letter.’b
TABLE 1. Examples of stimulus sentences. aLiteral translation. bParaphrase.
2.2. Pre-tests.
2.2.1. Cloze probability test. To determine the cloze probabilities of sentence-final verbs,
context sentences followed by a target sentence with the final word blanked were presented
to a group of thirty-two native speakers of Dutch (mean age 22.5, 27 female). Participants
were requested to fill in the blank with the first word that came to their mind. Four versions
(40 items per condition), randomized and balanced across conditions, were constructed.
Mean cloze probabilities were not different between the conditions (all comparisons using
T -tests, P> 0.05) in each test version as well as in the entire set.
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2.2.2. Entailment questionnaire. A paper-and-pencil judgment task was administered.
Thirty six Dutch native speakers (mean age 22.5, 28 female) were presented with the context
followed by a target sentence and a probe pair. The task was to select the appropriate probe.
Negative probes were more frequently chosen for disabled accomplishments than for the
other conditions. Neutral activities (A) (see table 1) showed the lowest mean of negative
responses (M=2.72, SD=3.22), followed by disabled activities (B) (M=8.06, SD=7.05), neu-
tral accomplishments (C) (M=10.03, SD=9.23) and disabled accomplishments (D) (M=25.14,
SD=8.02) (see 2 for details).
2.3. Participants. Thirty one students participated in the ERP experiment. Of these,
7 were left out of the final analysis due to a high number (> 20%) of trials contaminated
by artifacts. This left us with twenty four participants (mean age 22.5, 17 female), with no
history of neurological, psychiatric or cognitive disorders. Subjects were selected from the
database of the Donders Centre for Cognitive Neuroimaging at the Radboud University
Nijmegen. Participants received e 8 per hour or course credits. None of the subjects who
took part to the pre-tests and to the behavioral study reported in chapter 2 participated in
the ERP experiment.
2.4. Procedure. After applying the electrodes, participants were conducted into the
experimental booth and were asked to sit in front of the video monitor. The stimuli were
presented as follows: the two context sentences were displayed together on a single screen
(white on black background) for a variable duration (6, 7 or 8 s), depending on the length
of the sentences themselves; next the target sentence, one of (A)-(D), was presented on the
screen word-by-word (600 ms SOA, 300 ms word duration; white on black background);
the target sentence was preceded and followed by a fixation cross, presented for 1500 ms;
finally, the probe pair, one of (E)-(F), was shown on the screen (red on black background)
and remained visible until the participant gave a button-press; the probes were followed
by a fixation cross which lasted for 1500 ms. The same presentation parameters were used
for fillers. Participants were instructed to read each sentence carefully, to blink only when
the fixation cross was shown, and to select the correct probe by pressing one of two buttons
(left or right on the button box) as quickly and accurately as possible. The position on the
screen (top or bottom) of the positive and negative probe corresponded to the left and right
button respectively, and was counterbalanced across test versions. In this way, participants
could not prepare their motor response before the probe pair was presented on the screen.
The experiment took about 2 hours and was divided into 24 blocks of 10 trials each.
2.5. Recording. EEG and EOG signals were recorded using Ag/AgCl electrodes. The
EOG was measured from 4 electrodes: one at the outer canthus of each eye, one below and
one above the left eye (FE). The EEG was measured from 28 electrodes, arranged according
to American Electrophysiological Society conventions: Fp1, Fp2, F7, F3, Fz, F4, F8, FC5,
FC1, FCz, FC2, FC6, T7, C3, Cz, C4, T8, CP5, CE, CF, CP6, P7, P3, Pz, P4, P8, O1, O2.
Two additional electrodes were placed on the left and right mastoids, the former serving
as the reference during the measurement. All EEG and EOG electrodes were re-referenced
off-line to a linked mastoid. EEG electrodes were attached to an elastic cap, whereas EOG
and reference electrodes were applied using two-sided adhesive decals external to the cap.
Electrode impedance was kept below 5 kΩ throughout the experiment. The EEG/EOG was
amplified by a multichannel BrainAmp DC system, with a 500 Hz sampling rate, a low pass
filter set at 125 Hz and a 10 s time constant.
2.6. Data Analysis. For the data analysis we used FieldTrip,1 a MATLAB package for
processing EEG and MEG signals. The following transforms were applied to each subject’s
dataset. Segments corresponding to the critical noun and to the sentence-final verb were
extracted from the EEG with an interval of 200 ms preceding and 800 ms following word
1For more information, see http://fieldtrip.fcdonders.nl/
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onset. Baseline correction used the 200 ms interval preceding the onset of the critical noun,
and the 100 ms interval following the onset of the sentence-final verb. The latter choice was
effected so as to prevent ERP differences in the 400-600 ms interval following the onset of
nouns from biasing the baseline correction for the ERPs evoked by sentence-final verbs in
the same temporal interval. The use of such a post-stimulus baseline seems acceptable on
grounds that the expected recomputation effect at the verb should not affect such largely
exogenous components as the N1. Artifact rejection was based on two FieldTrip functions:
the first detects and rejects all trials that contain activity exceeding a threshold of ±100 µV ;
the second identifies and discards trials contaminated with eye movements or blinks by
means of thresholding the z-transformed value of the raw data in the EOG channels, pre-
processed using a band-pass filter of 1-15 Hz. A 30 Hz low-pass digital filter was applied
to the segmented, artifact-free data. ERPs were obtained for each subject by averaging over
trials in each experimental condition. A 5 Hz low-pass filter was used to produce the wave-
forms shown in figures 2-5. Topographies and statistical analyses were based on the 30 Hz
low-pass filtered data.
For the analysis of behavioral responses we employed two repeated-measures ANOVA
models with Subject as the random effect, Aspectual Class (Activity/Accomplishment) and
Subordinate Clause Type (Neutral/Disabling) as fixed effects, and the mean value of either
negative judgments (negative probes selected in the response task) or decision times in each
condition as the dependent variables.
Statistical analyses of ERP data used a non-parametric randomization procedure [129,
130] which was based on mean amplitude (µV ) values in each condition in time bins of 100
ms, starting from the onset of the relevant word and ending 800 ms after. The algorithm
produced as output a cluster of electrodes (min. 1, max. 28) in which the difference between
the conditions was significant in each time bin, the sum of T -statistics in that cluster and
Monte Carlo estimates of P-values.
For the correlation analysis (see section 1.4), we calculated the difference between the
ERPs evoked by sentence-final verbs in subordinate clauses – disabled (D) minus neutral
(C) – following accomplishments at anterior sites (Fp1, Fp2, F7, F3, Fz, F4, F8 averaged) in
the 500-700 ms interval after the onset of the sentence-final verb (see 3.2 for motivation).
Pearson’s product-moment correlation was computed to determine whether the amplitude
difference in ERPs varied with the number of negative responses, quantified again as the
difference of negative judgments between disabled (D) and neutral (C) accomplishments.
The correlation analysis was done on a per-subject basis, so that each pair of data points in
the correlation corresponded to a single subject’s data.
3. Results
3.1. Behavioral data. Neutral activities (A) had the lowest mean of negative responses
overall (M=4.08, SD=2.87), and were followed by disabled activities (B) (M=5.83, SD=4.51),
neutral accomplishments (C) (M=9.58, SD=9.96) and finally disabled accomplishments (D)
(M=18.13, SD=11.16). The distribution of the data in the different conditions appears rather
similar. Interestingly however, as can be seen in figure 1-a, disabled accomplishments have
a more spread-out distribution, suggesting that inference patterns were less uniform across
participants. ANOVAs revealed significant main effects of Aspectual Class and Subordinate
Clause Type, and a significant interaction between the two factors (table 2, figure 1-a). The
observed pattern of responses supports the linguistic views outlined above and replicates
our previous findings (see section 2.2.2 and chapter 2). We found no difference in decision
times (table 2, figure 1-b): (A), M=2111 ms, SD=677 ms; (B), M=2100 ms, SD=680 ms; (C),
M=2070 ms, SD=646 ms; (D), M=2086 ms, SD=710 ms.
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FIGURE 1. Behavioral data. (a) Boxplot of the categorical responses. (b)
Boxplot of the decision times. Conditions are represented on the abscissa
(see table 1 for the correspondences with the labels). Negative responses
and decision times are plotted on the ordinate. The solid line within the
boxes indicates the median, box height is equal to the interquartile range,
whiskers represent adjacent values, and empty circles denote outliers.
The maximum of potential negative responses is 40.
3.2. Event-related brain potentials.
3.2.1. Nouns. Figure 2 displays the ERP topographies and waveforms elicited by activ-
ities. An N1 component peaking at approximately 100 ms is followed by a P2 component
with a trough at about 200 ms. The amplitudes of the N1 and P2 are not different between
disabled and neutral clauses: no significant clusters were found between 0 and 300 ms (all
contrasts, P> 0.1). The N1-P2 complex is followed by an N400. The amplitude of the N400
is larger in neutral (‘tafelkleed’) than in disabling (‘papier’) clauses (figure 2-b): significant
clusters with a central distribution were found between 300 and 500 ms (table 3, figure 2-a).
No difference between neutral and disabling clauses was found after 500 ms.
Categorical responses Decision times
Aspectual Class F(1,23)=21.65 F(1,23)<1
P<0.001
Subordinate Clause Type F(1,23)=23.60 F(1,23)<1
P<0.001
Aspectual Class × Subordinate Clause Type F(1,23)=17.20 F(1,23)<1
P<0.001
TABLE 2. Summary of ANOVA statistics for behavioral data.
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Time Noun Sentence-final verb
Activities Accomplishments Activities Accomplishments
300-400 ms T (22) =−16.54 T (22) =−60.11
P= 0.026 P< 0.001
400-500 ms T (22) =−57.02 T (22) =−78.69 T (22) =−11.85
P< 0.001 P= 0.002 P= 0.034
500-600 ms T (22) =−18.58 T (22) =−71.09
P= 0.022 P< 0.001
600-700 ms T (22) =−39.16
P= 0.008
700-800 ms T (22) =−16.92
P= 0.028
TABLE 3. Summary of cluster-based statistics for the ERP data. Disabling
and neutral clauses are compared at the noun and at the sentence-final
verb, for activities and accomplishments, in bins of 100 ms starting from
word onset. The first significant effects occurred at 300-400 ms. Empty
cells denote the absence of significant clusters.
figure 3 displays the ERP topographies and waveforms elicited by accomplishments. Also in
this case, an N1-P2 complex can be observed. There is no difference between neutral and
disabling clauses, as no significant clusters between 0 and 300 ms were found (all contrasts,
P> 0.1). The amplitude of the N400 is again larger in neutral (‘tafelkleed’) than in disabling
(‘papier’) clauses (figure 3-b). The effect lasts longer than the N400 observed in activities:
significant clusters with a central distribution were found between 300 and 600 ms (table 3,
figure 3-a). For activities, no difference between conditions was found after 500 ms.
There is no overall difference between the two aspectual classes. Cluster-based T -tests
comparing the N400 effects in activities and accomplishments (corresponding to testing
the main effect of Aspectual Class in a parametric model) produced no significant clusters
between 300 and 600 ms from noun onset (all contrasts, P > 0.1). No difference was found
in any of the remaining time bins.
3.2.2. Sentence-final verbs. Figure 4 shows the ERP topographies and waveforms elicited
by activities. Contrary to what we had observed at the noun, there is no difference between
the N400 elicited by neutral and disabling clauses. Moreover, there is no difference between
conditions in any of the remaining time bins (table 3).
Figure 5 displays the ERP topographies and waveforms elicited by accomplishments. No
difference between disabling and neutral clauses was observed in either the N1-P2 complex
or the N400: no significant clusters between 0 and 400 ms were found (all contrasts, P> 0.1).
Whereas disabled and neutral activities do not result in any robust differential effect in later
time bins (400-800 ms, table 3, figure 4), disabling verbs following accomplishments evoked
larger negative shifts compared to neutral verbs (table 3, figure 5). This effect emerges at
about 400 ms following the onset of sentence-final verb, lasts for approximately 400 ms, and
is larger over left-anterior scalp sites. Based on its temporal profile and scalp distribution,
we take this effect to be an instance of sustained anterior negativity (SAN). The magnitude
of the SAN effect is correlated with the frequency of negative judgments in the response
task (r = −0.415,T (22) = −2.140,P = 0.043; figure 6): the higher the number of negative
responses, the larger the amplitude of the SAN.
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FIGURE 2. Activities, noun. (a) Grand-average (N=24) topographies dis-
playing the mean amplitude difference between the ERPs evoked by the
noun in neutral compared to disabled activities. Circles represent elec-
trodes in a significant cluster. (b) Grand-average (N=24) ERP waveforms
from frontal, central and parietal electrode sites time locked to the onset
(0 ms) of the noun in neutral and disabled activities. Negative values are
plotted upward.
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FIGURE 3. Accomplishments, noun. (a) Grand-average (N=24) topogra-
phies displaying the mean amplitude difference between the ERPs
evoked by the noun in neutral compared to disabled accomplishments.
Circles represent electrodes in a significant cluster. (b) Grand-average
(N=24) ERP waveforms from frontal, central and parietal electrode sites
time locked to the onset (0 ms) of the noun in neutral and disabled ac-
complishments. Negative values are plotted upward.
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FIGURE 4. Activities, sentence-final verb. (a) Grand-average (N=24) to-
pographies displaying the mean amplitude difference between the ERPs
evoked by the sentence-final verb in disabled compared to neutral ac-
tivities. (b) Grand-average (N=24) ERP waveforms from frontal, central
and parietal electrode sites time locked to the onset (0 ms) of the verb in
neutral and disabled activities. Negative values are plotted upward.
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FIGURE 5. Accomplishments, sentence-final verb. (a) Grand-average
(N=24) topographies displaying the mean amplitude difference between
the ERPs evoked by the sentence-final verb in disabled compared to neu-
tral accomplishments. Circles represent electrodes in a significant cluster.
(b) Grand-average (N=24) ERP waveforms from frontal, central and pari-
etal electrode sites time locked to the onset (0 ms) of the verb in neutral
and disabled accomplishments. Negative values are plotted upward.
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FIGURE 6. Scatter plot displaying the correlation between the amplitude
of the sustained anterior negativity elicited by disabled accomplishments
and the frequency of negative responses (r =−0.415,T (22) =−2.140,P=
0.043). The mean difference of negative responses between disabled and
neutral accomplishments is plotted on the abscissa. The mean amplitude
difference at fronto-polar and frontal electrodes between disabled and
neutral accomplishments in the 500-700 ms interval following the onset
of the sentence-final verb is plotted on the ordinate.
No difference between the two aspectual classes was found. Cluster-based T -statistics
comparing mean ERP amplitudes in activities and accomplishments, again corresponding
to testing the main effect of Aspectual Class in a parametric model, produced no significant
clusters between 0 and 800 ms from noun onset (all contrasts, P> 0.1).
4. Discussion
The ERP results reported above can be summarized as follows. The N400 elicited by nouns
is larger in neutral than in disabling clauses, following both activities and accomplishments.
This can be explained by the lower degree of semantic association with the preceding words
(‘writing’ and ‘letter’ or ‘letters’) of the noun in a neutral clause (‘tablecloth’) as compared to
the noun in a disabling clause (‘paper’). On the basis of our processing model, we predicted
that disabled accomplishments would induce a different ERP response at the sentence-final
verb compared to neutral accomplishments. This corresponds to the difference between the
recomputation and the extension of the initial discourse model (see section 1.3). The effect
was expected to be (i) absent in activities and (ii) correlated with the frequency with which
participants inferred that the goal state was not attained. These predictions were borne out.
Disabled activities did not modulate ERPs at the verb. Disabled accomplishments evoked
sustained anterior negativities (SANs). Moreover, a correlation of the SAN amplitude with
the frequency of negative judgments was observed. Taken together, our results would seem
to offer some support for the recomputation hypothesis. Below we address a few alternative
explanations of the data and some related outstanding issues.
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4.1. Alternative explanations and outstanding issues.
4.1.1. Local integration. One possible alternative explanation relates the observed effect
to difficulty in integrating the sentence-final verb into the ‘local’, clause-level context, rather
than to suppressing a ‘global’, discourse-level inference. If this were correct, a modulation
of the N400 should be expected, correlated with differences in cloze probabilities. However,
as reported above, cloze probabilities are not different between conditions (see 2.2.1). Also,
there was no difference in the N400s elicited by sentence-final verbs (see 3.2), which were
lexically identical across conditions. Following earlier research [149], we take the sustained
anterior negativity as reflecting difficulty in constructing a discourse-level representation of
disabled accomplishments. Supported by further evidence, recomputation could provide a
more explicit characterization of at least one instance of sentence-final ‘wrap-up effects’, in
terms of restructuring an existing sentence or discourse model.
4.1.2. Response frequency. Another alternative account is based on the observation that
sentences requiring a negative response (disabled accomplishments) are less frequent than
sentences requiring a positive one (activities and neutral accomplishments), the projected
ratios being respectively 1/4 and 3/4 (see 3.1 for the actual behavioral data). On this view,
a modulation of the P300 component [40, 181] might be expected, inversely correlated with
the frequency of negative judgments given to disabled accomplishments: the less frequent
the negative responses, the larger the amplitude of the P300. However, in our data no P300
response was observed, and the correlation was rather the inverse: the more frequent the
negative responses, the larger the amplitude of the sustained anterior negativity.
4.1.3. Monotonicity and possible worlds semantics. A crucial issue is whether the observed
sustained anterior negativity can be explained by a monotonic account of the progressive.
That is, it may be asked whether the ERP data reported here constitute compelling evidence
for non-monotonicity and against monotonicity. One such alternative explanation can be
formulated in possible worlds semantics [114, 42].
As we saw in chapter 2, in possible worlds semantics the progressive denotes a stage
of a process which, if it does not continue in the actual world, has chances of continuing in
some other possible worlds [36]. These can be called ‘inertia worlds’, courses of events in
which the process is not disturbed by external forces and is therefore brought to a successful
end. In his analysis of the progressive, Dowty [42] claimed that the following are equivalent:
1. ‘The girl is writing a letter’ is true in the actual world;
2. ‘The girl will have written a letter’ is true in all so-called ‘inertia worlds’, worlds
which are identical with the present world until ‘now’, but then continue in a way
most compatible with the history of the world until ‘now’.
This view has the following processing consequences. Processing neutral accomplishments
involves moving from the actual world, a snapshot of which is provided by the progressive
clause, to some inertia world, in which the goal state is eventually attained (the behavioral
data reported in 3.1 show that such an inference is drawn). By contrast, processing disabled
accomplishments amounts to proceeding from the actual world to a relatively unexpected
‘non-inertia world’, in which the process is disrupted by some event, such as spilling coffee
on the paper. Accessing a world in which the goal is not attained may be surprising. The
sustained anterior negativity may then be construed as an index of surprise or an equivalent
notion. This account is monotonic, as both neutral and disabled accomplishments require
shifting from the actual world to another accessible world. A simple extension of the initial
model is performed in both cases.
This analysis is seemingly in conflict with the non-monotonic one. Nevertheless, there
seems to be no real opposition between the two. In both accounts, an initial commitment to
the occurrence of the goal state is made. In the non-monotonic approach this takes the form
of a defeasible inference licensed by the minimal model, whereas in the monotonic theory
it is rather a prior, positive expectation concerning the attainment of the consequent state,
implying a lower probability assigned to its failure. This commitment is necessary, because
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accessing a possible world in which the goal state is not satisfied can be surprising only if
there is such a prior expectation. Furthermore, in both accounts a subsequent revision of
the initial commitment is made. In the non-monotonic analysis this is a recomputation of
the initial minimal model, whereas in the monotonic one it is a recomputation of the initial
(low) probability associated with the possible world in which the goal state is not attained.
There is recomputation and non-monotonicity is built into this ‘monotonic’ theory too.
The possible worlds account is monotonic as far as models are concerned (models are always
extended and never recomputed), but expectations change non-monotonically (probabilities
are recomputed). While prima facie opposed, the two accounts are in this respect equivalent.
Our reasons for preferring a non-monotonic account, one in which models are recomputed,
derive from theoretical considerations. First, there exist forms of non-monotonic inference
formally strongly related the non-monotonic reasoning in the progressive which cannot be
captured by Bayesian updates [196]. Second, minimal models can be computed efficiently
and non-monotonic inference can be implemented in neural networks (see 4.2), whereas it
is unclear to what extent models involving possible worlds and an accessibility relation are
at all computable. Last, the minimal models account of the progressive is embedded into
a larger non-monotonic framework [212, 195], covering other phenomena in reasoning and
language processing in children, adults, as well as patients with ADHD (Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder) [214] and ASD (Autistic Spectrum Disorder) [213].
We must note however that our study was designed to test a particular non-monotonic
theory of the progressive, and not to discriminate between monotonic and non-monotonic
accounts of the same phenomenon. The latter task would require, for one, a well-specified
entirely monotonic theory – that is, one that does not involve the recomputation of models,
probability values or other processing parameters – and, moreover, a set of predictions in
which the two proposals would actually differ. This is admittedly hard, apart from being
beyond the scope of the research reported above. Hence the need to emphasize the direction
along the theory-observation path which is relevant here: although it can be argued that our
non-monotonic theory leads to predictions that are consistent with the observed sustained
anterior negativity, it is clearly not the case that the data support only this particular theory.
4.1.4. Interruption and termination of activities. Compared to disabled accomplishments,
disabled activities may be inherently simpler because they involve at most an interruption
of the activity, for example writing letters in (B), which might be continued on some other
paper sheets. Accomplishments might leave a more definite ERP trace because they lead to
the termination of the activity, for example writing a letter in (D), which cannot be continued
being there only a single sheet. On this account, the sustained anterior negativity is not due
to model recomputation (as opposed to monotonic extension), but to the termination (as
opposed to the interruption) of the activity. Such an explanation follows from the seemingly
plausible notion that computing a discourse model where the effects of an event are more
‘catastrophic’ should also be more difficult. Here semantic theory comes to our rescue and
suggests that such notion is in fact misguided.
One issue that plays a role here is a type/token distinction concerning the noun ’letter’.
In the token interpretation of ’letter’ as referring to some particular scribbles on a particular
piece of paper, there is indeed a difference between interruption and termination. However,
on a type interpretation of ’letter’ as referring to particular content which can be inscribed
on any piece of paper, the activity and the accomplishment case seem comparable, in that in
both cases the girl has to reach for a new piece of paper. On the type reading, one wouldn’t
even expect a difference in behavioral responses. Nonetheless, since a behavioral difference
was observed, it seems the token reading is what subjects adopt. On this assumption, it can
be shown that, contrary to the alternative proposal, there is more computation going on in
the interruption case compared to the termination case – if goal states are not taken into
account; if they are, the pattern is reversed as implied by the recomputation hypothesis. It
seems harder to compute a model in which an activity is first interrupted, then re-initiated,
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compared to computing a model in which the activity is just terminated [212]. The alterna-
tive account would predict a larger sustained anterior negativity for activities compared to
accomplishments, which does not fit the experimental results. Also in this case, however,
we are ready to acknowledge that a different model, in which terminations are shown to be
more costly than interruptions, and in which goal states are not invoked to account for such
processing cost, may explain the observed sustained anterior negativity.
4.1.5. Goal states and underspecification. Our processing theory implies that, when an
accomplishment in the past progressive is encountered, the system computes a model in
which the goal state is satisfied. Processing the clause ‘The girl was writing a letter’ amounts
to computing a minimal model in which the writing activity will lead to a complete letter,
which is therefore part of the resulting discourse structure. We have hypothesized that this
computation is defeasible, so the model can be recomputed if further discourse information
implies that the goal state is not satisfiable, as in (6). One may ask whether the claim that
the culmination and consequent state are part of a minimal model of a progressive clause
is at all tenable. A seemingly more plausible account would assume that an underspecified
model, in which it is left undecided whether the goal state is attained or not, is computed
while the progressive is processed, and a decision is made only at the subordinate clause.
The main problem with an underspecification-based account is that, while it is true that
the information provided by the progressive clause is insufficient for determining whether
the goal was attained (which would motivate the construction of an underspecified model
at that stage), it is not the case that sufficient information is contributed by the subordinate
clause. While disabling clauses provide evidence that the activity was terminated, and thus
license the inference that the goal was not attained, no evidence concerning the satisfaction
of the goal state is derivable from neutral clauses. This is a consequence of the well-known
‘frame problem’ [134], which implies that it is impossible to enumerate all the effects and
non-effects of an event. For example, that ‘spilling coffee on the tablecloth does not affect
the writing activity’ (if that is the case) cannot be stored in declarative memory, but must be
inferred. This is an instance of ‘closed world reasoning’, which we described earlier on. In a
‘closed world’, unexpected accidents are ruled out. Therefore, the letter was completed. The
behavioral data reported above show that subjects draw this inference. Processing models
based on underspecification – or parallel processing, for that matter – would have to explain
why that very same conclusion (‘the girl wrote a letter’) is not drawn when the system is
faced with the relevant input (the VP in the progressive), and is instead delayed until the
end of the sentence, where critical information is nonetheless still missing. The hypothesis
that the goal state inference is drawn when the input is given seems to us more consistent
with the available evidence on immediacy and incrementality in discourse processing [80].
This line of reasoning speaks also to the issue of the possible influence of the primary
task on on-line comprehension processes. It can be argued that the system may have carried
out a number of inferences on-line in order to facilitate the response when the probes were
presented, but would have processed the same sentences in an underspecified manner if
no response task was administered. The brain would therefore compute representations
which are merely ‘good enough’ for the task at hand, striking a balance between efficiency
and cost minimization [49, 50, 41]. We grant this as a possibility, which cannot be excluded
based on either our data or our processing model. However, if it is true that comprehension
probes do not occur in actual language use, it is possible to imagine ‘language games’ in
which hearers are required to make interpretive commitments and form a belief concerning
the potential outcomes of a process described using the progressive. Our experiment may
be seen as a laboratory construction of such real world situations, but is not intended as a
realistic account of all situations in which progressive sentences are uttered and understood.
Further research is necessary to investigate the influence of the primary task on ERPs. This
is a question that applies to most experimental paradigms, and would require systematic
investigation.
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4.2. Recomputation in working memory networks. Minimal models correspond to
the stable states of associated neural networks. It has been shown that recurrent networks
can compute or approximate (depending on the expressiveness of one’s logical language)
the semantic operators based on which minimal models can be constructed [91, 194, 195]. In
this framework, recomputation can be modeled as the readjustment of connection strengths
driven by a simple form of back-propagation called ‘perceptron learning’ [179]. Computing
a minimal model of the progressive clause will correspond to the network settling into one
such attractor or stable state. Further computation on the initial model brings the network
from its initial stable state to another stable state, corresponding to the new minimal model.
Importantly, there is a large difference in the overall pattern of network activity in disabled
compared to neutral accomplishments. If the initial model is monotonically extended, as in
the neutral case (4), a number of units will be activated which were previously silent, while
the activation state of the remaining units, including those representing the goal state (the
complete letter), will remain unaltered. But if the initial minimal model is recomputed upon
encountering the subordinate clause in (6), units which were silent will be activated and the
activation patterns across some units which were previously active will be readjusted. For
instance, the units representing the goal state (the complete letter) will be shut down. In the
neural network this is achieved by successive applications of perceptron learning. It is still
unclear which biological mechanism could perform this function.
Even though in both cases the network processes the subordinate clause by settling into
a new attractor state, the transition in the disabling case requires an extensive adjustment of
the connection weights of the units representing the goal state. Recomputation thus results
in a more costly state transition. It remains an open question whether biologically plausible
networks can also approximate the semantic operators which give rise to minimal models.
Firing rate models, for instance, have been used to implement operations in connectionist
networks (e.g. multilayer perceptrons) of the kind required by the construction of minimal
models [34]. Interestingly, recurrent excitation in firing-rate models can account for several
aspects of persistent activity in prefrontal cortex neurons during working memory tasks
[43]. Recurrent networks thus suggest a plausible mechanistic link between recomputation
and sustained anterior negativities, and in general between working memory processes and
slow negative potentials [112, 146, 147, 207, 53, 48, 206, 161].
The leitmotiv of this book is that the cognitive neuroscience of language needs to bridge
the gap between psycholinguistic and formal models of specific aspects of language on the
one hand, and the neural architecture underlying neurophysiological measures on the other
hand. For a number of reasons [165] this is a daunting task, which we do not claim to have
adequately solved. However, tentatively the following can be said. There is no indication or
proof that the sustained anterior negativity is a language-specific ERP effect. Most likely, it
reflects the recruitment of neurophysiological activity that might be generated in prefrontal
cortex, and is triggered by different cognitive operations building upon working memory
capacity. That is why the prefrontal cortex is a plausible candidate from a neurobiological
point of view. In the light of our model, the sustained anterior negativity is taken to index
the recomputation following the termination of the activity in accomplishments, and the
recruitment of working memory resources required for this recomputation. In other cases,
the demand might be triggered by different cognitive operations [147]. In general, what we
seem to obtain with ERPs and other techniques is a many-to-one mapping from cognitive
models to neuronal implementation. This however in no way invalidates our model, which
is based on combined constraints from the cognitive and neuronal levels of analysis.
The research presented in this chapter extends the range of phenomena to which ERPs
can be applied, by testing a processing hypothesis suggested by a formal semantics of tense
and aspect. Our results indicate that the brain might support some form of non-monotonic
recomputation to integrate information which invalidates previously held assumptions. It
is a task for future research to provide more stringent tests of non-monotonic as opposed to
monotonic theories of semantic processing and cognitive update more generally.

CHAPTER 6
Coercion and compositionality
This chapter is a modified version of G. Baggio, T. Choma, M. van Lambalgen & P. Hagoort. Coercion and composi-
tionality. Under review.
1. Introduction
Productivity is the hallmark of language. Speakers of a language are capable of producing
and understanding a seemingly unlimited number of novel sentences starting from a finite
repository of lexical meanings and morpho-syntactic constraints. Productivity requires that
the brain is endowed with some computational mechanism combining stored signals into
larger, and possibly novel expressions. The principle of compositionality is usually invoked
to account for the productivity of language, as did Katz and Fodor [108]. Compositionality
is the notion that the meaning of a complex expression is a function only of the meanings of
its constituent parts and of the way they are syntactically combined [159]. This view has at
least one important consequence for theories of language processing: if word meanings are
assembled based on syntactic constraints alone, there is no other source of combinatoriality
in language than the syntax [33]. However, recent studies in psycholinguistics suggest that
language comprehension cannot be reduced to a strict, syntax-driven composition of lexical
meanings, but involves an independent level of semantic combinatorics which can, in some
cases, constrain syntactic analysis [111], and makes use of world knowledge and discourse
context – beyond context-invariant elementary meanings – to arrive at a full interpretation
of the utterance [80]. The processing consequences of compositionality have been discussed
in chapter 3. In this paper, ERP data will be presented that challenge strictly compositional
views of meaning assembly.
1.1. Complement coercion and enriched semantic composition. A great deal of the
experimental evidence supporting the independence of semantic operations has come from
studies of complement coercion [137, 205, 204, 136, 173]. Verbs like ’begin’ can occur in two
types of syntactic constructions with similar meanings. (a) As a subject control verb with an
NP and a VP arguments: ’The journalist began to write the article’ or ’The journalist began
writing the article’. Or (b) as a transitive verb with two NP arguments: ’The journalist began
the article’ [44]. In a number of cases, constructions of the second type involve an implicit
semantic element, which is expressed in the first type by the head of the VP argument. The
contrast between silent and expressed meaning is also found in the following pair:
(1) The journalist wrote the article before his coffee break.
(2) The journalist began the article before his coffee break.
In (1), the activity that the journalist is performing is expressed by the verb ’wrote’, while in
(2) the activity which was initiated by the journalist (presumably, writing) is not expressed
by any of the sentence’s constituent expressions. Rather, the implicit meaning is the result
of an inference – an operation which is not syntactic in nature – to the effect that, because
journalists typically write articles, (2) most likely means that the journalist began writing
(or typing et sim.) the article. Issues relating to semantic ambiguity will be briefly touched
upon below. Sentences like (2) are usually referred to as instances of ’complement coercion’.
Their interpretation is thought to involve some form of ’enriched composition’, resulting in
a model of the eventuality that includes also a representation of the activity [171, 98].
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1.1.1. Reading-time and eye-tracking research into complement coercion. McElree et al. [137]
were the first to report longer self-paced reading times at the noun (e.g. ’article’) and at the
noun + 1 (e.g. ’before’) positions in coercing sentences (2) compared to controls (1). McElree
et al. [136] report that coercing constructions are interpreted less accurately, that is, more
errors were made during an on-line sensicality judgment task, and more slowly than control
sentences. Traxler et al. [205] observed that coercions result in longer total reading times as
well as eye fixations on and regressions from the noun phrase region compared to control
sentences. To rule out the possibility that processing differences are due to some property of
verbs like ’begin’, for instance their syntactic polyvalence characterized above, or semantic
ambiguity (on this point, see [204] discussed below and [136, 62]), the authors compared (1)
and (2) to sentences like (3), in which an event-denoting NP occurs as a complement:
(3) The journalist began the meeting before his coffee break.
Here, the activity initiated by the journalist is expressed by the noun phrase ’the meeting’. If
processing difficulty is due to the verb, then there should be no difference in reading times
between (2) and (3). If however increased processing costs are due to recovering or inferring
silent meaning, (2) should still result in longer reading times compared to (3). Complements
denoting entities (’article’) are indeed associated with longer second pass and total reading
times in the critical NP region compared to event-denoting complements (’meeting’). This
suggests that readers experience difficulty only when the full event sense is not encoded in
the lexical items, but must be inferred.
Traxler et al. [204] propose that coercion involves four processing steps which unfold
sequentially after the reader encounters the complement. Following type-shifting accounts
of coercion, such as Pustejovsky’s [171], they argue that the complement ’the article’ violates
the verb’s semantic requirements, as ’begin’ should be followed by an expression denoting
an event such as ’the meeting’ or ’writing the article’. Hence, enriched composition consists
in shifting the semantic type of the complement NP such that an entity-denoting expression
is used to refer to an event instead. Here are the proposed processing steps:
1. The noun’s lexical entry is accessed and an attempt is made to integrate the stored
senses into the semantic representation on-line;
2. The mismatch between the verb’s semantic requirements and the stored lexical
senses of the noun trigger a coercion computation (Steps 3 and 4);
3. Properties associated with the noun and properties associated with the discourse
are used to infer the correct event sense related to the entity-denoting comple-
ment;
4. The event sense is incorporated into the semantic representation of the discourse
by reconfiguring the semantic representation of the complement from that of the
entity to that of the related event.
The authors argue that the processing difficulties observed in earlier experiments [137, 205,
136] result from Step 4 of the proposed model. In order to support this claim, they designed
and tested two types of stimuli. The first type (Type 1) were such that a context anticipated
the event sense of the coercing noun phrase in the target sentence:
(4) a. The soldier was drinking in a bar next to the base. (Context)
b. In the afternoon, he began a bottle of imported scotch. (Target)
In target sentences, Step 3 should be relatively quick as the comprehender can immediately
home in on the event sense provided by the context (’drinking’), and need not spend time
sorting through the variety of associated event senses. Therefore, if Step 3 is the costly step,
processing time should be reduced or eliminated with Type 1 sentences. In the second type
of stimuli (Type 2), context and target sentences contained an identical coercing expression
(‘the novel’), therefore the context was expected to prime the coercion process (shifting the
semantic type of the noun phrase) in the target sentence:
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(5) a. The schoolboy began the novel about the mafia family. (Context)
b. Once he began the novel he forgot all about doing his homework. (Target)
If coercion costs are eliminated for Type 2 and not for Type 1 sentences, Traxler et al. reason,
this would indicate that Step 4 is the costly step in the coercion process.
The results show that there are more eye fixations and regressions in the noun phrase
and post noun-phrase regions in target sentences of Type 1 stimuli than in the same regions
in control sentences. Traxler et al. conclude that Step 3 is not the costly step since processing
difficulty was not significantly reduced when the context provided the appropriate event
sense. The results from Type 2 sentences do not show any significant difference in fixations
and regressions in the noun and post-noun phrase regions compared to control sentences.
Based on this finding, the authors argue that Step 4 is the costly step.
1.1.2. An MEG study of complement coercion. The complexity of coercing constructions
was recently demonstrated with MEG. Pylkka¨nen and McElree [173] recorded event-related
fields (ERFs) while participants read sentences like (1), (2) and (6) word-by-word.
(6) The journalist astonished the article before his coffee break.
Multiple-source models were used to account for the event-related fields elicited by critical
nouns. Semantically anomalous nouns modulated activity in left temporal cortex, resulting
in larger source amplitudes compared to coercing and neutral nouns that peaked around
350 ms following noun onset. In the ERP literature, after Kutas and Hillyard [117], semantic
anomalies are known to increase the amplitude of the N400, a negative component elicited
by every open class word, which appears around 250 ms, peaks at about 400 ms, and lasts
until approximately 550 ms following the onset of the word. More recent work [186, 88, 82]
has suggested that the left superior temporal cortex is one of the main sources of the N400.
Therefore, the M350 and the N400 might share neuronal generators in left temporal cortex.
By contrast, the ERFs elicited by coercing nouns seem to be best accounted for using sources
in ventromedial prefrontal cortex [173]. This anterior midline field (AMF) is more sensitive
to coercion, and less to semantic anomaly, and vice versa for the left temporal field.
1.1.3. The present ERP study. The studies just reviewed show that coercing expressions
give rise to some form of on-line enriched composition. However, connecting these findings
to current knowledge of the processing mechanisms (as opposed to the functional anatomy)
of language in the brain is problematic. That is because a sizable portion of that knowledge
comes from ERP studies, whereas there currently is no EEG work on complement coercion.
Linking the MEG findings of Pylkka¨nen and McElree [173] to the ERP literature on semantic
processing is quite possible, but not straightforward.
It is becoming increasingly clear that the N400 [117] is not the whole story as far as the
neurophysiological correlates of semantic integration are concerned. Still, the N400 remains
a reliable measure of semantic processing load and an important term of comparison when
brain correlates of different aspects of semantic composition are sought. Thus, experiments
investigating enriched composition would benefit from being able to directly compare the
responses evoked by, say, complement coercion with a standard N400. Such a comparison
is possible on the basis of MEG data only indirectly. In particular, source reconstructions of
ERF data may be consistent with several patterns of ERP effects. Coercing and anomalous
nouns modulate responses at different MEG sources, and this arguably implies functional
differences between processing semantic anomalies and complement coercions. However,
AMF modulations were reported only very recently [173], they do not seem to surface with
equal strength across subjects and experimental paradigms [173, 11], and they are not found
in all putative cases of enriched composition, such as concealed questions [85]. ERPs afford
a direct comparison with the well-established N400, hence they may provide more reliable
evidence for/against a functional dissociation between processing semantic anomalies and
complement coercions.
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2. Method
2.1. Participants. Twenty-one right-handed native speakers of English (9 women, age
range 18-34) participated in the ERP study. Varieties of English spoken by subjects included
American, Canadian, Australian and British dialects. Participants had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision, and no history of neurological or behavioral disorders. Subjects were paid
for taking part in the study. Three subjects (1 woman) were left out of the final analysis due
to a high number (> 20%) of trials contaminated by artifacts.
2.2. Materials. The set of materials consisted of 159 triplets like the following:
Coercing: The journalist began the article before his coffee break.
Anomalous: The journalist astonished the article before his coffee break.
Neutral: The journalist wrote the article before his coffee break.
The coercing verbs used and their frequencies within the stimulus set were: begin (15), finish
(27), start (25), try (19), attempt (3), master (12), endure (6), complete (20), enjoy (28), manage (1)
and resist (3) (see [137, 205, 204] for similar choices). From the original set of 159 triplets, 3
test versions were constructed, each containing 53 items per condition.
Each version included also 150 fillers, identical across versions. Fillers were sentences
of varying structure, content and length, and included coercing and anomalous sentences
with the critical VP in different positions in the sentence structure. Coercing and anomalous
fillers were added so that readers could not anticipate where in the sentence they would
encounter the coercing or anomalous noun. Each participant read 159 critical sentences (53
per condition) and 150 fillers.
The default event sense associated with each coercing VP was determined using a fill-
in-the-blank questionnaire administered to 25 subjects, with 160 items like: ’The journalist
began ——— the article before his coffee break’. Conflating synonyms and near-synonyms,
on average 75% of the respondents selected the same event sense, which was then used as
the verb in the corresponding neutral items.
A second pre-test was aimed at matching verbs’ mean frequencies across conditions.
Using the CELEX English corpus [4], lemma frequencies per million words were as follows:
coercing, 314.7; anomalous, 255; neutral, 299.8 (all comparisons using T -tests, P > 0.05).
Word-form frequencies per million words were: coercing, 31.1; anomalous, 26.6; neutral,
23.6 (all comparisons using T -tests, P > 0.05). Verb length was matched across conditions:
coercing, 6.74; anomalous, 6.52; neutral, 6.44 (all comparisons using T -tests, P> 0.05).
A third pre-test was carried out to match the cloze probabilities of the object nouns
in neutral and coercing sentences. The cloze probability of a particular word is defined as
the frequency with which it occurs in the overall response set at a particular position in a
sentence. A fill-in-the-blank test was administered to 40 participants, using 159 sentences
per condition: ’The journalist began the ———’ or ’The journalist wrote the ———’. Nouns
were selected for use in the ERP stimuli that were equiprobable in the neutral and coercing
cases based on the survey results. The mean cloze probabilities after adjustment were 0.061
for the coercing and 0.086 for the neutral condition (T -test, P > 0.05). Cloze probabilities
were 0 for the anomalous case: nouns (such as ‘article’ following ‘The journalist astonished
the’) were strongly dispreferred and therefore likely to be processed as anomalous.
2.3. Procedure. After applying the electrodes (see 2.4), participants were conducted
into the experimental booth and were asked to sit in front of the video monitor. Subjects
were given written instructions asking them to avoid eye blinks and movements during the
presentation of the stimuli. They were also directed to read the sentences carefully and were
informed that the experimenter would ask them some questions at the end of the session.
Stimulus sentences were presented one word at a time for 300 ms per word, followed by
300 ms of blank screen before the onset of the next word. Words were presented in white
on a black background in the center of the screen. After 1000 ms of blank screen following
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the offset of the last word of each sentence, an asterisk mark appeared for 1500 ms, during
which subjects were allowed to blink.
2.4. Recording. EEG and EOG signals were recorded using Ag/AgCl electrodes. The
EOG was measured from 4 electrodes: one at the outer canthus of each eye, one below and
one above (Fp1) the left eye. The EEG was measured from 28 electrodes, arranged according
to American Electrophysiological Society conventions: Fp1, Fp2, F7, F3, Fz, F4, F8, FC5,
FC1, FCz, FC2, FC6, T7, C3, Cz, C4, T8, CP5, CP1, CP2, CP6, P7, P3, Pz, P4, P8, O1, O2.
Two additional electrodes were placed on the left and right mastoids, the former serving
as the reference during the measurement. All EEG and EOG electrodes were re-referenced
off-line to a linked mastoid. EEG electrodes were attached to an elastic cap, whereas EOG
and reference electrodes were applied using two-sided adhesive decals external to the cap.
Electrode impedance was kept below 5 kΩ throughout the experiment. The EEG/EOG was
amplified by a multichannel BrainAmp DC system, with a 500 Hz sampling rate, a low pass
filter set at 100 Hz and a 10 s time constant.
2.5. Data analysis. EEG data were analyzed using the MATLAB package FieldTrip.1
The following transforms were applied to each subject’s dataset. Segments corresponding
to the determiner and the noun were extracted from the raw EEG with an interval of 200
ms preceding and 1000 ms following stimulus onset. Baseline correction used the 200 ms
interval preceding the onset of the stimulus. Artifact rejection was based on two FieldTrip
functions: the first detects and rejects all trials that contain activity exceeding a threshold
of ±100 µV ; the second identifies and discards trials contaminated with eye movements
or blinks by means of thresholding the z-transformed value of the raw data in the EOG
channels, preprocessed using a band-pass filter of 1-15 Hz.
For the analysis of ERPs, a 30 Hz low-pass digital filter was applied to the segmented,
artifact-free data. ERPs were obtained for each participant by averaging over trials in each
experimental condition. A 5 Hz low-pass filter was used to produce the waveforms shown
in figure 1. Topographical plots and statistical analyses of ERP data are however based on
the 30 Hz low-pass filtered data.
To test for significant differences between conditions in the time windows of interest,
we performed repeated measures ANOVA with two within-subject factors: Experimental
Condition (Coercing/Control/Anomalous) and Electrode Site (28 levels, one for each scalp
electrode). For the contrasts between condition pairs, a similar analysis was conducted, in
which the factor Experimental Condition had two levels only. ANOVAs were carried out
in two time windows: 300-500 ms, corresponding to the latency of the N400; and 700-1000
ms, based upon a visual inspection of ERP waveforms (see below).
To characterize the temporal profiles of the ERP effects elicited by coercing, anomalous
and neutral nouns, we used a non-parametric randomization procedure [129, 130] which
uses mean amplitude (µV ) values in each condition for time bins of 100 ms, starting from
the onset of the critical word and ending 1000 ms after. The outcome is a number (possibly
0) of clusters of electrodes in which differences between two conditions are significant in
each time bin, the sum of T-statistics in that cluster, and Monte Carlo estimates of P-values.
3. Results
An inspection of ERP waveforms elicited by the determiner (data not shown) and the noun
(figure 1) revealed no differences between conditions in the early ERP components such as
the N1 and P2 (in both cases: 0-150 ms, P> 0.1; 150-300 ms, P> 0.1). The ERP modulations
evoked by the determiner do not differ across conditions in later time windows either. This
conclusion is supported by the results of ANOVA statistics on the standard N400 and P600
time windows (data not shown in figure; 300-550 ms, P> 0.1; 550-900 ms, P> 0.1).
1For more information, see http://fieldtrip.fcdonders.nl/
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Differences emerge only around 300 ms following the onset of the critical noun (figure
1). The noun in the anomalous condition elicits a larger N400 compared to the same lexical
item appearing in the control condition. Similarly, the coercing noun evokes what appears
to be a larger N400 (but see below) compared to the control noun. Both effects start around
300 ms following word onset, peak approximately 100 ms later, and have a centro-parietal
distribution as is characteristic of the N400. In both cases, the effect is statistically reliable in
the standard N400 time window: 300-550 ms (table 1). In this interval, there is no significant
difference between the effects evoked by anomalous and coercing nouns.
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FIGURE 1. (a) Grand-average (N=18) topographies displaying the mean
amplitude differences between the ERPs evoked by coercing vs. neutral
nouns and anomalous vs. neutral nouns, in the 300-550 ms and 700-1000
ms regions following noun onset. (b) Grand-average (N=18) waveforms
from frontal, central and parietal electrode sites time locked to the onset
(0 ms) of the noun. Negative values are plotted upward.
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An examination of ERP waveforms (figure 1-b) suggests that brain potentials specific to
coercion, in which the coercing condition differs from both the neutral and the anomalous
cases, surface in a later time window, that starts at about 700 ms from noun onset. Coercing
nouns evoke a negative-going shift with a central scalp distribution (figure 1), lasting until
the end of the epoch (1000 ms). The topography of this negativity resembles that of the ERP
effect evoked by coercing nouns in the 300-550 ms interval (figure 1-a, compare the first and
third plots). This effect is statistically highly significant compared to the control condition
(table 1), and approaches significance compared to the anomalous case (P < 0.1, see below
for a more sensitive test using cluster-and-randomization analysis). The difference between
anomalous and control nouns is, in this time interval (700-1000 ms), not significant.
300-550 ms 700-1000 ms
Condition F(1,17)=3.948 * F(1,17)=13.600 ***
Coercing vs. Neutral F(1,17)=4.6245 * F(1,17)=14.925 ***
Anomalous vs. Neutral F(1,17)=4.5411 * F(1,17)=2.8552
Coercing vs. Anomalous F(1,17)=0.0441 F(1,17)=3.7095
Significance codes: p<0.001 ’***’; p<0.01 ’**’; p<0.05 ’*’
TABLE 1. Summary of ANOVA statistics for the ERP analysis.
Due to the resemblance in scalp topography between the earlier and later negativities
evoked by coercion (figure 1-a), as well as to the seemingly continuous negative shift in the
waveforms (figure 1-b), it may be suggested that the earlier ERP shift persists as a sustained
negativity until the end of the epoch, or that the N400 effects evoked by downstream words
are also larger. Cluster-and-randomization analyses indicate that this is most probably the
case: anomalous nouns, as compared to neutral nouns, give rise to statistically significant
activity over a centro-parietal cluster of electrodes (sites: C3, Cz, CP5, CP1, P3, Pz) limited
to the 300-500 ms interval (see table 2); coercing nouns modulate activity in similar scalp
regions (electrodes: C3, Cz, C4, CP1, CP2, P3, P4), starting at 300 ms and lasting until 1000
ms instead (table 2). The difference between anomalous and coercing nouns was significant
after 700 ms (table 2), providing a more sensitive statistical test than ANOVAs [129, 130]
(compare the Coercion vs. Anomalous contrast in tables 1 and 2).
4. Discussion
Our results support the claim that complement coercion gives rise to definite processing
costs – a claim that is now backed by reading-time, eye tracking, MEG and EEG evidence.
It can therefore be concluded that, with respect to neutral items, coercing sentences require
additional computations (whatever their exact nature), as is shown by reliable differences
in the Coercion vs. Neutral contrasts. Furthermore, the insertion of an additional semantic
element (corresponding to the silent activity) in coercing constructions leads to downstream
unification costs, as is shown by the Coercion vs. Anomalous contrast in later regions. The
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ERP correlates of coercion differ from those of semantic anomaly in their temporal profile
at least. None the less, it cannot be concluded that there is a qualitative difference between
the sustained negativity evoked by coercion and the N400 elicited by anomaly, because the
former could also be taken as a sequence of N400 effects evoked by the coercing noun and
more downstream words. But it does seem that this negative shift should be attributed to
coercion, because it can hardly be explained by other factors, like the repetition of coercing
verbs across stimulus sentences. It was shown by Rugg [182] that repeated words evoke an
early (200 ms) transient negativity and a later, topographically widespread and temporally
sustained positive shift. Consistently with these findings, Bresson et al. [12] reported that
repetition reduced the amplitude and shortened the duration of the N400 component. Our
study revealed rather the opposite pattern of effects.
Coercing vs. Neutral Anomalous vs. Neutral Coercing vs. Anomalous
300-400 ms T(16)=-54.874 ** T(16)=-37.412 *
400-500 ms T(16)=-61.287 ** T(16)=-34.018 *
500-600 ms T(16)=-52.658 **
600-700 ms T(16)=-50.151 *
700-800 ms T(16)=-44.456 * T(16)=-20.135 *
800-900 ms T(16)=-53.645 ** T(16)=-35.419 **
900-1000 ms T(16)=-64.083 ** T(16)=-63.260 **
Significance codes: p<0.01 ’**’; p<0.05 ’*’
TABLE 2. Summary of cluster-and-randomization statistics for the ERP
analysis. The first significant effects occurred at 300-400 ms. Empty cells
denote the absence of significant clusters.
4.1. Simple and enriched composition. In this chapter we have presented ERP data
that, in line with earlier reading-time, eye-tracking and MEG studies, suggest that enriched
semantic composition is involved in processing sentences in which verbs like begin are used
transitively with two NP arguments, like in ’The journalist began the article’. It therefore
seems that the neural reality of complement coercion, which has now been established with
MEG [173] and EEG, challenges linguistic theories that analyze these constructions in a
strictly compositional manner [172] (see also chapter 3).
Theories exist that model the coercion process in a non-compositional manner, where
world knowledge is involved alongside syntax and lexical semantics. One such proposal is
based on unification, a mechanism adopted by several linguistic accounts of syntactic and se-
mantic structure assembly [106, 221, 212]. Equally viable approaches have been developed
that do not rely explicitly on unification [171, 98], but what makes that concept appealing
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here is that accounts of language processing inspired by neurobiology are trying to bridge
the gap between linguistics and neuroscience by means of the notion of unification [71, 72].
Complement coercion can be described in a unification-based theory of tense, aspect and
event structure, and that is the Event Calculus [212] applied in earlier chapters. The reader
may recall that the formalism is type-free, and is therefore alternative to analyses based on
types and type-shifting [171], which earlier experimental research on complement coercion
made reference to [137, 205, 204, 136].
In the Event Calculus, the verb ’begin’ and its synonyms are represented by the clause
Initiates(start,a, t), which means that a starting event (start) initiates the activity a at time t.
The variable a has to be unified with material provided by the context or world knowledge,
that is, a VP (a = write) or a nominalized event (a = meeting). This formalism attractive also
due its cognitive plausibility, discussed in greater detail in [212]. Semantic representations
for VPs and the unification operation find their motivation in an hypothesized evolutionary
connection between the semantics of tense, aspect and event structure on the one hand, and
planning on the other [191] (chapter 1). The Event Calculus is in fact a planning formalism,
which has been applied in the design of intelligent agents in robotics, and to the semantics
of temporal expressions in linguistics [212, 83]. Three arguments justify our preference for
unification over type-shifting as a framework in which to try to make sense of our ERP data:
a connection with the notions of unification and binding in neuroscience [71, 72], cognitive
plausibility through a link with planning and an ontology that does not involve types, and
success in modeling linguistic phenomena.
It should be emphasized that the ERP data reported here do not favor unification over
alternative accounts of coercion such as Putesjovsky’s [171] type-shifting notion, nor was
the present ERP study designed to verify predictions suggested by the unification model.
However, and conversely, the unification framework can be used to shed some light on our
ERP data. The Event Calculus, in particular, suggests that coercing sentences require more
complex unification operations than neutral sentences, as an extra inference step has to be
made in order to unify the variable a with a plausible activity. The goal of this (abductive)
inference step is precisely to find out an activity that fits semantically the given discourse
context. As can be seen, unification formalizes the traditional notion of integration of lexical
items into a sentence or a discourse model. Therefore, to the extent that the N400 effect can
be regarded as a signature of semantic integration (see below), the N400-like shift elicited by
the coercing noun may be associated with the more complex, inference-driven unification
leading to a richer event structure. The sustained negativity, or the sequence of N400 effects
involving also more downstream words, could reflect difficulty in integrating lexical items
following the noun into a more complex semantic representation of the unfolding sentence.
The type-shifting account formalizes the traditional notion of integration in different terms,
but in this case it may not lead to an entirely different account of the data.
4.2. Enriched composition and lexico-semantic anomaly. Pylkka¨nen and McElree cor-
rectly remark that the nature of the N400 as an index of integration difficulty has so far not
been demonstrated [173]. Experimental evidence points in the direction of two competing
accounts: the first, which postulates that the N400 is directly correlated with the difficulty in
integrating the meaning of the upcoming word in the sentence model [208, 209, 79, 155, 52,
81, 148, 127]; the second, which proposes the N400 is inversely correlated with the amount
of pre-activation a word receives from the preceding context [117, 118, 216, 217, 93, 76, 47,
115, 35]. It is important to avoid setting up a false opposition, because these two accounts
merely highlight different processes that may underlie the generation of the N400, but are
in no way alternative and mutually exclusive theories. In fact, a unified view that fits most
data seems conceivable, in which different roles are assigned to each cerebral hemisphere:
predictive semantic coding is a left hemisphere mechanism, whereas the right hemisphere
contribution is strictly postlexical in nature, thus contributing to the integration of word
meanings, that is, to unification [47, 115, 75].
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Within this unified framework for the N400, our ERP data seem to favor an explanation
based on integration. In particular, if the N400-like negativity elicited by the coercing noun
were to be accounted for in terms of lexical pre-activation, then it seems the unification story
sketched above (or any other interpretation based on integration, for that matter) should be
abandoned. According to the pre-activation view, the amplitude of the N400 component is
inversely correlated with the amount of lexico-semantic priming a word receives from the
preceding sentence or discourse context [47, 115]. One driving factor behind pre-activation
is semantic relatedness, so ’article’ should be pre-activated more strongly by the fragment
’The journalist wrote the’ as compared to ’The journalist astonished the’ and ’The journalist
began the’. However, the cloze probability data reported in section 2.2 indicate that there is
very little difference between neutral (’the journalist wrote the’) and coercing (’the journalist
began the’) contexts as far as the expectancy of the noun ’article’ is concerned. This seems to
challenge an account of the ERP correlates of coercion that is based on lexical pre-activation
alone. As a result, it lends some plausibility to the integration/unification view.
As we noted above, complement coercion requires inferring a plausible event sense
based on world knowledge, and integrating that (via unification or type-shifting) into the
event structure of the VP began the article. This process appears to be non-compositional,
and has two brain correlates: (a) a modulation at sources different from those that generate
the N400, as the AMF data by Pylkka¨nen and McElree [173] show; (b) a modulation of the
N400 at the coercing noun and more downstream regions, leading to a sustained negative
shift. Our experiment does not license the conclusion that the neural processes underlying
enriched composition are qualitatively distinct from those supporting standard semantic
composition and the processing of semantic anomalies. We did find a specific ERP effect of
coercion, but this differed from a standard N400 only in duration: a sustained negativity, or
a sequence of N400s to downstream words was found, with a similar scalp distribution as
a standard N400 effect. Therefore, contrary to what one might have expected on the basis
of the MEG study, the ERP data did not distinguish between anomaly and coercion in the
typical N400 window, which is the time interval in which the AMF was found (350-500 ms).
Based on the data available so far, it is impossible to say how exactly, if at all, the AMF, the
N400 and the sustained negativity evoked by coercion could be related. Further MEG, EEG
and possibly fMRI studies into enriched composition seem necessary to address this issue.
Additional experimental testing might also be useful to address the conjecture, proposed by
Pylkka¨nen and McElree [173], that the physiologic responses specific to coercion (the AMF
in their report) may be generated in medial prefrontal cortices, which have been associated
with perspective taking and inferring others’ mental states. The interpretation of coercing
sentences, and the abductive inference to find out a plausible activity, might involve taking
the perspective of the agent depicted in the sentence (that is, the journalist). EEG data might
reveal whether the N400 is sensitive to varying degrees of complexity in perspective taking
during sentence processing, and fMRI data might give us a more precise picture of the brain
structures recruited by non-compositional meaning assembly.
To conclude, together with the ERP results reported in chapter 5, these data provide
some evidence that the brain computes and updates models of the input in an incremental,
yet non-monotonic and non-compositional manner. Negative shifts in the ERPs, N400s as well
as slower potentials, constitute valuable on-line measures of such processes.
Conclusions
As stated in the foreword, the aim of this book was to combine theoretical and experimental
investigations on meaning processing at the sentence and discourse levels. It is now time to
stand back, consider how the resulting picture looks like, and what are its implications for
research in linguistics and neuroscience. In this final section we will first provide a synthesis
of current knowledge of semantic computation in the human brain, with some emphasis on
the hypotheses and results reported in previous chapters. Next we will introduce problems
to be addressed in future work, and take a few steps towards a neurobiology of meaning.
One source of difficulty in providing a systematic account of semantic computation is
due to immediacy and its corollary incrementality. These two principles are well-established
in psycholinguistic research, but they are notoriously hard to formalize. The notion that the
system handles first the information that becomes available first implies that each utterance,
and not just each sentence, is processed differently. This makes any attempt of generalizing
over the processing steps involved in computing complex meanings particularly hard. The
temporal and logical dependencies of unifications in phonology, morpho-syntax, semantics
and pragmatics are indeed utterance-dependent. For instance, the different positions of the
temporal adverbial in
(1) a. Last sunday Vincent painted the window frames of his country house.
b. Vincent painted the window frames of his country house last sunday.
are likely to have an effect on how temporal constraints are set up and solved, and therefore
may lead to different ERP responses. However, ERP components define temporal windows
in which processes of the same type occur routinely. It is on these regularities that theories
of language processing should focus. This would allow us to address three basic questions:
(a) What are the goals of computation in semantic structure assembly? (b) What is retrieved
from semantic memory given the input? (c) How does computation take place? The reader
may recognize (a) and (b) as Marr level-1 (computational) issues, and (c) as an instance of a
level-2 (algorithmic) issue.
Our answer to (a) is that brain systems compute, and incrementally update, a minimal
model of the input. The definition of minimality adopted here relies heavily upon the work
by Stenning, van Lambalgen and Hamm [212, 196], and is based on closed world reasoning
in logic programming (negation as failure) and program completion as a means of deriving
minimal models. Other notions of minimality are available, for example in the framework
of Optimality Theory and Harmonic Grammar [7, 188]. If these different definitions lead to
different processing predictions, it makes sense to treat them as testable hypotheses on the
nature of semantic representations in the brain. Additional, and possibly crucial constraints
may be suggested by knowledge of the biophysical implementation of discourse models as
equilibrium states of the cortical networks involved in computing complex meanings [72].
Regardless of the details concerning the proper definition of minimality, it seems necessary
to postulate that the brain resorts to some minimization procedure for obtaining discourse
models: language understanding is not based on all models of what is said, for if that were
the case, human working memory capacity would soon be exceeded for even the simplest
of utterances. ERP data that speak to this problem, however indirectly, have been presented
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in chapter 5. Further research is needed to understand what minimization mechanisms the
brain actually employs, what kind of information is left out of minimal models, and why.
Our answer to (b) is somewhat less dependent on ERP results. The reader may wonder
why our discussion of semantic processing in the brain does not start with hypotheses on
the nature of elementary representations stored in memory. Here a different approach was
chosen. Processing predictions were derived from formal semantic theories, and these are
typically more focused on sentences and discourses than on the lexicon. That explains why
we had not much to say about lexical processes. In a way, however, the choice of unification
as a basic combinatory mechanism does suggest a particular view of stored representations
as constraint-based data structures. This notion is explicit in chapter 4. Just like the binding
of foot and root nodes in Vosse and Kempen [221], the unification of temporal variables that
takes place during tense processing is best treated as a constraint-solving task. Constraints
are essential for computing with languages that involve variables and individual constants.
However, there is more to atomic semantic data structures than constraints in the formal
sense, and that is conceptual content. Lexical meanings must include constraints, that code
for dependencies between denotations of different parts of speech (individuals, times etc.),
and predicates, representing the features that jointly constitute the conceptual content of an
expression. The language of the Event Calculus makes this distinction too.
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FIGURE 2. Grand-average waveforms displaying ERP effects correlated
with semantic complexity. (a) Left Anterior Negativity: dotted line, verb
tense violation; continuous line, control (chapter 4). (b) N400: continuous
line, lexico-semantically unrelated word; dotted line, control (chapter 5).
(c) Sustained Anterior Negativity: dotted line, semantic recomputation;
continuous line, control (chapter 5).
Let us now address (c), and see how the proposed theory accounts for known language-
related ERP effects. Within the first 200 ms following the moment at which a stimulus word
impinges on the peripheral visual or auditory systems, physical changes in the environment
are recognized as linguistic input. Within the following 200 ms, neural activation spreads to
temporal cortices, activating phonologic, syntactic and semantic representations associated
with the input. Retrieved meanings are necessarily partial structures (chapter 3), although
selection mechanisms are still largely unknown. ERP data (figure 2-a) suggest that, during
this time interval (≈ 200-400 ms from stimulus onset) the system tries to satisfy constraints
that are bound to morphological features of words, such as word category, tense, case, num-
ber, and gender. As we have argued in chapter 4, regardless of the level at which processing
occurs in these cases (possibly at that of word form, rather than semantic representations),
the LAN demonstrates that semantic constraints set up by the preceding material are taken
into account when processing each incoming word. This shows that some form of semantic
computation involving variables or individual constants (e.g. for time instants or intervals)
takes place within the first 400 ms from stimulus onset.
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Once morphologically-bound constraints (word category, agreement etc.) are satisfied,
aspects of semantic computation involving predicates (conceptual content) become more
prominent. Between 300 and 500 ms from stimulus onset, the system tries to unify semantic
features across parts of speech. This can be seen as a second-order unification of properties,
analogous to the first-order unification of variables or constants (regimented by constraints)
that sets on around 200 ms from word onset. The N400 (figure 2-b) is an electrophysiological
marker of these processes. For instance, in the context of the fragment ‘The girl was writing
a letter when her friend spilled coffee on the’, the word ‘tablecloth’ evokes a larger N400 as
compared to ‘paper’. This might be because ‘paper’ is semantically quite related to ‘writing
a letter’, so some feature in its lexical representation can be easily unified with some other
feature in the representation of the VP. This cannot be done (so easily) for ‘tablecloth’, hence
the larger N400. Consider another example: the word ‘article’ in the three different contexts
‘The journalist wrote/began/astonished the’. Unification of higher-order properties seems
easier for ‘article’ following the fragment ‘The journalist wrote the’ as compared to the other
two cases, because there seems to be very little in the meaning of ‘begin’ and ‘astonish’ that
is shared with ‘article’. These unification attempts might involve a word and its preceding
sentence or discourse context (as in the cases just considered), world knowledge, perceptual
input delivered from other modalities, co-speech gestures etc. – recall the various situations
considered in chapter 3. The N400 effect suggests that the brain tries to construct a semantic
representation in which features are connected across constituent expressions. In our theory,
this is achieved by repeated applications of unification. Modulations of the N400 amplitude
are produced when unifications are harder to compute, or more unifications are required to
arrive at a discourse model.
Toward the end of the N400 time window (around 550 ms), the current minimal model
has been updated with information brought about by the relevant content word. The bulk
of the computation so far has been semantic, except for the early processing stages in which
morphological information is also prominent. Syntactic unification might also occur before
≈ 550 ms. However, the P600 shows that disrupting syntactic processing, if only temporarily
as in garden-path constructions, has somewhat later consequences (550-900 ms). This might
be taken to suggest [201] that syntactic unification is a relatively late process, which secures
the unifications proposed by the semantics. This stands in contrast with the received picture
of language processing (syntax first, semantics next), but it does fit with important ERP data
such as the ‘semantic attractions’ [111] discussed in chapter 3. In approximately the same
time lapse (≈ 400-800 ms), another set of operations takes the unifications proposed by the
semantics as input, but this time with a different purpose – evaluating the consequences of
unification for the discourse model. Here inference processes come to the fore, and possible
ERP signatures may be the SFN (sentence-final negativity) of chapter 4, the SAN (sustained
anterior negativity) of chapter 5 (figure 2-c), and the prolonged negative shift of chapter 6.
These are different effects physiologically (as is testified by different temporal profiles and
scalp distributions) and, as a consequence, functionally. However, they all seem to support
processes that belong to the same family, namely a late, global adjustment of the discourse
model so as to fully and consistently represent the input. It remains unclear whether such
processes can also take place in the N400 time window, and if so, to what extent. This relates
to the fundamental issue whether the N400 is the only ERP index of semantic processing in
the brain, and sustained negativities are rather an effect of working memory or attentional
resources modulated by the task. Further research is necessary to address this issue.
The picture just presented makes a distinction between three, partly overlapping time
windows in which functionally distinct processes take place. From 200 to 400 ms following
word onset, attempts are made to satisfy the constraints set up by morphologically-bound
features. Here semantics comes into play whenever word forms have to be evaluated based
on the preceding semantic material, as is the case for tense violations. These processes can
be modeled along the lines of the agreement check of Vosse and Kempen [221], which takes
the form of feature matching in morpho-syntax (e.g. case) and the unification of individual
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variables occurring in semantic constraints (tense). This early processing stage is indexed
in the ERPs by (E)LANs. Between 300 and 550 ms, higher-order semantic features of words
are accessed, and attempts are made at connecting these across retrieved lexical structures.
This process can be modeled as the unification of predicates and variables of a different sort
than individuals (e.g. fluents). The N400 indexes complexity at this intermediate processing
stage. From 400 to 900 ms, the outcome of first-pass semantic unification is handed over to
two, seemingly parallel (given temporal overlap in the ERPs), yet interacting, components.
The first validates the first-pass semantic input by unifying syntactic frames. Whenever this
is not straightforward, or not at all feasible, as when there is a conflict between the proposed
semantic input and the permissible syntactic unifications, a P600 is produced. The second
validates the first-pass semantics by adjusting the message-level representation. If difficulty
is caused by this set of operations, as when a full event sense is integrated into the model, or
when the model is recomputed, a sustained negativity will be observed. Compositionality
(informational encapsulation, chapter 3) is a hypothesis about the constraints holding at the
interface between the lexico-semantic component and the syntactic component. In terms of
ERPs, this bears on the relations between N400 and P600. Monotonicity can then be seen as
a hypothesis on the computations allowed within the discourse-semantic component.
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While early-stage processes can be accounted for in a purely feed-forward architecture,
a recurrent network is necessary for implementing operations at later stages. Therefore, the
full computational capacity of the neocortex – which is characterized by massive recurrent
connections – really comes into its own only later than≈ 300 ms after the onset of a linguistic
stimulus. This interval contains all language-related ERP components, like the N400, P600
and SAN. As a consequence, it seems any neural account of these effects should be based on
an application of the recurrent architecture. Recent work using Dynamic Causal Modeling
seems to point in that direction too [63]. Recurrent and attractor networks were mentioned
on several occasions in earlier chapters. Let us now look at a simple recurrent network that
can be taken as a launch pad for future research. Minimally, a network that sets out to model
N400, P600 and SAN should include two sub-systems: a storage component, modeling the
function of left temporal cortex; and a computation component, modeling the function of
left inferior frontal cortex. This should allow us to describe the balance and the interactions
between storage and computation (chapter 3) or, using Hagoort’s [72] terminology, between
memory and unification.
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Our toy network is constituted by 500 leaky integrate-and-fire neurons, organized into
four recurrent memory modules [126] (see figure 3-b for a simple 4-neuron module). These
are grouped into two components: one (1 module of 100 excitatory neurons) stores learned
patterns that range from intra-sentential syntactic templates to discourse structures such as
logical arguments or narratives; the other (2 modules of 150 excitatory neurons each, and 1
module of 100 inhibitory interneurons) computes the stable states of the network given the
input and patterns stored in the first component. Future modeling work should extend and
refine a recurrent network of this kind so that it can yield theoretical curves comparable to
independent components (as opposed to whole waveforms) extracted from ERPs. The key
task and foremost challenge is to adjust the scale of the network’s output dimensions to that
of observable ERP quantities (microvolt and milliseconds), and realistically constrain their
orders of magnitude. This could be done by increasing the degree of physiological realism
of the network, for instance adding neurons to each module, fine-tuning time constants, and
changing the network’s architecture based on fMRI data and cytoarchitectonic constraints
on neocortical organization. The superficial resemblance between the network’s activation
landscape (figure 3-b) and the SAN profile (figure 2-c) conceals the heterogeneity between
biophysical ERP quantities and arbitrary scales in the network output. However, recurrent
networks exhibiting fixed-point dynamics seem to meet both top-down requirements (they
are suitable for approximating the semantic operators that compute minimal models [91])
and bottom-up requirements (they are plausible models of prefrontal cortex function [43]).
Therefore, they are a promising platform for modeling language-related ERP effects.
In this book we have tried to lay down a path that connects semantics to neuroscience,
from the philosophical and methodological considerations of chapter 1, via an examination
of the processing consequences of formal semantic principles in chapters 2-3 and the ERP
data of chapters 4-6, to the conjectures on recurrent networks presented above. There would
be little point in arguing that this solves any of the problems associated with meaning and
the brain, or that the proposed picture is accurate and complete. Nonetheless, what can be
concluded is that bridging theories and processing data in the study of meaning is possible.
Assuming a unified perspective is an asset, it is useful to devise an integrative methodology,
sufficiently explicit to function as a guide in day-to-day work. Here methodological choices
(essentially Marr’s scheme, plus several add-ons specific to the task at hand) were brought
to the fore since the first chapter, and applied in an almost step-by-step fashion throughout
the remaining chapters. Cognitive science has been characterized by intense philosophical
and conceptual debates since the very beginning, and current imaging-aided neuroscience
has inherited some of that attitude. The studies presented here build upon this established
feat of the behavioral and brain sciences, and contribute to keeping it alive and prominent in
times when the proliferation of theories and experimental results may give the impression
that there is little need for questioning the foundations of and divisions within the field.
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Samenvatting
Het is duidelijk dat de hersenen ons in staat stellen te communiceren. Wat minder duidelijk
is, is hoe de hersenen precies taal verwerken. Dit boek gaat over de opbouw van complexe
betekenissen in het intacte menselijke brein. Om dit te onderzoeken, hebben we modellen
uit de formele logica gecombineerd met experimentele methoden uit de neurofysiologie.
Daarbij was de vraag hoe mensen tijd, aspect en gebeurtenisstructuur in taal begrijpen het
uitgangspunt.
In het eerste deel van het boek, ’From semantics to neuroscience’, beschrijven we hoe
de semantiek – in het bijzonder de principes van compositionaliteit en monotoniciteit – kan
worden gecombineerd met fysiologische metingen zoals ERPs (event-related potentials). In
hoofdstuk 1, komt ons onderzoeksplan hiervoor aan de orde. Tevens biedt hoofdstuk 1 een
overzicht van de meeste empirische vragen die in hoofdstukken 2-6 worden besproken. Dit
hoofdstuk is filosofisch en methodologisch van aard. Het bespreekt de redenen waarom
de verschillende disciplines die betekenis onderzoeken, tot nu toe van elkaar gescheiden
waren. We suggereren dat de formele semantiek ons in staat stelt het aantal voorspellingen
over taalverwerking te beperken. Voorbeelden van deze methodologie worden gegeven in
hoofdstukken 1, 2 en 3. Tegelijkertijd kunnen experimentele resultaten worden gebruikt om
semantische theoriee¨n te verbeteren.
In het tweede deel van het boek, ’The electrophysiology of meaning’, beschrijven we
drie ERP-experimenten naar het begrijpen van taal. Deze experimenten waren opgezet om
de voorspellingen op basis van de formele analyses uit het eerste deel van het proefschrift
te testen. Het eerste experiment (hoofdstuk 4) laat zien dat schendingen van tijdsvorm een
negatief ERP effect veroorzaken tussen de 200 en 400 milliseconden na het verschijnen van
het werkwoord. Dit effect wijst erop dat de opbouw van betekenissen sterk incrementeel
is. In het tweede experiment (hoofdstuk 5), onderzochten we werkwoordelijk aspect. Hier
we laten zien dat ERP-resultaten verenigbaar zijn met de niet-monotonische theorie van de
’imperfective paradox’ die in hoofdstuk 2 wordt beschreven. We vonden een negatief ERP
effect tussen de 400 en 800 milliseconden na het kritieke woord, die was het sterkst over de
elektroden in het frontale gebied. We verklaren dit ERP effect in termen van herberekening
van betekenis. Ten slotte, in het derde experiment (hoofdstuk 6) hebben we ’complement
coercion’ onderzocht. We vonden hier bewijs dat er sprake is van een verrijkte semantische
samenstelling in de verwerking van gebeurtenisstructuren. Hier tonen de ERP-resultaten
een negatief effect die enkele honderden milliseconden duurt. In alle drie de experimenten
waren de ERP-effecten van semantische berekening belangrijk verschillend van een N400,
die vaak verbonden is aan de verwerking van betekenis in de hersenen.
Dit proefschrift laat zien dat een combinatie van formele modellen en experimentele
technieken in het onderzoek naar betekenis van taal waardevol kan zijn. De ERP-resultaten
goed verenigbaar zijn met de theorie van taalverwerking die in het eerste deel is beschreven:
de opbouw van betekenissen in het brein verloopt incrementeel, en is in wisselwerking met
andere niveaus van taalvoorstelling, niet-compositioneel en niet-monotonisch.
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